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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the close of the nineteenth century, American courts
have struggled with the legal dilemmas presented in religious
healing controversies. In particular, judicial opinions reveal
the manner in which state and federal governments have
attempted to satisfy their twin obligations of promoting public
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health and preserving religious liberty.' Likewise, scholars
have wrestled with the place of religious healing in our legal
and medical systems, proposing a variety of measures to
restrict2 or expand3 the legitimate scope of religious healing.
As the end of the twentieth century draws near, however,
the increasingly precarious state of healthcare in the United
States has intensified the debate over the appropriate scope of
religious healing as an alternative to conventional medical
care. Specifically, as one government commission reports,
"[r]apidly rising medical costs are increasing the numbers of
people without health coverage and [are] straining the system's
1. See, e.g., United States v. Article or Device, etc., 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971)
(balancing protection of public from healing device with religious liberty).
2. See, e.g., I.H. RUBENSTEIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW ON CULTS (1948); C.C.
Cawley, Criminal Liability in Faith Healing, 39 MINN. L. REV. 48 (1954); I.H.
Rubenstein, Criminal Aspects of Faith Healing, 224 NEW ENG. J. MED. 239 (1941);
Jonathan Turley, Laying Hands on Religious Racketeers: Applying Civil RICO to
Fraudulent Religious Solicitation, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441 (1988); Ivy B. Dodes,
"Suffer the Little Children . . .": Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of
Reasonable Care Owed Children by Religious Faith Healers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165
(1987); Comment, Quackery in California, 11 STAN. L. REV. 265 (1959); Donna K.
LeClair, Comment, Faith-Healing and Religious-Treatment Exemptions to Child-
Endangerment Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to
Provide Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79 (1987); Wayne
F. Malecha, Comment, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping
the Faith Versus Medical Care for Children, 12 J. OF LEGIs. 243 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Christine A. Clark, Religious Accommodation and Criminal Liability,
17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 559 (1990); Marjorie Heins, 'Other People's Faiths'" The
Scientology Litigation and the Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONsT.
L.Q. 153 (1981); Robert L. Trescher & Thomas N. O'Neill, Medical Care for Dependent
Children . Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 203
(1960); Jenny Brown, Comment, California Penal Code's Child Neglect/Abandonment
Statutes: Religious Freedom or Religious Persecution?, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 613
(1985); Ellen L. Hodgson, Comment, Restrictions on Unorthodox Health Treatment in
California: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 24 UCLA L. REV. 647 (1977); Daniel J.
Kearney, Comment, Parental Failure to Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based
on Religious Beliefs Causing Child's Death-Involuntary Manslaughter in
Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REV. 861 (1986); Paul M. Smith, Comment, Medical Care,
Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of Damages, 87 YALE L.J. 1466 (1978). See also
Steven Schneider, Christian Science and the Law: Room for Compromise?, 1 COLUM.
J. L. & Soc. PROBs. 81 (1965) (noting that Christian Scientists have accommodated
themselves to some laws restricting choice of health treatment); Elizabeth R. Koller,
Note, Walker v. Superior Court: Religious Convictions May Bring Felony Convictions,
21 PAC. L.J. 1069 (1990) (arguing that California Supreme Court decision disallowing
common law reliance on a religious belief in prayer healing as a defense may be
unconstitutional under the religion clauses); Catherine W. Laughran, Comment,
Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice Systerw Some Problems of the Faith
Healer, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 396 (1975) (concluding that judicial leniency toward
parents choosing faith healing for their children is preferred where the law is unclear).
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capacity to provide care for those who cannot pay."4 In addi-
tion, advanced medical technology has been accompanied by
tighter governmental control over healthcare.' Thus,
decreased access to medical treatment combined with increas-
ing healthcare regulation has generated friction over the
appropriate regulation of alternatives to conventional medical
care.6 The regulation of religious healing, in particular, has
recently drawn considerable attention around the nation with
the prosecution of parents who chose religious rather than
medical care for their seriously ill children.7
Accordingly, in light of this struggle to balance public
health with religious liberty, this Article chronicles the evolv-
ing liberties and liabilities of religious patients, parents, and
healers over the course of the twentieth century and examines
the current state of religious healing law. Throughout, it advo-
cates the greatest possible liberty for religious healing consis-
tent with public and family security, as well as advocating
equal protection under the law for all involved in religious
treatment, whether they are members of organized religious
groups or individual practitioners.
Section II begins with a summary of the extensive history
of religious healing in the West and describes how its origins
on these shores precede national independence. It then traces
the development of religious healing in American culture from
the early methods of revivalism, mesmerism, and spiritualism
in the nineteenth century, to more recent forms of religious
healing employed by the Church of Scientology and the New
Age movement. Section II then describes how the increased
interest in religious healing in the twentieth century and the
simultaneous increase in healthcare regulation has led to sig-
nificant conflict over the parameters of the First Amendment
guarantee of religious liberty.
Section III focuses on religious patients, the source of their
right to refuse medical treatment, and the various limitations
4. PEPPER COMMISSION: U.S. BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH CARE, A CALL FOR ACTION, ExEcUmvE SUMMARY 2 (Sept. 1990).
5. See, e.g., irfra part V.B.1 (discussing regulation of drugs and devices).
6. See, e.g., Bill Thompson, Treating Your Sick Child" Are Parents Free to Choose
Alternative Therapies?, EAST WEST, Feb. 1991, at 40. See generally David Eisenberg et
al., Unconventional Medicine in the United States, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 246, 246
(1993) (describing the prevalence, costs, and patterns of use of alternative treatments).
7. James T. Richardson & John DeWitt, Christian Science Spiritual Healing, the
Law, and Public Opinion, 34 J. CHURCH & ST. 749 (1992).
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imposed on this right. This section finds that religious patients
are limited in their right to refuse medical treatment when
there is a clear threat of danger to innocent third parties. Sec-
tion III then describes the various consequences of a patient's
preference for religious treatment over medical care. In partic-
ular, a patient's choice of religious treatment over medical care
may jeopardize his or her recovery for personal injuries and
may cast doubt on his or her competency as a juror or testator.
Finally, Section III concludes that the growing recognition of a
patient's right to control his or her own form of healthcare
supports increased freedom for proponents of religious healing.
Section IV explores religious parents' rights and responsi-
bilities for their children's healthcare. Specifically, this section
describes the expanding scope of government involvement in
compelling medical treatment for children over their parents'
religious objections. This section then details the prosecution
of parents who relied exclusively on religious healing for their
seriously ill child. Section IV concludes that courts should
refrain from interfering with the parent-child relationship
absent life-threatening circumstances accompanied by the
probability-rather than the possibility--of medical cure.
Courts should also be willing to entertain evidence that reli-
gious healing is a reasonable form of treatment for a sick child.
Section V examines the tension between a legitimate gov-
ernment interest in protecting individuals from fraud and the
public's right to practice and receive unorthodox treatment. It
explores various forms of regulation applicable to religious
healers and suggests that courts should liberally construe cur-
rent state statutes to permit religious healers to employ spiri-
tual treatment so long as it is harmless in itself and delivered
in a religious context.
A hypothetical will help to illustrate the variety of legal
dilemmas regarding religious healing that are dealt with in the
following pages:
Parent and Child are driving home one afternoon when
another motorist collides with their vehicle. Both Parent and
Child sustain internal injuries, but they do not go to the hospi-
tal. Parent chooses instead to employ Religious Healer who
treats both patients on a number of occasions using prayer and
other spiritual means.
When State Officials later learn of the accident, they ask
Parent and Child to seek medical care. Parent refuses for him-
1993]
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self and on behalf of Child. State Officials bring court actions
against Parent and Child to compel them both to receive medi-
cal care. State Officials claim that Parent's reliance on reli-
gious healing is evidence that Parent lacks the mental
competence to make decisions of any kind. State Officials also
bring criminal charges against Religious Healer for practicing
medicine without a license.
While these proceedings are pending, Child dies. The
prosecutors charge Parent and Religious Healer with involun-
tary manslaughter. Disillusioned with religious healing, Par-
ent sues Religious Healer for negligence and malpractice. In
addition, Parent sues the motorist for his own and Child's inju-
ries. Unable to return to his former employment as a result of
the accident, Parent also files for disability benefits.
Although a thorough analysis of this fact pattern requires
the remainder of this Article, the most likely results of this
hypothetical litigation may be summarized here. As detailed in
Section III, Parent's rights of religious freedom and privacy
will protect him from being compelled against his will to sub-
mit to medical treatment unless his condition poses a threat to
community health. Parent will not be required to seek medi-
cal care to recover government disability benefits, and a doctor
who forces medical care upon him will be liable for a personal
injury.
In addition, Parent cannot be declared incompetent to con-
duct his affairs simply on the basis of his preference for reli-
gious healing. If Parent loses consciousness altogether,
however, without first making it clear that he objects to subse-
quent medical care, a court might order life-saving treatment
for him. And in Parent's action against the motorist who
caused the accident, the doctrine of avoidable consequences
will bar recovery for any of Parent's complications or suffering
that could have been avoided had he chosen medical rather
than religious treatment.
The decision to employ only religious treatment for Child
has at least two significant legal consequences, as described in
Section IV. First, the court would most probably have com-
pelled life-saving treatment for Child, unless Child were
deemed mature enough to have made the medical decision
independently. Had it not been clear that Child's life was in
danger, however, Parent's choice of religious treatment might
have prevailed, especially in those jurisdictions which statuto-
[Vol. 16:599
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rily provide that affording spiritual treatment alone for chil-
dren does not constitute neglect.
As a second consequence, Parent himself may suffer pros-
ecution when Child dies from injuries sustained in the acci-
dent. If it is determined that a physician could have saved
Child's life, Parent may be convicted of child neglect, child
endangerment, or even some form of homicide. Parent's good
faith reliance on religious healing, however, may help to
reduce or eliminate a prison sentence if he is convicted.
Religious Healer may be more fortunate. As discussed in
Section V, she might escape criminal liability for practicing
medicine without a license because of statutory exceptions to
most state medical licensing acts. The mere fact that she
received compensation for her services will not subject her to
liability. So long as Religious Healer confined her healing
activities to prayer, she need not fear prosecution. But if she
employed other means besides prayer-such as laying-on-
hands, anointing with oil, or other verbal or material aids-her
immunities may vanish. This outcome is even more likely if
she is not closely affiliated with an organized religious group.
Finally, with regard to Parent's tort claim against Reli-
gious Healer, she would not be liable for negligence or mal-
practice even though Parent and Child did not benefit from
her care. In addition, her employment of spiritual means alone
would protect her from liability for negligently causing Child's
death even had she advised Parent against seeking medical
treatment for his child.
Analysis of nine decades of litigation from which the
above conclusions were drawn, together with suggestions con-
cerning future directions in the law, follows an overview of the
place of religious healing and religious liberty in America.
II. RELIGIOUS HEALING AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA:
AN OVERVIEW
[lt has been ultimately recognized by the medical profession
and by the AMA that there is a direct relationship between
spiritual health and physical health.
-David Everhart, Vice-President Administrator,
Johns Hopkins Hospital s
8. Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 221 A.2d 370, 388 (Md. 1966). See also Denise
M. McKee & John N. Chappel, Spirituality and Medical Ptactice, 35 J. FAM. PRACT.
201 (1992).
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Throughout the ages, religious healing has played a signifi-
cant role in world religions.9 This section examines the origins
and development of that role and its impact on the develop-
ment of religious healing in America. This section then
touches briefly on both the importance and difficulty of inter-
preting and preserving the First Amendment's guarantee of
religious liberty in today's diverse society.
It would seem tautological to argue that religion's proper
role is to promote spiritual health. The assertion that religious
practices may directly benefit mental or physical health is
more likely to engender debate. Nonetheless, the combination
of spiritual, mental, and physical healing has played a major
role in religious life around the world. 0 Scholars have even
speculated that it was the experience of suffering, together
with the desire for healing, that first gave rise to the religious
impulse."' In any event, apart from the truth or falsity of such
speculation, that courts and other authorities have recognized
the historical connection between religion and healing is
undeniable.' 2
9. Lawrence E. Sullivan, Healing, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 226 (Mircea
Eliade et al. eds., 1987).
10. "Often the most important figure or symbol in any given religious tradition is
the source of healing." SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 226. In the Christian tradition-
which has dominated American approaches toward religious healing-Jesus's
miraculous cures have served as an indication of his messiahship. Biblical accounts of
Jesus and his apostles healing the sick are numerous. In the four Gospels, Morton
Kelsey has identified "[florty-one distinct instances of physical and mental
healing .. " MORTON T. KELSEY, HEALING AND CHRusTIANrrY IN ANCIENT THOUGHT
AND MODERN TIMES 54, 55-62 (1973). In the New Testament, the power to heal-divine
in origin-is not mediated through Jesus alone. Jesus instructs his disciples to "heal
the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out demons," Matthew 10:8, and the
book of Acts records that the apostles performed numerous cures. In James, church
elders are told that the sick may be cured by anointing them with oil and praying to
the Lord:
If one of you is ill, he should send for the elders of the church, and they must
anoint him with oil in the name of the Lord and pray over him. The prayer of
faith will save the sick man and the Lord will raise him up again; and if he
has committed any sins, he will be forgiven. So confess your sins to one
another, and pray for one another, and this will cure you.
James 5:14-16.
11. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMAS BARTON, RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE AND MEDICAL
PRACTICE 3 (1958); STEFAN ZWEIG, MENTAL HEALERs x (1932).
12. In this regard, one court has noted:
From the earliest recorded times, the care of the sick was undertaken by the
religious organizations. The temples of Saturn, some 4000 years B.C., were
medical schools in their earliest form; in Egypt and Greece the custom of
laying the sick in the precincts of the temples was a national practice. Harun
al-Rashid, Caliph of Baghdad, (763-809 A.D.) attached a hospital to every
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In the Christian tradition, spiritual healing was initially
revered by the early church. Over time, however, authorities
began to downplay its importance. By the fourth century,
Augustine-who remained the major Catholic theologian for
more than a millennium--declared that Christians were no
longer to seek a continuation of the gift of physical healing.
13
At about the same time, another well-known theologian,
Jerome, used the more theological term "save" in the Vulgate
when translating the word "cure."' 4 Unction for healing, at
one time a common Christian practice, was transformed by the
thirteenth century into a sacrament in preparation for death.' 5
During the Reformation, prominent Protestant theologians
also instructed their followers not to expect miracle cures.'
6
Reformers criticized what they considered Roman Catholic
magical practices and questioned the belief that prayer and
other ritual acts would lead to physical healing.
Despite these forces, Christian interest in religious healing
did not disappear. Early American Christians, in particular,
were not unapprised of the relationship between religion and
healing. The roles of minister and doctor were often united in
one person whose charge it was to tend to the spiritual,
mental, and physical ills of the community. Churches founded
the earliest hospitals,' 8 and healing that was not sanctioned by
the Church met with suspicion.' 9
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reports of
cures effected at revival meetings along with the establishment
of "healing homes"-in which various forms of treatment were
combined with prayer-provide evidence of American's contin-
uing faith in the intimate connections involved in healing body,
mind, and soul.20 The spread of Enlightenment theories
regarding the material causation of disease, however, generally
mosque. Christian religious orders founded and maintained hospitals from
the time of Constantine.
Truitt, 221 A.2d at 387 (citing 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 791-92 (11th ed. 1910)).
13. He later repudiated his skepticism. KELSEY, supra note 10, at 184.
14. Id. at 193-94.
15. Id. at 209.
16. Id. at 221.
17. Id.
18. Truitt, 221 A.2d at 387.
19. See, e.g., RECORDS OF SALEM WITCHCRAFT 262-63 (1969) (offer to cure
presented as evidence of witchcraft).
20. David Edwin Harrell, Jr., Divine Healing in Modern American Protestantism,
OTHER HEALERS: UNORTHODOX MEDICINE IN AMERICA 215, 216 (Norman Gevitz, ed.,
1988).
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served to undercut belief in the power of prayer. By the latter
part of the nineteenth century, revivalism--called "the single
most effective healing ritual at [the churches'] disposal"-had
been seriously undermined by "intellectual secularism and
social pluralism."'
l
Despite this undermining effect, other wellsprings of reli-
gious healing arose contemporaneously.22 Beginning around
the middle of the nineteenth century, mesmeric-then called
magnetic--and spiritualist healers gained popularity, encourag-
ing Americans to enter into trancelike or hypnotic states.'
Consequently, many Americans in the latter half of the nine-
teenth century entertained the belief in a metaphysical healing
experience whose explanation lay outside of traditional Chris-
tian theology. Healers entered altered states of consciousness
to transmit healing energies, to divine causes of illness, and to
prescribe remedies.2 4 Mesmerists also induced patients them-
selves into trance states to effect cures.25
Mesmerism and spiritualism, by emphasizing the connec-
tion between healing and mental states, contributed to the sub-
sequent development of the mind-cure religions--Christian
Science and the various forms of New Thought. These "reli-
gions of healthy-mindedness," as William James called them,
gained considerable followings by the beginning of this cen-
tury. 2 6 James even speculated that the mind-cure religions
might some day have as great an impact on popular religion as
had the ReformationY
At the beginning of this century, one New Thought leader
outlined three healing methods-still prominent today-pro-
21. ROBERT C. FULLER, ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE AND AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE
64 (1989) [hereinafter FULLER, ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE I].
22. See generally id.; Robert C. Fuller, The Turn to Alternative Medicine, SECOND
OPINION (Jul. 1992) [hereinafter Fuller, Alternative Medicine II].
23. One court has written that:
Hypnotic techniques have been used since antiquity; healing practices by
priests of ancient Egypt and Greece are striking examples. Trancelike
behavior attributed to "spirit possession" has played a role in Christianity,
Judaism, and in many primitive religions. Miraculous powers ascribed to
witches and the arts of faith healing throughout the ages are probably related
to hypnosis.
People v. Hughes, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (Onondaga Cty. Ct. 1979) (quoting Hypnosis,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 134 (15th ed. 1974)).
24. Fuller, Alternative Medicine II, supra note 22, at 12-15.
25. Id.
26. WILLUAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOuS EXPERIENCE 78 (1982).
27. James wrote as follows: "[Sleeing [mind-cure's] rapid growth in influence, and
its therapeutic triumphs, one is tempted to ask whether it may not be destined ... to
[Vol. 16:599
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moted by mind-curists: (1) pranic or magnetic healing, in
which the healer transmits a vital force to the patient's body,
often through the healer's hands; (2) mental healing, in which
the healer uses direct suggestion or telepathy to communicate
the potent image of perfect health to the patient; and (3) spiri-
tual healing, in which the healer becomes an "instrument or
channel through which flows the Spiritual Healing Force of
the Universe."'
Although their curative theories and methodologies differ
somewhat, New Thought and Christian Science each rely heav-
ily on healing for empirical proof of their validity. One scholar
has observed that "[v]irtually every new American religion of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has offered to prove
itself by empirical and objective standards."'
The mind cure traditions have not been the only religions
in recent times to turn to healing as a demonstration of faith.
Early in this century, Christian interest in divine healing
reawakened. The pentecostal movement, sparked by events at
the Azusa Street Revival in 1906, placed considerable signifi-
play a part almost as great in the evolution of the popular religion of the future as did
those earlier [Reformation] movements in their day." JAMES, supra note 26, at 108.
To what did mind-curists attribute their "therapeutic triumphs?" According to
James, the following testimony of one adherent expresses "the feeling of continuity
with the Infinite Power, by which all mind-cure disciples are inspired." Id. at 101.
The first underlying cause of all sickness, weakness, or depression is the
human sense of separateness from the Divine Energy which we call God. The
soul which can feel and affirm in serene but jubilant confidence, as did the
Nazarene: "I and my Father are one," has no further need of healer, or of
healing. This is the whole truth in a nutshell....
I& at 102.
28. YOGI RIMACHARAKA, THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHIC HEALING 33-34 (1937).
Christian Science authors, on the other hand, have not been as all-inclusive as
Ramacharaka in acknowledging the value of the various mind-cure methods.
Specifically, Christian Scientists decry the use of magnetic and mental healing and rely
on spiritual healing only. See, e.g., Judge Septimus J. Hanna, Christian Science: A
Practical Religion, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION 51, 63 (Clifford P. Smith ed.,
1905). Christian Science founder Mary Baker Eddy explained that Christian Science
healing arises from realization of the patient's true spiritual nature. Eddy wrote as
follows:
There is no life, truth, intelligence, nor substance in matter. All is infinite
Mind and its infinite manifestation, for God is All-in-all. Spirit is immortal
truth; matter is mortal error. Spirit is the real and eternal; matter is the
unreal and temporal. Spirit is God, and man is His image and likeness.
Therefore man is not material; he is spiritual.
MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEYT To THE ScRPrURES 468 (1875).
29. R. LAURENCE MOORE, IN SEARCH OF WHITE CROWS: SPIRITUALISM,
PARAPSYCHOLOGY, AND AMERICAN CULTURE 235 (1977).
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cance on the gift of healing as well as on speaking in tongues.'
The spread of pentecostalism resulted in the formation of the
Assemblies of God, the Church of God, and other enduring
Christian sects. Healing evangelists also attracted national fol-
lowings to their ministries, and mainline churches expressed
interest in exploring the connection between religion and
healing.s
After the relative quiet of the Depression and World War
II years, America entered the "heyday of healing revivalism.""2
Mainline Protestant denominations issued official studies
emphasizing the need for religious healing, and the Vatican
Council II gave renewed support to healing within the Catholic
Church.'I At the grass roots level, the charismatic movement,
with its emphasis on speaking in tongues and miraculous heal-
ings, began sweeping through mainstream American Christian
churches.
The tumultuous years of the 1960s and early 1970s also
saw an increase in the popularity and diversity of non-Chris-
tian forms of religious healing.34 Religions with origins in the
East, Transcendental Meditation for instance, gained consider-
able support promoting the healing effects of meditation and
related ritual practices. 5 The Church of Scientology attracted
a large following extolling the healing virtues of an interactive
process called auditing. Native American forms of religious
30. Interracial and multi-ethnic in scope, the Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles
continued through 1909 and had international reverberations. CATHERINE ALBANESE,
AMERICA: RELIGIONS AND RELIGION 105 (1981).
31. In the first decades of this century, the Reverends Elwood Worcester and
Samuel McComb of the Emmanuel Episcopal Church in Boston founded the
Emmanuel Movement to bring together the healing abilities of clergy and medical
doctors. See generally ELWOOD WORCESTER & SAMUEL McCoMB, RELIGION AND
MEDICINE: THE MORAL CONTROL OF NERvous DISORDERS (1908). Following the
footsteps of the Emmanuel Movement, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ
organized the Commission on Religion and Health in 1923. Primary among the aims of
the Commission were "[t]o show that health of body, mind, and spirit is an essential
concern of religion" and "[t]o discover and demonstrate the distinctive function of
religion in the maintenance, restoration, and improvement of health and emotional
balance." J. SnusorN JUDAH, THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE METAPHYSICAL
MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA 301-02 (1967).
32. Harrell, supra note 20, at 219.
33. KELSEY, supra note 10, at 223, 241-42.
34. See Fuller, Alternative Medicine II, supra note 22, at 11.
35. See generally Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977) (Transcendental
Meditation garnered enough public support in the 1970s to be introduced in public
school system).
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healing also gained increased attention, and the New Age
movement, in which healing plays a central role, took shape.
Many of the new religious movements that have developed
during the past thirty years employ eastern, spiritualist, psy-
chotherapeutic, or shamanic methods of religious healing. To a
greater extent than traditional Christian healers and mind-
curists, these practitioners make use of material and performa-
tive aids to diagnose, prescribe remedies, and cure illness.
Crystals and feathers, chanting and dancing, for example, have
supplemented the better recognized modes of prayer and lay-
ing-on-hands.
Interest in religious healing, revitalized early in this cen-
tury and accelerating in the 1960s, has not subsided today. A
recent study located one hundred thirty religious healing
groups in one suburban New Jersey county alone.' Two soci-
ologists have offered the opinion that religious healing is on
the point of becoming "mainstream" and "seems positioned to
assume a significant role in American culture and modern
medical consumerism. ' '3 The ongoing interest in religious
healing described above has led to significant conflict with
American healthcare regulation over the course of the twenti-
eth century. At the core of the dispute is the constitutional
guarantee of religious liberty.
Religious liberty holds an esteemed position among Amer-
ican values. The first words of the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution set forth the federal policy regard-
ing religion: "Congress shall make no law respecting the estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."'3 These broad prohibitions guard against the twin
dangers of favoritism and hostility by the government toward
one or more religions. At the amendment's adoption in 1791,
the federal government was one of limited powers, and reli-
gious expression was relatively uniform. Hence, the First
Amendment's mandate that Congress neither establish nor
interfere with religion was not a major source of dispute. 9
In the twentieth century, however, the government's obli-
gation toward religion has proved more troublesome. Govern-
36. See MEREDITH McGuIRE, RITUAL HEALING IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (1988).
37. Anson Shupe & Jeffrey K. Hadden, Understanding Unconventional Healing
Model&: A Progress Report, 7 SECOND OPINION 82, 91, 101 (Mar. 1988).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
39. See JOHN T. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE xiii (1987).
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ment regulation of social and economic life has grown
enormously, and the forms of American religious expression
have diversified. Accordingly, government neutrality has
become more difficult to define, and controversy has flourished
over the proper relationship between government and religion.
One constitutional scholar and federal judge has observed that
"[n]o area of modern law ... has been so marked by sectarian
struggle, so strained by fundamental fissures, so reflective of
deep American doubts and aspirations."'
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amend-
ment has played the central role in defining the parameters of
American religious liberty in the twentieth century.41 But the
Court has not had occasion to rule on every form of govern-
ment regulation affecting religious life. Hence, other federal
and state court opinions have also been important in setting
bounds for the liberties and liabilities afforded to those
involved in the practice of religious healing. In most instances,
as the following sections detail, courts across the nation have
risen to the challenge of protecting religious liberty while
guaranteeing the rule of law in religious healing litigation. But
in other cases to be examined, religious freedom has been
unjustly subordinated to interests of a lower order.42
III. RELIGIOUS PATIENTS
Control of one's own healthcare has often been considered
an essential element of individual liberty. In vetoing an early
twentieth-century bill that would have required physicians to
obtain licenses, Governor Charles Thomas of Colorado
declared: "The fundamental vice of the bill is that it denies
absolutely to the individual the right to select his own physi-
cian. This is a right of conscience, and as sacred as that which
enables the citizen to worship God as he may desire."'43
Governor Thomas's position, however, represents the
minority view today. Through extensive regulation of healers
40. Id.
41. The First Amendment's religion clauses are equally applicable to state and
local government activity. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
42. Former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger has written: "The essence of all that
has been said and written on the subject [of religious freedom] is that only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216
(1972).
43. CLIFFORD P. SMITH, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE AND LEGISLATION 33 (1905).
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and their instrumentalities, every state indirectly limits indi-
vidual freedom of choice in healthcare matters. This section
addresses the liberties and liabilities of individuals who wish to
refuse medical care on a variety of religious grounds.44 It also
explores some collateral legal consequences that have arisen
for patients who chose religious treatment rather than medical
care. Increasing recognition of the patient's right to refuse
medical care--even in the face of death-supports the position
advanced throughout this Article that patients should be
afforded a high degree of liberty in their pursuit of religious
healing.
A. The Source of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
While judicial opinion has not been unanimous, a qualified
right to refuse care for religious reasons has emerged. Courts
have based this right not only on the First Amendment's guar-
antee of religious freedom, but also on the constitutional and
common law protections of privacy.45 The patient's right of
refusal may even prevail at death's door.
"Do our humane laws make it the duty of a physician to
leave the bedside of a dying man, because he demands it, and,
if he remains and relieves him by physical touch, hold him
guilty of assault?" asked the New York high court shortly after
the turn of this century." Justice Irving Vann's opinion in
Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias47 clearly implied
that New York law required no such result. But a decade
later, the same court laid the foundation for a contrary
conclusion.
In Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital,48
44. Christian Science, for example, teaches that spiritual healing is incompatible
with materia medica. Mary Baker Eddy wrote: "The schools have rendered faith in
drugs the fashion, rather than faith in Deity .... Such systems are barren of the
vitality of spiritual power." EDDY, supra note 28, at 146. Jehovah's Witnesses, on the
other hand, refuse medical care involving blood transfusions, which they believe are
prohibited by the Bible. See generally Maureen L. Moore, Comment, Their Life is in
the Blood Jehovah's Witnesses, Blood Transfusions and the Courts, 10 N. KY. L. REV.
281 (1983).
45. See, e.g., In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1039-40 (Miss. 1985) (upholding refusal
of blood transfusion based on constitutional rights of free exercise of religion and
privacy, as well as common law right of privacy).
46. Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias, 70 N.E. 111, 112 (N.Y. 1904),
aff'd, 198 U.S. 508 (1905).
47. Id.
48. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914) (refusing to hold hospital liable), overruled by Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1959) (finding hospital liability under negligence theory).
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the plaintiff sued the hospital as the result of a surgery per-
formed without her consent. The court held the hospital
immune from liability. But Justice Benjamin Cardozo none-
theless asserted that: "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages."49
Schloendorff did not involve a patient who spurned medi-
cal intervention in the face of a life-threatening condition.
During the second half of this century, however, numerous
courts have been confronted with precisely this scenario.'
Until fifteen years ago, most of these matters involved patients
with religious objections to medical care. More recently, litiga-
tion involving nonreligious refusals has also arisen.5
The first reported opinion concerning the right of a com-
petent adult to refuse life-saving medical treatment appeared
in 1962.52 Jacob Dilgard, a Jehovah's Witness, was voluntarily
admitted to the hospital suffering from gastro-intestinal bleed-
ing. 3 Although he was willing to undergo a recommended
operation, Dilgard refused to submit to a blood transfusion.'
The court upheld the patient's right to control his own
healthcare.55
In deciding for the patient, the court first disagreed with
the physician's contention that Dilgard's action was the
equivalent of suicide.' The court wrote that: "[I]t is always a
question of judgment whether the medical decision [about the
need for a transfusion] is correct."57 Without reference to
authority, Justice Bernard S. Meyer continued that: "[I]t is the
individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has the
final say and.., this must necessarily be so in a system of gov-
ernment which gives the greatest possible protection to the
49. 1i at 93.
50. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (collecting 54 such
decisions), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
51. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
52. Erickson v. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).




57. Dilgard, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
[Vol. 16:599
Religious Healing
individual in the furtherance of his own desires."'
Three years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion based on the First Amendment's guarantee
of the free exercise of religion.59 A probate court had already
compelled the medical treatment against the will of Bernice
Brooks, but the supreme court nonetheless issued its opinion
because the matter was of "substantial public interest."'
The court concluded that the First Amendment "protects
the absolute right of every individual to freedom in his reli-
gious belief and the exercise thereof, subject only to the quali-
fication that the exercise thereof may properly be limited by
governmental action where such exercise endangers, clearly
and presently, the public health, welfare or morals."'"
The opinion further noted that, prior to the transfusion,
Bernice Brooks had released her doctor and hospital from any
civil liability and that she had no minor children who might
have become wards of the state upon her death.62 Accordingly,
the court ruled that Brooks' refusal to accept a blood transfu-
sion did not pose a clear and present danger to society and that
her wishes should have been respected.'
Brooks also implied that the right of refusal might find
constitutional support beyond the First Amendment in a
broader "right to be let alone."" Since Brooks, most courts
have relied on either the First Amendment's right of free exer-
cise, or the right of privacy, or both, to uphold religious
patients' medical refusals. 65 Courts have protected this right of
58. Id.
59. In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (Ill. 1965).
60. Id. at 437 (quoting People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Ill.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952)).
61. Id. at 441.
62. Id. at 442.
63. Id.
64. Brooks, 205 N.E.2d at 442. Quoting from a 1928 dissenting opinion by Supreme
Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the court noted: "The makers of our Constitution...
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man." Id.
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
65. E.g., Public Health Trust v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); In re Brown, 478
So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985). Most recently, the Supreme Court has held that an
individual's interest in refusing medical care falls within the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of liberty. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281
(1990). The Court, however, did not take the opportunity to analyze this liberty
interest in detail. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. In fact, the Court specifically refused to
decide whether "the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
1993]
616 University of Puget Sound Law Review
refusal by providing various legal and equitable remedies even
after treatment has been compelled. In a number of cases, the
patients or their representatives won declaratory judgments
after treatment had been provided and even after the patients
were deceased." In other actions, doctors and hospitals have
faced civil liability for violating a patient's right to refuse.67
As a general rule, physicians who render treatment with-
out or beyond the scope of the patient's consent are liable for
damages.68 Causes of action for assault and battery, negligence,
and malpractice are most common in this regard. But actions
may also be brought for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
infliction of emotional distress.69  In addition, healthcare pro-
fessionals who provide medical care against the patient's reli-
gious wishes may be liable under federal civil rights laws
designed to protect individuals from constitutional
deprivations. 0
B. Limitations on the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
While a patient's interest in refusing medical care has
been characterized as fundamental-particularly when sup-
ported by religious considerations-this interest must, in each
case, be weighed against state interests before courts will order
medical care to be withheld or withdrawn.7' State interests
have most often been categorized as preservation of life, pro-
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id. In
passing, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist did note that the "Due Process Clause
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical
treatment." Id. at 281. Hence, the extent to which a patient may rely solely on the
Fourteenth Amendment to refuse medical treatment is still open for debate.
66. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (11. 1965); see also Mercy Hosp.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), vacated, 510 A.2d 562 (Md.
1986).
67. E.g., Interblitzen v. Lane Hosp. 12 P.2d 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932) (cause of action
in assault and battery upheld against hospital where female patient alleged repeated
intimate examinations by ten or twelve male doctors without her consent); Mines v.
Boland, 138 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964) (the administration of a barium enema, if
without the plaintiff's consent, would amount to an assault and battery); Physicians' &
Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P.2d 568 (1941) (cause of action
for medical malpractice upheld where, upon a visit to the hospital for lab tests, cross-
complainant was given a hysterectomy against her will).
68. See, e.g., Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); 61 AM. JUR.
2D Physicians and Surgeons and Other Healers, § 197 (1981); and supra note 67.
69. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Regents of the University of California, No. 837936 (Sup.
Ct. Cal. 1990).
70. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).




tection of the interests of innocent third parties, prevention of
suicide, and maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.72 As a general rule, however, the government's
interest in compelling medical treatment has outweighed the
patient's desires only when the lives of third parties were jeop-
ardized or when the patient was not competent to refuse
care.73 The state's obligation to protect innocent third parties
has routinely overridden the autonomy of patients who
opposed compulsory vaccination or who were pregnant.
74
Patients may refuse life-saving treatment, however, even if the
patient's dependents will be abandoned.75
1. Protection of Third Parties
a. Vaccination
Early in this century, religious opposition to smallpox vac-
cinations provided the Supreme Court with its first opportu-
nity to balance an individual's desire for freedom from medical
intervention against society's interest in protecting the health
of its citizens. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,7" the Court stated
as follows: "Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount
necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members."77
Since Jacobson, courts have upheld compulsory vaccina-
tion laws even without the immediate threat of an epidemic.7"
State legislatures have made exceptions in these statutes, how-
ever, for members of recognized denominations that oppose
immunization.79  But of late, these exemptions have been
called into question."' Several courts have eliminated the
exemptions because they reveal a governmental preference for
organized religion over individual religious or secular prac-
72. E.g., St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
73. See infra part III.B.l.a-c.
74. See infra part III.B.l.a-b (discussing right to refuse treatment in situations of
vaccinations and preganancy).
75. See infra part III.B.l.c (discussing right to refuse treatment for patients with
dependents).
76. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
77. Id. at 27.
78. See, e.g., Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964).
79. See, e.g., Dalli v. Board of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971); Davis v. State,
451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982).
80. Dalli, 267 N.E.2d 219; Davis, 451 A.2d 107.
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tices.8" Other courts have construed the exemptions broadly to
allow individuals with personal religious objections to avoid
vaccination.8 2
b. Pregnancy
Governmental concern with preventing harm to innocent
third parties also lies behind court decisions compelling life-
saving medical treatment for pregnant women with religious
objections to medical care. In the earliest case of note, Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,83 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey expressed its willingness to
compel a transfusion for a Jehovah's Witness in her thirty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy." The medical evidence established a
probability that at some point in the pregnancy both she and
her unborn child would die unless a transfusion was adminis-
tered.' The court ruled that a transfusion could be adminis-
tered to the mother if necessary because "the welfare of the
child and the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it
would be impracticable to attempt to distinguish between
them."'
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Author-
ity, 7 the court authorized a more intrusive medical procedure
upon a woman in her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy. The
patient and her husband opposed a Caesarean section because
they were "of the view that the Lord ha[d] healed her body
and that whatever happen[ed] to the child [was] the Lord's
will." But the trial court concluded that the unborn child
had a ninety-nine to one hundred percent certainty of dying
without the operation and that the mother had a fifty percent
chance of dying. With the operation, both parties had nearly a
81. See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887
(1980).
82. See, e.g., Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (upholding
preliminary injunction prohibiting exclusion from school of non-immunized children
who practiced faith similar to Christian Science); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964) (compelling state university to accept a non-
immunized student who belonged to no recognized religious group when Christian
Scientists were exempted from vaccination).
83. 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
84. Id. at 538.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).
88. Id. at 459.
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one hundred percent chance of surviving. 9 On review, the
Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with the trial court that the
intrusion into the lives of both parents was "outweighed by the
duty of the State to protect a living, unborn human being from
meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to
live."0
In Crouse Irving Memorial Hospita4 Inc. v. Paddock,91 a
New York trial court took the unusual step of extending the
state's interest beyond the life of the fetus to the protection of
the medical profession as well.92 The court concluded that
physicians must be permitted to stabilize patients following an
operation.93 Stacey Paddock consented to a Caesarean section
but not to blood transfusions, which her physician deemed nec-
essary to safeguard her life. The court found that "[e]very
such grant of responsibility should be accompanied by 'author-
ity sufficient to properly carry out the delegated respon-
sibilities.' ""
Thus, this summary of pregnancy cases reveals that the
state's interest in rendering life-saving medical care for a via-
ble fetus may outweigh the mother's religious objections to
medical intervention, at least where the mother's health is not
threatened by the treatment.95
c. Dependents
As noted above, in defense of innocent third parties, courts
have imposed medical care on those who refused vaccination
and on pregnant women who jeopardized the lives of their
unborn offspring. Some courts have gone even further and
indicated that a religious patient may not refuse life-saving
89. Id. at 458.
90. Id. at 460.
91. 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
92. Id. at 446.
93. Id.
94. Id. But see Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 489 A.2d 1130 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)
(affirming a pregnant woman's right to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion where
fetus was not at risk), vacated, 510 A.2d 562 (Md. 1986).
95. Given the unstable status of abortion laws at the present time, the outcome of
future litigation in this area is particularly uncertain. Outside parameters for judicial
intervention, however, may be suggested. A court has more reason to closely
scrutinize a religious healthcare decision affecting a viable fetus than it does a
religiously inspired choice by a non-pregnant adult. In any event, however, a court
should not intervene on behalf of a fetus as readily as it would in the case of a
seriously ill child whose parent refuses medical treatment on religious grounds. See
inzfra part IV for a detailed discussion regarding the latter circumstances.
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medical care if the decision will result in the abandonment of a
minor child." Other courts have indicated, however, that the
state's interest is negated by proof that minor children will
receive adequate financial support if the patient dies. 7 Most
recently, the New York Court of Appeals completely
subordinated the state's interest in protecting dependent chil-
dren to the patient's right of refusal." The court relied on the
fact that no legislation forced a patient to submit to medical
treatment for the benefit of a child.'
2. Protection of Patients
In addition to giving credence to the state's interest in pro-
tecting innocent third parties, courts have identified the pro-
tection of patients themselves as a countervailing interest to
autonomy. Accordingly, courts generally act to prevent suicide
and to prevent all types of self-inflicted injuries by those lack-
ing the capacity to know better.'00 Although refusal of medical
care by competent adults is probably no longer equated with
self-destruction, 1 1 defining the scope of autonomy for incom-
petent patients can be a complex matter.
a. Suicide
Despite Supreme Court Justice Wiley B. Rutledge's much-
noted dictum that "parents may be free to become martyrs,"' 0 2
the state's interest in preventing acts of self-destruction has
often been asserted. As the Supreme Court remarked in its
first significant religious free exercise opinion, it is not beyond
96. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (state as
parens patriae will not permit a parent to abandon a child by refusing life-saving
medical treatment), cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); In re Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 490
N.Y.S.2d 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (same).
97. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (family business would supply
children's material needs in absence of father); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d
666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refusal of medical care would not result in abandonment
because primary residence of child was in another state and child was supported by
mother).
98. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77, 84 (N.Y. 1990).
99. Id. at 83-84. See also In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987) (state's interest in
protecting minors does not outweigh right of parent with two teenage sons to
terminate life support); Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (state's
interest in protecting minors does not outweigh parent's right to refuse care when
there is no evidence of abandonment).
100. See, e.g., Fosmire, 551 N.E.2d at 82.
101. See, e.g., Farrell, 529 A.2d at 411.
102. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1943) (parents are not free to
make martyrs of their children).
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the power of the civil government to prevent religious sui-
cide.0 3 And as recently as 1990, the Court declared that it did
"not think a State is required to remain neutral in the face of
an informed and voluntary decision by a physically-able adult
to starve to death.' 10 4
Accordingly, several courts have raised the state's interest
in preventing suicide as a reason for preventing religious medi-
cal refusal.0 5 In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Hes-
ton,"° the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that "unless
the medical option itself is laden with the risk of death or of
serious infirmity, the State's interest in sustaining life in such
circumstances is hardly distinguishable from its interest in the
case of suicide."' "°7
Since Heston, however, a majority rule has emerged to the
contrary, and courts no longer equate medical refusal with sui-
cide."~ The New Jersey Supreme Court itself has reversed its
earlier position.1°9
b. Incompetency
A more difficult question is presented concerning individu-
als who, by reason of incapacity, are unable to decide on their
own course of treatment. The state's interest in preventing
harm to the patient is greatest when the patient is no longer-
or has never been--competent. The government's authority to
act as guardian for those who are unable to care for themselves
is well-established in the law."0 The standard used by courts
to determine whether an individual is in need of a guardian
103. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
104. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
105. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971), overruled
by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1009 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465
So. 2d 666, 669 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
106. 279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971), overruled by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985)
(no longer equating rejection of medical treatment with suicide).
107. Id. at 673.
108. In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (N.J. 1987) (collecting decisions).
109. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
110. The Supreme Court has traced the origin of the doctrine of parens patriae
back to the English constitutional system in which the sovereign or his representative
served as "the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics," Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1971) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (1768)). The power to act as "father of the country" passed
from the king to the states and was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court as
early as 1890. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57 (1890).
1993]
622 University of Puget Sound Law Review
varies, however, according to the circumstances under consid-
eration. An individual may be deemed competent to make
some decisions, but not others. Although reluctant to set forth
detailed competency standards for medical decision-making,
courts generally consider a patient to be competent if he or she
"has a clear understanding of the nature of his or her illness
and prognosis, and of the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment, and has the capacity to reason and make judgments
about that information.""'
While adults are presumed competent, this presumption
may be overcome by evidence to the contrary." 2 Those
patients who oppose doctors' recommendations are more likely
to be deemed incompetent." 3 Certain types of evidence, how-
ever, will not prove incompetency. For instance, a patient who
has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution is not
thereby deprived of the capacity to refuse medical care for reli-
gious reasons.-1 In addition, while evidence pertaining to an
individual's cognitive abilities is admissible at a competency
adjudication, religious beliefs may not serve as the basis for a
finding of incompetence." 5
Although minors enjoy some constitutional liberties,16
courts have been willing to override children's objections to
medical care on incompetency grounds." 7 Children as young
as twelve years of age, however, have been permitted to reject
medical care when such action would not endanger their
lives."1 And two recent cases have upheld mature minors'
rights to refuse even life-saving medical care for religious
111. Farrell, 529 A.2d at 413.
112. Id. at 415.
113. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARv.
L. REv. 1519, 1646 (1990) (noting commentators who have reached this conclusion).
114. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971)
(holding that mental illness and commitment does not raise presumption of
incompetency). See also In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255, 257 (Ohio) (holding that
involuntary commitment is not tantamount to finding of incompentency), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 820 (1987).
115. Milton, 505 N.E.2d at 257.
116. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). In this case, the
court stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id.
117. See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982) (overriding minor's
objection to treatment).
118. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (N.Y. 1955) (allowing child to
refuse treatment for cleft palate and harelip). See infra part IV for further discussion




The difficulty in determining whether a minor has made a
mature, independent decision to refuse medical care is akin to
the problem of ascertaining the competency of an adult whose
mental state is variable. As a general rule, treatment instruc-
tions articulated while the patient is competent are entitled to
respect despite prior or subsequent incapacity. 120 Nevertheless,
several courts have ordered life-saving treatment for presently
incompetent patients despite evidence from family members
that the patients would have objected on religious grounds.
These decisions relied in part on the notion that the patient's
actual wishes were not known because he or she was already
incompetent on arrival at the hospital.12 1
In a few relatively early cases, courts even turned a
patient's prior objection to medical care into a type of consent.
These courts emphasized the fact that the patient actually con-
sented to be compelled by a court order.122
The related argument has also been advanced that patients
who object to medical care on religious grounds may be com-
pelled to accept treatment if such compulsion will relieve the
patient of any responsibility for accepting treatment. Thus in
In re E.G.,' 23 the State asserted that the court should have
119. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (cited in In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d
322, 330 (Ill. 1989)), But see In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(court ordered fourteen-year-old to undergo medical treatment for gonorrhea over his
religious objections).
120. See, e.g., In re Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (N.Y.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); In re Quakenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. Morris Cty. Ct. 1978) (upholding patient's
refusal of amputation despite evidence of incompetency).
121. See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.)
(ordering blood transfusions for unconscious patient despite husband's religious
objections), cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston,
279 A.2d 670 (N.J. 1971) (ordering blood transfusion for unconscious adult patient
despite parent's religious objections), overruled by In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985); In re Estate of Dorone, 534 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1987) (ordering blood transfusion for
unconscious patient despite parent's objection on grounds that patient was a Jehovah's
Witness).
122. In In re Georgetown College, for instance, Justice Skelly Wright lent support
to his decision compelling treatment by noting that when he asked the patient
whether she would oppose a court-ordered transfusion "she indicated ... that it would
not then be her responsibility." 331 F.2d at 1007. See also United States v. George, 239
F. Supp. 752, 753 (D. Conn. 1965) (patient stated that his "conscience was clear" and
that the responsibility was "upon the court's conscience"); Powell v. Columbian
Presbyterian Medical Center, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (patient did
not object to receiving treatment, but would not direct its use).
123. 515 N.E.2d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), as amended (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
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compelled treatment for the seventeen-year-old patient
because her church would view the transfusion as "the court's
transgression, not her own, and would support rather than
punish her."''1 On appeal, however, the court explicitly
refused to adopt the State's suggested rationale because of the
harm inevitably inflicted on the patient's conscience.m
Two additional objections help dispose of the "relief from
transgressions" argument: (1) a judicial determination of a
religious transgression necessitates a theological inquiry, but
theological inquiries by the court are to be avoided;' and (2) if
the patient opposes medical care because of a belief that reli-
gious healing is incompatible with medicine, the patient's
desire is to be healed by religious means, not to avoid a reli-
gious transgression; thus, the spiritual consequences of the
court's action are irrelevant to the exercise of the patient's
right of refusal.
Courts have not been so reluctant to withhold or withdraw
medical care for the mentally incapacitated when life does not
hang in the balance.12' In such cases, courts have regularly
employed what has been termed the "substituted judgment"
approach to determine the course of treatment.128 Employing
this method, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
declared that: "(a) when an individual, prior to incompetence,
has objected, absolutely, to medical care on religious grounds,
(b) the evidence demonstrates a strong adherence to the tenets
of that faith, and (c) there is no countervailing evidence of vac-
illation, the court should conclude that the individual would
reject medical treatment.'" 9 In the absence of such clear-cut
indications, the court noted that evidence regarding the detri-
124. Id. at 289.
125. The court noted that "a Jehovah's Witness minister testified that the
withholding of consent did not make transfusions a less difficult experience for one of
his faith." Id. "He analogized appellant's suffering to that of a rape victim: '[Jiust
because the person exonerated you in having participated in it, it wouldn't mean that
the trauma wasn't there. Forcing anyone to violate his consideration [sic] is the most
painful indignity that an individual could have perpetrated against him."' Id
126. See Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
887 (1990).
127. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 752 (D.C. 1979) (requiring trial court to give
greater consideration to the beliefs of a Christian Scientist patient before
administration of psychotropic drugs); Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.)
(holding that tranquilizers should not have been administered to an incompetent
patient known to be a Christian Scientist), cert denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
128. Boyd, 403 A.2d at 749 n.10.
129. Id. at 751.
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mental side effects of the proposed treatment and the likeli-
hood of cure or improvement is also relevant to determine
whether a previously competent patient's religious objections
to treatment must be honored.130
The Supreme Court recently left open the question of
whether a formerly competent patient who has provided clear
and convincing evidence of her intent to refuse medical care is
entitled to constitutional protection for such a decision.' 3 ' By
statute, however, many states now provide that written
instructions of the patient's intent in this regard are to be
honored.1
2
In sum, regarding the limitations placed on the religious
patient's right to refuse medical intervention, the courts have
made clear that medical treatment should not be compelled
over the patient's objections without a court order unless:
(1) an emergency arises in which the life of an innocent third
party is threatened; or (2) the patient's life is in immediate
danger and there is reason to conclude that the objections arise
from mental incapacity. Beyond these existing doctrines, and,
in the interest of religious liberty, a court should not compel
treatment unless: (1) the lives of innocent third parties are
threatened; or (2) the patient would not have objected to the
treatment if he or she were competent.
C Limitations on the Right to Seek Religious Treatment
In reviewing the liberties and liabilities of patients who
employ religious healing, the previous subsections outlined the
right to refuse orthodox medical intervention and the limita-
tions on the exercise of that right. This section examines vari-
ous collateral consequences of a patient's preference for
religious treatment over medical care. In particular, this sec-
tion illustrates that the use of religious treatment has created
problems for patients by jeopardizing their recovery for per-
sonal injuries and by casting doubt on their competency as
jurors and testators.
1. Damages and Disability Benefits
The choice of religious rather than conventional medical
treatment has raised legal questions concerning the recovery of
130. Id.
131. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
132. See Medical Technology and the Law, supra note 113, at 1671.
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damages and the receipt of disability benefits. Religious plain-
tiffs have had to overcome arguments that their use of spiri-
tual healing enabled them to transcend all pain and suffering
or, to the contrary, served to exacerbate their injuries.
Damage calculations for personal injury include compensa-
tion for the victim's pain and suffering. Thus, the fact that the
victim's suffering may have been lessened by spiritual treat-
ment is relevant in determining damage awards. On this basis,
a Texas appellate court approved cross-examination of the vic-
tim regarding her belief in Christian Science and her ability to
control her own pain by rising to a "spiritual plane high above
mental and physical sufferings ... .s In a related matter,
however, when a Christian Scientist testified that he believed
in the existence of pain and had, in fact, suffered as the result
of injuries inflicted by the defendant, the Alabama Supreme
Court ruled that an inquiry into the plaintiff's contrary reli-
gious beliefs was properly forbidden.' 34
A larger hurdle for patients of religious treatment seeking
recovery for personal injuries has arisen from the operation of
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. Victims of personal
injury are under a general duty to promote their own recovery
and prevent the aggravation of their condition." Under the
doctrine of avoidable consequences, the perpetrator of the
harm is not liable for damages that could have been prevented
if the plaintiff had taken reasonable measures to mitigate the
injury."'3 Courts have struggled with the issue of how to apply
this rule to injury victims who object to medical care for reli-
gious reasons. 3 7 In general, juries have been instructed to
determine if the plaintiff's choice of religious healing was rea-
sonable under all of the relevant circumstances. 38 If they so
find, they are to conclude that none of the plaintiff's harm was
avoidable. 39 This course avoids adopting into law the irrebut-
table presumption that conventional medicine is the only rea-
sonable form of treatment for injuries.
The leading decision on the doctrine of avoidable conse-
133. Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Travis, 99 S.W. 1141, 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
134. City of Montgomery v. Wyche, 53 So. 786, 789 (Ala. 1910).
135. Munn v. Southern Health Plan, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Miss. 1989),
aff'd, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 526-27.
138. Lange v. Hoyt, 159 A. 575, 577-78 (Conn. 1932).
139. Id. at 578.
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quences 140 involved an eight-year-old girl who sustained a frac-
tured left arm and pelvis when she was hit by a car. 4'
Although Minelda Lange received emergency medical treat-
ment immediately after the accident, the motorist claimed that
the child's mother subsequently interfered with Minelda's
medical care." The mother was a Christian Scientist.143 On
appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court wrote that reasonable
treatment following an injury must be determined in light of
"all the surrounding circumstances including whatever belief
as to methods of treatment . . . [the plaintiff] conscientiously
held."1'" The court also pointed out that curative theories held
by large numbers of intelligent people should not be disre-
garded.14' The court added that the child's personal injury
award would not, in any event, be limited by her mother's
choice of religious healing over medical care, even if that
choice was unreasonable.'4
Several courts have subsequently elaborated on the "sur-
rounding circumstances" standard.147  One opinion specified
that "[t]here is no hard and fast rule that the injured person
must seek medical care of a particular type.' 14' Accordingly,
evidence that the plaintiff was a Christian Scientist was rele-
vant in determining whether he acted with reasonable dili-
gence following an auto injury. 49 In more recent litigation
involving a religious refusal to accept medical care, another
court acknowledged that the jury is permitted to consider the
victim's knowledge of proposed treatments in determining
140. For other cases discussing the doctrine of avoidable consequences, see Miller
v. Hartman, 36 P.2d 965, 966 (Kan. 1934) (approving jury consideration of evidence
tending to show that a Christian Scientist's failure to seek medical care resulted in
avoidable injury); Christiansen v. Hollings, 112 P.2d 723, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (court
approved jury instruction allowing consideration of Christian Science belief in spiritual
healing); Oxley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 So. 2d 90, 91-92 (La. Ct. App. 1970) (implying
that a belief in faith healing might support a delay in seeking medical care).
141. Lange, 159 A. at 576.
142. Id. at 576-77.
143. Id. at 576.
144. Id. at 577.
145. Id. at 578.
146. Lange, 159 A. at 578.
147. Munn v. Alge, 730 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Miss. 1990), aff'd, 924 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991); Christiansen v. Hollings, 112 P.2d 723 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1941).
148. 0iristiansen, 112 P.2d at 730 (upholding $8,000 award in wrongful death suit
in which decedent opted for treatment from Christian Science Practitioner).
149. Id.
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whether reasonable steps were taken to mitigate the harm."W
Thus, the plaintiff's view of religious treatment is arguably
relevant.
In light of these conclusions, the decision in Adams v.
Carlo 151 is subject to criticism. In Adams, a Missouri state trial
court prohibited the defendant from learning the healing
formula employed by a Christian Science plaintiff injured in a
steam shovel accident.152 The defendant appealed the ruling,
but the reviewing court affirmed on the ground that the
inquiry was intended to expose the plaintiff to jury ridicule.I "
The jury should have been permitted, however, to learn of
all the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's choice of
treatment. Although the exclusion of evidence concerning
religious treatment may have benefitted the plaintiff in
Adams, this approach ultimately contributes to the establish-
ment of orthodox medicine as the only reasonable form of
care. Religious parties must be allowed to offer testimony to
support the prudence of their actions. To be judged imprudent
is the risk assumed in using the courts to recover civil damages
after employing religious healing. For his part, the plaintiff in
Adams had been willing to repeat the prayer.1M But on its
own initiative, the court instructed him not to do so.'
Most recently, two other courts have discussed-without
finally deciding-the constitutionality of allowing the jury to
take religious beliefs into account to determine whether the
victim acted reasonably to avoid additional harm." These
decisions affirm that patients who employ religious means are
not exempt from the doctrine of avoidable consequences.
157
Thus, religious plaintiffs must prove that they acted diligently,
although even an unreasonable refusal to seek medical care
150. Munn, 730 F. Supp. at 28 (upholding jury's decision to award no damages in
wrongful death suit).
151. 101 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).




156. Munn v. Algee, 719 F. Supp. 525, 530 (N.D. Miss. 1989), qffl'd, 924 F.2d 568
(5th Cir.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990).
157. Munn, 719 F. Supp. at 529-30 (to exempt religious practitioners from the
doctrine of avoidable consequences might unconstitutionally establish religion);
Corlett, 562 N.E.2d at 262 (declining to create an exemption from duties to mitigate
injuries for a patient who refuses reasonable medical treatment on religious grounds).
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does not necessarily relieve the defendant of all liability.1' If
religious discrimination is to be avoided, plaintiffs should con-
tinue to be given the opportunity to show that their choice of
unorthodox treatment was prudent in light of all relevant
circumstances. 159
A few courts have taken a different tact to avoid religious
discrimination in litigation involving the award of governmen-
tal disability benefits. 16° In these matters, courts have ruled
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the state
from discriminating against individuals who choose religious
treatment over medical care. l6 ' Although a contrary rule was
articulated prior to the 1970s,16 2 claimants have been awarded
benefits despite evidence that medical treatment would allevi-
ate the disability.'6
Thus, courts are now willing to compel government agen-
cies to accept disability claims by those who rely exclusively on
religious healing. Perpetrators of personal injuries, however,
are not required to bear increased liability resulting from the
unreasonable use of religious healing. Juries are to determine
whether religious healing was reasonable in light of all rele-
vant circumstances and may not disregard popular curative
theories even if they are unacceptable to the medical
establishment.
158. Corlett, 562 N.E.2d at 262; Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wash. 2d 645, 652-53, 695 P.2d
116, 121 (1985) (upholding the trial court's reduction of plaintiff's award in wrongful
death case), cert denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1987).
159. This conclusion, as it applies to religious parents who refused medical care for
their children, is also discussed ikfra part IV.C.
160. Montgomery v. Board of Retirement, 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(reversing a lower court decision denying benefits to a claimant who refused medical
treatment on account of her belief in faith healing). See also Lewis v. Califano, 616
F.2d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 1980) (vacating district court's grant of summary judgment due to
lack of a specific finding regarding the sincerity of the plaintiff's religious beliefs);
Collins-Maat v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 664, 669 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff's religious
beliefs disregarded because court found her capable of performing work).
161. Califano, 616 F.2d at 81.
162. Martin v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 304 P.2d 828 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956)
(no recovery because plaintiff's death resulted from his unreasonable refusal to accept
blood transfusion). But see Industrial Comm'n v. Vigil, 373 P.2d 308, 311 (Colo. 1962)
(benefits should be awarded for those injuries that would have been sustained had the
claimant accepted surgery); Nashert and Sons v. McCann, 460 P.2d 941, 943 (Okla.
1969) (holding on constitutional grounds that benefits should be awarded for those
injuries that would have been sustained even if the patient had accepted medical
treatment).
163. Montgomery, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 185. Some state statutes provide for similar
results. See, e.g., Comment, Medical Care, Freedom of Religion, and Mitigation of
Damages, 87 YALE L.J. 1466, 1467 n.5 (1978) (summarizing state statutes).
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2. Competency
Those who have relied on religious rather than medical
treatment have not only faced difficulties recovering compen-
sation for injuries, they have also suffered challenges to their
competency to serve on juries and to execute wills. 164
Although religious beliefs have, on occasion, been considered
relevant in determining whether a juror is fit to carry out des-
ignated duties, 65 no reported opinion holds that a juror's prac-
tice of religious healing provides adequate grounds for
overturning a jury verdict. Similarly, testators have had their
wills challenged in probate because they relied on spiritual
care.' 6 Although a few courts have used a testator's religion
to overturn a will,16 7 belief in the efficacy of religious healing
should not provide grounds for such an outcome.
a. Jurors
At common law, trial participants who did not believe in
God were deemed incompetent.168 Statutory and constitutional
laws have since provided, however, that witnesses and jurors
may not be barred simply because of their religious beliefs.6 9
A juror may be disqualified, however, if religious convictions
foster a mental attitude that interferes with the faithful execu-
tion of that juror's duty to find the facts and apply the law.Y7
In a 1929 California will contest, a testator's nephew
unsuccessfully attempted to prove that the testator lacked a
sound mind when he executed his will.17 1 On appeal, the
nephew sought to overturn the verdict by disqualifying a juror
because she was a Christian Scientist. 7 2 The appellant con-
tended that as Christian Science denied the existence of
mental disease or incapacity, the juror would not have found
the testator incompetent no matter what the evidence
164. Smith v. Smith, 46 P.2d 232 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (challenge to juror's
service based on religious beliefs); Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 139 P. 207 (1914)
(challenge to testator's competency because of religious beliefs).
165. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 46 P.2d 232 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
166. See, e.g., Spencer v. Spencer, 221 S.W. 58 (Mo. 1920).
167. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 139 P. 207 (1914).
168. See 3 BowE-PARKER, PAGE ON WiLis 401 (1961); Joel E. Smith, Annotation,
Religious Beliefs, Affiliations, or Prejudice of Prospective Jurors As Proper Subject of
Inquiry or Grounds for Challenge on Voir Dire, 95 A.L.R.3d 172, 193-96 (1979).
169. In re Malvasi's Estate, 273 P. 1097, 1099-1100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1929).
170. Smith v. Smith, 46 P.2d 232, 233 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
171. Malivasi's Estate, 273 P. at 1098.




The court rejected the appeal, quoting the juror's affidavit
that "Christian Science at all times in the past has recognized
and does now recognize the existence of disease, including
mental incompetency."' 74 In light of the juror's understanding
of Christian Science, the court held that the nephew had failed
to show that her attitude toward mental disease disqualified
her from service.175
Six years later, another California court made clear that a
juror's religious beliefs could conceivably be related to a state
of mind that would result in a challenge for cause.176 The case
involved a dispute between former spouses over a property set-
tlement agreement. 177 The plaintiff's counsel questioned pro-
spective jurors regarding the effects of their religious beliefs
on their view of divorce and remarriage. In dismissing the
defendant's objections to the plaintiff's line of questioning, the
appellate court noted:
While it is certain that no person shall be rendered incompe-
tent to be a juror on account of his opinions on matters of
religious belief... it is equally true that because of his reli-
gious faith a prospective juror may be unable to try a certain
case impartially, because of a resulting state of mind which
would be a ground of challenge for cause. 1 7 9
Despite theoretical concern that jurors who believe in reli-
gious healing might fail to recognize the existence of pain or
otherwise acknowledge the operation of natural or human law,
there are no holdings to that effect. But judicial opinion is not
unanimous as to whether religious beliefs may serve as evi-
dence of incapacity to execute a will. 8 °
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1099-1100.
175. Id at 1100. See also Hehir v. Bowers, 407 N.E.2d 149, 151-52 (11. App. Ct.
1980) (juror's belief in faith healing held insufficient to impeach jury verdict in
personal injury action).
176. Smith v. Smith, 46 P.2d 232, 233 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
177. Id. at 232.
178. Id. at 233.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 139 P. 207 (1914) (religious beliefs
received as evidence of incapacity). But see In re Brush's Will, 72 N.Y.S. 421 (N.Y.
1901) (religious beliefs do not serve as evidence of incapacity).
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b. Testators
Although a testator's religious views are generally not rel-
evant in determining a will's validity, testimony on this subject
has, at times, been received into evidence.""' A belief in the
efficacy of religious healing, however, should not serve to
prove incompetency.
Among the various types of legal transactions, making a
will requires the highest degree of capacity and is thus subject
to the closest scrutiny. 8 2 But the courts have made clear that
evidence of the testator's religious beliefs is generally inadmis-
sible to undermine the will's validity. This remains true even
if such convictions are different from those others commonly
hold."s Nor will evidence of religious enthusiasm or extreme
piety prove mental incapacity.' Regarding religious healing
in particular, courts have declared that belief in laying-on-
hands' 85 or in miraculous curesse does not constitute evidence
of insanity. 8 7
Nonetheless, litigants have, on occasion, been permitted to
introduce the deceased's religious beliefs into evidence to sup-
port a claim that the individual lacked the requisite capacity to
execute the will. Religious beliefs have been admitted as evi-
181. See, e.g., Ingersoll, 72 Wash. 462, 139 P. 207.
182. The test for capacity has been described as follows:
First, the testator must understand the ordinary affairs of his life; second, he
must know both the nature and extent of his property and the persons who
are the natural objects of his bounty;, third, he must know that he is disposing
of his property in the manner and to the persons mentioned in his will.
Spencer v. Spencer, 221 S.W. 58, 63 (Mo. 1920) (quoting Haim v. Hanmersteen, 198
S.W. 833, 836 (Mo. 1917)).
183. See, e.g., Brush's Will, 72 N.Y.S. at 425; see generallzy 3 BOWE-PARKER, PAGE
ON WILL, supra note 168 at 573.
184. See, e.g., Clark v. Johnson, 105 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Ky. 1937). See also In re
Elston's Estate, 262 P.2d 148, 151 (Okla. 1953) (the term "insane delusion" does not
include a religious belief if not altogether illogical).
185. See, e.g., Spencer, 221 S.W. at 62.
186. See, e.g., Brush's Will, 72 N.Y.S. at 425.
187. In considering a believer's faith in Christian Science healing, one court
summarized judicial sentiment as follows:
[H]owever opposed these teachings may be to the beliefs or notions of others,
they are founded on the religious convictions of those professing them. This
being so, the court cannot say that those persons are mentally unsound. The
truth or falsity of religious belief is beyond the scope of a judicial inquiry.
Thus, the court has often been asked to pass upon the falsity of Spiritualism,
and to hold that a follower of this faith, which, like Christian Science, is
contrary to the convictions of most men, was of necessity laboring under an
insane delusion; but it has uniformly refused so to declare or hold.
Brush's Will, 72 N.Y.S. at 425 (citations omitted).
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dence of an insane delusion'" or on the grounds that they so
impaired the testator's mind as to control his judgment on the
disposition of property. 8 9 This evidence may be rebutted by
testimony that the testator's convictions were "in accord with
the practices and beliefs of a religion to which a substantial
number of people adhere."'"
On at least one occasion in this century, a belief in reli-
gious healing provided evidence for the conclusion that the
deceased person lacked testamentary capacity. 191 In that case,
the Washington State Supreme Court found that Miranda
Crim, an Alaskan miner, suffered from an insane delusion, and
for that reason the court invalidated his will.
19 2
For five years preceding his death, Crim had belonged to a
religious sect known as the Saints of the Lord.193 The Saints'
founder, Thomas H. Gourley, taught that illness could only be
cured through faith in Christ and that one should give all of
one's property to the poor.' 9 Gourley's followers believed that
their leader had miraculous healing powers, and when Crim
contracted cancer, he forsook medical treatment to rely on
religious healing.195 In a will written eight months prior to his
death, Crim bequeathed one-half of his $70,000 estate to Gour-
ley "in trust for the benefit and use of widows, orphans, and
deserving poor.'196
After hearing conflicting testimony on Crim's mental
capacity, the trial court set aside the will." The Washington
State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, declaring that
"this will was wholly the result of Crim's belief that his sancti-
fication and redemption depended upon his bestowing his prop-
erty upon the poor, and that Gourley was the steward chosen
188. See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Gourley, 78 Wash. 406, 411, 139 P. 207, 209 (1914)
(testator's belief in giving property to poor and that religious leader was God's steward
constitutes insane delusion).
189. See, e.g., In re Murray's Estate, 144 P.2d 1016, 1022, 1023 (Or. 1944) (evidence
of religious fanaticism may render will invalid); In re Trich's Will, 30 A. 1053, 1056-57
(Pa. 1895) (will may be overturned if testator is subject to a delusion rendering him
insensible to his parental duty).
190. Nalty's Administrator v. Franzman's Ex'r, 299 S.W. 585, 586 (Ky. 1927).
191. Ingersoll, 78 Wash. 406, 139 P. 207.
192. Id. at 411, 139 P. at 209.
193. Id. at 409, 139 P. at 208.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 409-10, 139 P. at 208.
196. Ingersoll, 78 Wash. at 409, 139 P. at 208.
197. Id. at 407, 410, 139 P. .at 207, 208-09.
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by God through whom this should be done."'198
The high court's decision, however, is subject to question.
Its holding rests on the finding that Crim's beliefs in sanctifica-
tion and in redemption and in Gourley's superhuman abilities
were delusions. But delusions are, by definition, false. And as
the United States Supreme Court has made clear, the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs is not subject to adjudication.'
Accordingly, the Washington court erred in basing its decision
on Crim's belief in religious healing. In the words of one nine-
teenth-century Pennsylvania trial judge, one who makes a will
should be found competent "however absurd, ridiculous, or
unfounded" his religious views.2°°
D. Conclusion
Competent patients possess constitutional and common
law rights to refuse medical treatment that may only be over-
come by the threat of danger to innocent third parties. The
wishes of formerly competent individuals who have left clear
evidence of their desires must also be honored. In exercising
the right to choose religious over medical care, individuals
need not act in accordance with a particular church tenet,201
nor be affiliated with a recognized religious organization.' 2
Remedies for violation of this right to be let alone are
available. 03
Those who pursue religious healing to the exclusion of
orthodox medical treatment, however, have faced certain hur-
dles in related legal matters. Under the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, these plaintiffs will not be able to recover per-
sonal injury damages for any complications and suffering that
they could have avoided by reasonable care.2 °4 In this regard,
juries should not assume that medical treatment is the only
198. Id. at 411, 139 P. at 209.
199. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See infra text accompanying
notes 483-511.
200. In re Trich's Will, 30 A. 1053, 1056 (Pa. 1895).
201. Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980).
202. See In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987);
Lewis v. Califano, 616 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has most recently
taken a similar stand in protecting the personal religious beliefs of an individual who
refused to work on his sabbath. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 489
U.S. 829 (1989).
203. See, e.g., supra cases cited note 67.
204. Munn v. Southern Health Plan, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Miss. 1989), oqff'd,
924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 (1991).
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reasonable form of care. They should consider all of the sur-
rounding circumstances, including evidence that the particular
type of spiritual healing chosen by plaintiff is practiced by a
relatively large number of reasonable persons.
Believers in religious healing have also had their compe-
tency questioned in court.205 The truth or falsity of religious
beliefs, however, is not subject to judicial determination. Nor
does religious fervor prove incapacity. Accordingly, the prac-
tice of religious healing alone should not disqualify one from
jury service nor undermine the validity of one's will.
IV. RELIGIOUS PARENTS
The previous section explored the competent individual's
right to pursue religious rather than medical care. As noted,
adults are presumed to possess the requisite mental capacity to
exercise this fundamental right.2 w Of course, the presumption
may be rebutted by evidence of incompetency. 20 7 The situation
concerning healthcare for minors is quite different from that
of adults. Minors are presumed to lack the capacity to make
their own treatment choices. 208  While mature individuals
below the age of majority have been permitted to follow their
own religious preferences on occasion,209 in most instances par-
ents bear the primary responsibility to make healthcare deci-
sions for their minor children.2
10
This section explores religious parents' rights and respon-
sibilities for their children's healthcare. The first subsection
discusses litigation where the state sought medical treatment
205. See, e.g., Smith v, Smith, 42 P.2d 232 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Ingersoll v.
Gourley, 72 Wash. 462, 139 P. 207 (1914).
206. See supra text accompanying note 112.
207. See, e.g., In re Milton, 505 N.E. 2d 255, 257 (Ohio 1987) (distinguishing
commitment from incompetency proceedings).
208. See generally In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989).
209. E.g., In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989) (reversed on other grounds), and supra text
accompanying notes 118 and 119.
210. The rights and responsibilities of court-appointed guardians in choosing
religious healing for wards who have never been competent is beyond the scope of this
Article. One commentator has suggested, however, that the discretion of such
guardians should not be as broad as that of parents. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, DEATH,
DYING, AND THE BIoLOGIcAL REVOLUTION 86 (1989). At least one state provides by
statute that courts should consider appointing guardians for adherents of faith healing
who are sympathetic to and willing to support religious healing. Amy L. Brown, Proay
Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1050 (1990) (citing
K xN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3014(a)(2)(c) (Supp. 1987)).
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for children whose parents preferred to rely on religious heal-
ing or for other religious reasons chose to resist medical care.
The second subsection describes the prosecution of parents
who relied exclusively on religious treatment for their seri-
ously ill children.
In general, this section concludes that courts should exer-
cise restraint in this area. To promote religious liberty and
family integrity, judges should rarely second-guess consensual
family healthcare decisions based on religious considerations.
Further, parents who rely on religious healing should only suf-
fer conviction following their child's death if the fact finder
has considered all evidence-medical and religious alike-to
determine whether the parents acted with reasonable care.
A. Compelling Treatment for a Child Over Parents'
Religious Objections
A parent's right to raise children is sacred."' The United
States Supreme Court has asserted that parenting rights are
"basic civil rights" 2 ' and constitute a "fundamental liberty
interest. 213 "It is cardinal with us," the Court has said, "that
the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents. '2
14
As child protection legislation has expanded and medical
practices have advanced, however, courts have become more
willing to intervene in the formerly sacrosanct relationship
between parent and child. The government, acting as parens
patriae,15 clearly possesses the authority to do so. Accord-
ingly, courts have been asked with greater frequency to compel
medical care for children over the religious objections of par-
ents. In resolving these disputes, courts have generally
weighed the following factors: the gravity of the child's condi-
tion, the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, and the
maturity and preferences of the child.2 16 Although judges cur-
rently order life-saving medical care over parents' religious
211. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 678, 126 P.2d 765, 768 (1942).
212. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
213. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
214. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
215. See supra note 110.
216. E.g., In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980).
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217objections as a matter of course, decisions to provide reme-
dial treatment are not quite so routine.2 18 When the burdens
of medical intervention are great or the threat to life remote,
courts should exercise restraint.
1. Historical Development
During the first half of this century, courts were reluctant
to intrude on the parent-child relationship without specific leg-
islative authorization.219 In fact, under the common law, the
judicial branch was without power to order surgical treatment
for a child over a parent's objection. ° However, when a stat-
ute specifically required parents to provide such care, courts
had no difficulty compelling life-saving,"' corrective,2 2 2 or pre-
ventative22 medical attention. But early in the century, child
protection statutes generally failed to mention medical treat-
ment.221 In 1911, for instance, a Pennsylvania court refused to
order corrective surgery for a child suffering from rickets
because the relevant statute authorized intervention only if the
parents' conduct resulted from "moral depravity" rather than
mistaken judgment.m As recently as 1942, the Washington
State Supreme Court declared itself without power to order
surgery in In re Hudson'22 because the child dependency stat-
utes made no mention of the provision of medical care.
In re Hudson involved an eleven-year-old child suffering
217. See infra part IV.A.2.a.
218. See irfra part IV.A.2.b.
219. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); In re Tuttendario,
21 Pa. 561 (1911).
220. In re Rotkowitz, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1941); see also In re
Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
221. See, e.g., In re Vasko, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1933) (ordering
treatment for a two-year-old suffering from a malignant eye growth).
222. See, e.g., In re Rotkowitz, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1941) (compelling
juvenile to undergo corrective surgery for leg deformity caused by poliomyelitis).
223. See, e.g., Stone v. Probst, 206 N.W. 642 (Minn. 1925) (requiring school children
recovering from infectious diseases to pass medical examinations before returning to
school).
224. See, e.g., In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. 561 (1911); Justice v. State, 42 S.E. 1013 (Ga.
1902) (medical care does not amount to "necessary sustenance" required by statute to
be provided for children).
225. See In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. 561 (1911). In this case, the parents were afraid
that surgery to correct the non-life threatening condition would be fatal even though
doctors testified that operation was extensively performed and generally successful. In
refusing to order treatment, the court noted that parents had already lost seven of
their ten children to an early death.
226. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 712-13, 126 P.2d 765, 783 (1942).
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from a congenital deformity.22 Patricia Hudson's left arm was
ten times the size of her right arm and nearly as large as her
entire body.22s As a result of the enormous appendage, the
child was frail, subject to infection, and her chest and spine
were becoming deformed.m On a number of occasions, Patri-
cia tearfully expressed the desire to have the arm removed.'
The physicians proposed amputation so that the child
could "take her place in society and live a normal life."'" But
Patricia's parents feared for the safety of their child.' They
had relied in the past on treatment by a divine healer, and
they consistently opposed the operation.233 The court agreed
with the Hudsons and declared that determining the risk of
the operation was the parents' duty.' The parents' decision
would not be overturned unless they were otherwise unfit and
the child was "treated with cruelty or exposed to immoral or
debasing conditions. 35
Three justices dissented in Hudson. They argued that
even without a specific legislative mandate, the court should
exercise its power as parens patriae.2 6 Justice George Simp-
son wrote that the child's welfare, rather than the parents'
conduct, should be of paramount importance. 7
Justice Simpson's reasoning has since prevailed. In 1947, a
Texas appellate court signaled the end of the era in which
courts looked for specific legislative backing to compel treat-
ment for minors.2-s The court was presented with a child suf-
fering from what appeared to be non-life-threatening
complications following rheumatic fever.239 The mother had
sought to cure the child by prayer for divine healing and home
remedies.240 The relevant dependency statute made no men-
tion of a parent's duty to provide medical treatment but
227. Id. at 675, 126 P.2d at 767.
228. Id. at 714, 126 P.2d at 784 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 676, 126 P.2d at 768.
230. Id. at 677, 126 P.2d at 768.
231. Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d at 677, 126 P.2d at 768.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 717, 126 P.2d at 785 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 700, 126 P.2d at 778.
235. Id. at 693, 126 P.2d at 775.
236. Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d at 723, 126 P.2d at 787 (Simpson, J. dissenting).
237. Id. at 733, 126 P.2d at 791 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
238. Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
239. Id. at 814.
240. Id. at 814, 815.
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required that children receive "proper parental care."'"
In ordering the treatment, the court declared that
"medicines, medical treatment and attention, are in a like cate-
gory with food, clothing, lodging and education as necessaries
from parent to child."'  "While a considerable amount of dis-
cretion is vested in a parent," the court stated, "the right of
appellant and his mother here to live their own lives in their
own way is not absolute. '243 Rather than looking to the par-
ents' good character or intentions, the court-in accord with
the Hudson dissenters-reached its decision by focusing on the




Courts have regularly imposed a duty on parents to seek
medical care for children with life-threatening conditions."4
This has been the rule whether parents opposed treatment on
religious grounds or sought to rely exclusively on religious
healing. As one recent opinion points out, however, courts
should not routinely overrule parents whenever their child's
life is threatened.24  When medical treatment will impose
great burdens on the patient and its chances of success are rel-
atively small, the family's wishes should be respected.27
Since the Second World War, courts have regularly
imposed what they hope will be life-saving care over parents'
objections. In Wallace v. Labrenz,24s the Illinois Supreme
Court directly addressed the issue of the parents' right to
object to such care on religious grounds.2 4 9 Darrell and Rhoda
Labrenz, Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to give permission for a
blood transfusion to their eight-day-old infant.25 The court
ordered the treatment after finding that without it the child
241. Id. at 813.
242. Id. at 813-14.
243. Mitchell, 205 S.W.2d at 815.
244. Id.
245. See People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.) (eight-day-old
infant in need of blood transfusion), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re D.L.E., 645
P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (sixteen-year-old suffering from epileptic seizures).
246. Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 1991).
247. Id.
248. 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
249. Id. at 773.
250. Id. at 771-72.
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would "almost certainly die."251 In response to the argument
that the transfusion violated the parents' right to the free
exercise of religion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Prince v. Massachusetts,252 upholding the state's
power to regulate child labor.2 53 The following quotation from
Prince became the standard rationale offered by courts to
override religious objections to life-saving medical treatment
for children:
The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty
to expose the community or child to communicable disease
or the latter to ill health or death.... Parents may be free
to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.254
This rationale has prevailed in cases involving religious
treatment as well. For instance, when evidence indicated that
the child's life was in jeopardy without medical treatment, the
Colorado Supreme Court saw fit in In re D.L.E.1 to prevent a
child from relying exclusively on prayer.2" In In re D.L.E., the
court ordered a sixteen-year-old juvenile suffering from epilep-
tic seizures to resume medication. 7 The child and his adop-
tive mother, a member of the General Assembly and the
Church of the First Born, had resisted medical care in favor of
faith healing.258
Other courts have also overruled parental decisions to rely
exclusively on religious healing when the child's life was in
danger even though medical treatment offered little hope of
cure.25 9  In In re Hamilton,2 ° expert testimony established
251. Id. at 773.
252. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
253. Id. at 171.
254. 1& at 166-67, 170 (citation omitted). See I. -renz, 104 N.E.2d at 774; see also
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140
(N.J. Super. Ct. 1961); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962); Jehovah's Witnesses
v. King Cty. Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 309 U.S 598 (1968).
255. 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982).
256. Id. at 276.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 272.
259. See In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1385 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (seven-year-
old compelled to accept treatment offering sixty percent chance of saving his life).
With regard to the denial of the parents' religious liberty in this case, the court felt
that it was "important" to note that the Willmanns' had resisted the administration of
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that twelve-year-old Pamela Hamilton had between a twenty-
five and fifty percent chance of long-term remission, and at
least an eighty percent chance of "temporary response and
pain relief" with the proposed chemotherapy and radiation." 1
Hamilton suffered from Ewing's Sarcoma, and doctors declared
that she would be dead within nine months without treat-
ment.262 The child and her family were members of The
Church of God of the Union Assembly, and they sought to
adhere to a church tenet that required them to "live by faith"
rather than by "medicine, vaccinations or shots of any kind."2
A Tennessee appellate court affirmed the trial court's
insistence that the child receive medical treatment. But,
apparently out of respect for the family's faith, the court also
directed the State to "accede to and respect the wishes of the
parents regarding Pamela to the extent that the treatment rec-
ommended by the physicians is not interfered with or
impaired."2'
Medical prognoses have spurred courts to order treatment
not only in cases where cure is uncertain, but also where there
is considerable uncertainty that the child's life is actually in
jeopardy. In 1983, testing disclosed that three-year-old Eric B.
was suffering from retinal blastoma-eye cancer.2' Eric's par-
ents, both Christian Scientists, consented to surgery but later
objected to follow-up treatment.2 66 Eric was declared a depen-
dent child (i.e., subject to court control) upon evidence of the
"extremely high statistical probability that, without medical
treatment, the cancer would reappear. ' 26 7 After the treatment
concluded in 1985, doctors recommended a two-year observa-
medical care because they believed that the child had already been healed by Christ
and not because the care was forbidden by scripture. IA at 1388. This rationale,
however, is constitutionally suspect. Either the court was relying on testimony that
the medical treatment was not forbidden by scripture, or the court reached this
conclusion on its own. But the latter course is subject to question because it requires
the court to engage in theological analysis. See Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990). And no matter which course the court
followed, First Amendment protection does not hinge on the existence of specific
scriptural support. See Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829
(1989).
260. 657 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
261. Id. at 427.
262. Id.
263. 1&
264. Id, at 429.
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tional phase, and again Eric's parents objected.2" Eric had
been receiving Christian Science treatment, and they wished to
continue only his religious care." 9
At a hearing to determine whether Eric's care should
remain subject to the court's control, the physicians testified
that tests had revealed no evidence of cancer during the previ-
ous two years, but that without monitoring Eric stood "maybe
a 40 percent chance he would die if there's nothing monitored
and nothing done about it."'  Consequently, the referee
appointed to hear the matter approved the monitoring plan,
the juvenile court refused to review the order, and a California
appellate court affirmed the referee's decision.21
The appellate opinions in In re D.L.E., In re Hamilton, and
In re Eric B. are indicative of a general reluctance on the part
of courts to accept religious healing as an exclusive form of
treatment for a potentially endangered minor.1 2 When highly
intrusive medical procedures offer little hope of success, how-
ever, exclusive reliance on religious healing is more acceptable,
as the following case demonstrates.
In Newmark v. Williams ,27 the Delaware Supreme Court
recently refused to force Christian Science parents to subject
their three-year-old son to an extremely risky and toxic cancer
treatment. Colin Newmark was suffering from Burkitt's lym-
phoma and doctors predicted that he would die within six to
268. Id. at 23, 24.
269. Id at 23. For a discussion of Christian Science healing, see supra notes 28, 44.
270. Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
271. The court wrote:
Granted, there was no clear and present showing of cancer in Eric. But no
reason in either law or logic exists to demonstrate why the State, with the
substantial interests it is entitled to assert on its own behalf as well as for a
child, should be compelled to hold its protective power in abeyance until harm
to a minor child is not only threatened but actual.
Id at 26.
272. In Eric B., the referee had stated that he "would not allow Eric to be treated
exclusively by spiritual means absent a showing that it would be 100 percent effective."
Id. at 29. Eric's parents objected to the referee's approach. They argued that an
applicable statute declared that a court "shall give consideration to any treatment
being provided to the minor by spiritual means," in determining whether to order
medical care. Id. at 28. The appellate court rejected the parents' claim that the
referee had failed to apply this law. The referee did consider the spiritual treatment,
the appeals court noted. He simply found such treatment inadequate under the
circumstances. Id. See also In re J.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (fourteen-
year-old infected with gonorrhea); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(six-year-old suffering from sickle-cell anemia).
273. 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991).
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eight months without chemotherapy.2 4 Colin's parents wished
to treat the child by spiritual means alone. 5 The high court
reversed the trial court's decision and, in effect, allowed the
parents to proceed exclusively with religious healing."6 The
linchpin in reaching its decision, the supreme court declared,
was a comparison between the risk of the proposed medical
intervention and its potential for success. 7 Where, as in this
case, the chemotherapy ran a high risk of causing the child's
death and threatened to disrupt the parent-child relationship,
while offering less than a forty percent chance of success, the
parents' preference would not be set aside." s
b. Non-Life-Threatening Conditions
When children suffer from non-life-threatening health
conditions, courts are divided on whether to compel medical
treatment over parents' religious objections.2 9 Although the
trend has been in favor of intervention, several courts have
found reason for judicial restraint. Legislation in a number of
states prevents courts from intervening in family affairs solely
because children are being treated by spiritual means alone.'
274. Id. at 1111.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1115.
277. Id.
278. Williams, 588 A.2d at 1115. A recent study indicates that a majority of
individuals viewed an equivalent chance of survival as reason to refuse an even less
intrusive form of medical treatment. In a survey of 226 healthy senior citizens, fifty-
eight percent would not want cardiopulmonary resuscitation if their chances of
survival were no more than forty percent. Paul Cotton, Talk to People About Dying-
They Can Handle 14 Say Geriatricians and Patients, 269 J.A.M.A. 321, 321 (1993).
279. For cases in which courts compelled medical treatment, see Harley v. Oliver,
404 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Ark. 1975) (cyst removal), aff'd, 539 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1976);
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) (six-day-old infant
in danger of brain damage); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (15-
year-old suffering from neurofibromatosis), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971), aff'd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (six-year-old with sickle-cell anemia); In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (child with burns covering four percent of her body). For cases in which
courts refused to compel medical treatment, see In re Cochise County, 650 P.2d 467
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (children declared "anticipatorily dependent"), vacated, 650 P.2d
459 (Ariz. 1982); In re D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980) (12-year-old with epileptic
seizures); In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. Child Ct. 1954) (congenital harelip and
cleft palate), rev'd, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div.), rev'd, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955);
In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972) (16-year-old with poliomyelitis), appeal after
remand, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
280. See Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 n.1 (Fla. 1992) (listing statutes in
various jurisdictions).
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In re Seiferth28l illustrates some of the fundamental dis-
agreements that arise when the state intervenes in these inti-
mate family matters. This 1955 case did not involve a threat to
the child's life nor to public health, and a New York court
refused to compel surgical treatment. 2 Martin Seiferth, Jr.
suffered from a congenital harelip and cleft palate.' The con-
dition gave the child a "hideous" appearance and caused a
speech defect.' Nonetheless, the boy and his father refused
to consent to corrective surgery.A The father asserted that
surgery would interfere with certain universal forces that
could heal his son. The court found that twelve-year-old Mar-
tin was "conditioned" by these beliefs as well.'
The trial judge decided that the child should be given the
opportunity to make the decision without court compulsion or
family interference.2s7 Although the operation could improve
Martin's condition with "reasonable safety and certainty," the
judge declared that to force the child to submit to surgery
against his will "might do more harm than good."' 8 To help
Martin decide, the court restrained the father from interfering
in discussions between the child and court-designated advo-
cates of the medical treatment." 9
On appeal, the intermediate court reversed the trial court
and ordered treatment.' According to the appellate decision,
the father's objections did not rise to the level of religious free
exercise but were merely "delusions" or a philosophy of heal-
ing in which "a small group of believers, without a leader or
literature, meet and exercise the forces."291 Justice Raymond
Vaughan expressed the court's view that it was immaterial
that Martin's life was not in danger, because "what is in danger
is his chance for a normal, useful life."292 While the father's
decision was entitled to the greatest respect, the court wrote,
281. 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (N.Y. Child. Ct. 1954), rev'd, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div.),
rev'd, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955).
282. Id. at 65.
283. Id. at 63.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 65.




290. Seiferth, 137 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
291. Id. at 37.
292. 1d at 38.
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"it must have some slight basis in fact or reason, when seri-
ously opposed to the best interests of the child."'
In a split decision, however, the New York Court of
Appeals reinstated the trial judge's verdict. 94 The high court
pointed out that no emergency was involved and that Martin's
cooperation would be needed for speech therapy following the
operation. 5 Thus, the court held that the trial judge's discre-
tion should have been respected with regard to allowing the
child to reach his own decision.
Justice Stanley Fuld, joined by two other judges, dissented
in Seiferth on the grounds that the court should not have
avoided its duty to promote the welfare and interests of the
child by "foisting upon the boy the ultimate decision to be
made." Justice Fuld explained as follows: "Neither by stat-
ute nor decision is the child's consent necessary or material,
and we should not permit his refusal to agree, his failure to co-
operate, to ruin his life and any chance for a normal, happy
existence."" 7
The dissent's emphasis on the medical promise of "nor-
malcy and happiness," together with a willingness to ignore
the child's own wishes, set the standard fifteen years later in
another important New York opinion. In re Sampson"8 is
indicative of the current trend in which some courts stand
ready to override religious objections by parents and to compel
even dangerous medical treatment for children whose lives are
not in immediate jeopardy.m
293. Id. at 39.
294. Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d at 823.
295. Id.
296. I& at 824 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
297. Id.
298. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971), aff'd, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
299. For additional cases following this trend, see Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp.
450 (W.D. Ark. 1975) (parent may not deny child necessary medical care on religious
grounds), aff'd, 539 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Petra B., 265 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (affirming lower court's declaration of child as dependent of Department of
Social Services for medical treatment of child's serious burn injuries); Muhlenberg
Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1974) (six-day-old infant in
danger of brain damage); In re Gregory S., 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1976)
(ordering physical and dental examinations where parent's actions posed some
substantial threat to health and welfare of children); In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981) (ordering custody of child suffering from hydrocephalus to the
Children's Services Division, admitting that child's life was not in immediate danger,
but noting that risk to the most basic quality of child's life did not differ significantly
in magnitude from an immediate threat to life); In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa.
19931 645
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Kevin Sampson, age fifteen, was afflicted with extensive
neurofibromatosis, which caused massive deformity on the
right side of his face and neck." Due to a large fold of facial
tissue, Kevin's eyelid, cheek, ear, and the corner of his mouth
drooped badly.301 The trial judge declared that Kevin's appear-
ance could "only be described as grotesque and repulsive." 2
As a result of his condition, Kevin had been exempted from
school since age nine, and he was virtually illiterate. 3
Although the child had no outstanding personality aberration,
he did evidence feelings of inferiority and a low self-concept.' °4
To treat Kevin's deformity, doctors proposed surgery that
could partially excise the disease but would not provide a
cure.30 5 Moreover, surgeons admitted that the procedure was
"much, much, much" above average in risk.' Kevin's mother,
a Jehovah's Witness, did not oppose the surgery as such, but
refused to consent to the use of blood during the operation.0 7
Kevin's opinion in this regard was solicited by the trial judge,
but was not directly reported in the appellate court opinion. 08
The trial court ordered the surgery to protect the child's
"right to live and grow up with a sound mind in a sound
body. ' '309 Judge Hugh R. Elwyn agreed with the dissent in
Seiferth that the court should not "place upon [the child's]
shoulders one of the most momentous and far-reaching deci-
sions of his life."' 31 0 Rather than reaching its own conclusion
about whether the surgery should be performed, however, the
court left the final decision to the physicians. Elwyn wrote:
"This is a judgment that only the surgeons are qualified to
make."
,3 11
The trial court's decision in Sampson was affirmed by the
New York Court of Appeals. 31 2 The court emphasized that it
Super. Ct. 1989) (appointing hospital as guardian ad litem to consent to blood
transfusion therapy, even though child's life was not in immediate peril).
300. Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 644.
304. Id.
305. Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
306. Id
307. Id.
308. Sampson, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
309. Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
310. Id. at 656.
311. Id. at 658.
312. Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918.
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was clearly within the trial court's discretion to order treat-
ment of "a serious physiological impairment which did not
threaten the physical life or health of the subject or raise the
risk of contagion to the public. '313 The court also noted that a
religious objection to a blood transfusion did not bar the order
"at least where the transfusion is necessary to the success of
required surgery.
314
Although Sampson did not involve a parent's desire to
treat a child by religious means, courts have often followed its
lead in addressing this issue.315 Several courts have even
rejected parents' exclusive reliance on religious treatment for
children without any evidence that the children's well-being
was actually in jeopardy. In re Gregory316 indicates how far
the courts have traveled from their reluctance to order medical
treatment. The City of New York brought a neglect petition to
secure medical and dental examinations for three siblings, aged
sixteen, fourteen, and ten, after a school doctor observed that
the eldest suffered from an umbilical hernia, cavities, and frac-
tured teeth.317 The children's mother, a member of the
Church of God and Christ, refused to permit medical care
unless the children themselves expressed a desire for it.3 18 She
believed that God or Jesus would help heal her children if the
need arose, and ten years earlier she had taken what she
described as a vow to the Holy Ghost to this effect.319
In accord with a neglect statute that gave the court juris-
diction over minors "impaired" by failure to receive medical
care, the trial court ordered the children to submit to the
examinations.320 Judge William Berman admitted that the
mother's religious sincerity was beyond question and that she
had not failed in her duties in any other respect.321 But the
court declared that its intervention was justified whenever
medical treatment would have a beneficial effect.32 2 Although
the judge made no mention of any evidence that the younger
313. Id. at 918-19.
314. Id. at 919. See also Santos v. Goldstein, 227 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. App. Div.
1962).
315. See cases cited supra note 299.
316. 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1976).
317. Id. at 621.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 622.
321. Gregory, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
322. Id. at 623.
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children had actually been "impaired" in any way, he noted
that they had not been examined by a doctor for at least five
years. 3
23
Despite the trend toward greater judicial intervention, a
few courts in the past two decades have been unwilling to
require medical treatment for minors over the parents' reli-
gious objections. 3 4  Because the children's lives were not
threatened, these courts supported family integrity and upheld
constitutional and statutory protections of religious free
exercise.
Less than six months after the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision in Sampson, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania chose to follow a different course in In re
Green.' Ricky Green was sixteen years old when his case
reached the Pennsylvania high court. He had experienced two
attacks of poliomyelitis, which led to obesity and paralytic sco-
liosis.326  Consequently, Ricky was unable to stand, and he
risked becoming a bed patient.327 Although his mother con-
sented to a dangerous spinal fusion, she would not consent to
any accompanying blood transfusion because of her beliefs as a
Jehovah's Witness.328
The trial court refused to declare Ricky a neglected child,
but the appellate court reversed that decision.3-9 The supreme
court, in turn, reversed the appeals court and remanded the
case for an evidentiary hearing to determine Ricky's wishes in
the matter.' When the case reached the supreme court for
323. Id. at 621. See also In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (ordering
fifteen-month-old child afflicted with hydrocephalus to submit to repeated surgical
shunting in order to drain the fluid from her cranium).
In matters not involving religious healing, courts confronted by religious
objections to medical treatment have concluded that the possibility of brain damage,
Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974), or of
crippling mental retardation caused by sickle-cell anemia, In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), warranted medical intervention. See generally In re Karwath,
199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (approving surgical removal of tonsils and adenoids over
the father's religious objections).
324. See In re Cochise County, 650 P.2d 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 650 P.2d
459 (Ariz. 1982); In re D.L.E., 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa.
1972), supplemented by, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
325. 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972), supplemented by, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973).
326. Id. at 388.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 387.
330. In its first opinion, the high court framed the issue in this way: "Mhe
penultimate question presented by this appeal is whether the state may interfere with
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the second time, Ricky's opposition to the operation proved
determinative. The court noted that Ricky's decision was
based both on religious grounds and on the risk involved in the
procedure. 3 1
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly rejected
Sampson's conclusion that a religious objection could not bar a
transfusion deemed necessary for the success of a required sur-
gery. "One can question," Chief Justice Benjamin Jones wrote
for the Green majority, "who, other than the Creator, has the
right to term certain surgery as 'required.' " The Penn-
sylvania high court held that the state did not have an interest
of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the parent's religious oppo-
sition, at least where Ricky objected to the operation and his
life was not immediately imperiled.'
In In re D.L.E.,1 the Colorado Supreme Court also
refused to compel medical treatment of a minor who suffered
from grand mal seizures.'3 The child and his parents refused
medical care and opted to rely on spiritual healing alone. s 8
Finding that the record did not show that the child's life was in
danger, the court concluded that the matter was controlled by
a state statute protecting the parents' practice of spiritual heal-
ing.33 ' The court also noted that the proposed medical treat-
ment involved potential hazardous side effects.3
The Arizona Supreme Court made use of a similar statute
a parent's control over his or her child in order to enhance the child's physical well-
being when the child's life is in no immediate danger and when the state's intrusion
conflicts with the parent's religious beliefs." Id. at 390.
331. Green, 307 A.2d at 280.
332. Green, 292 A.2d at 392.
333. Id. But see In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
334. 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980).
335. Id. at 874.
336. Id. at 873-74.
337. The statute read as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, no child who in good faith is
under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with
the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a
duly accredited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be considered
to have been neglected within the purview of this title.
Id. at 874 (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. § 9-1-114 (1973)).
Similar provisions are included in numerous state laws. See Hermanson v. State,
604 So. 2d 775, 776 n.1 (Fla. 1992) (listing statutes in other jurisdictions). Problems
with these exemptions are discussed infra part IV.B.2.b. Ultimately, the court did
order treatment for D.L.E. when the case returned and there was a finding that the
child's life was, in fact, in danger. See supra text accompanying note 255.
338. In re DL.E., 614 P.2d at 875.
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in rejecting a dependency petition not unlike the one approved
in Gregory.' While the trial court in Gregory ordered physi-
cal examinations for all three siblings because of the eldest
child's condition,34° the Arizona court in In re Cochise
County3 1 refused to declare several siblings "anticipatorily
dependent" following the death of their six-year-old brother.
34
Therial Drew suffered from a strangulated hernia and was
pronounced dead on arrival at the emergency room of the Cop-
per Queen Community Hospital in Bisbee, Arizona. 1 3 Follow-
ing Therial's death, the emergency room physician contacted
the Department of Economic Security (D.E.S.). 3 4 A D.E.S.
representative later conducted a twenty-minute interview with
the child's mother. 4 5 The mother stated that, because of her
faith in miracles, she would not seek medical care if any of her
remaining children were to become ill.43 Subsequently, the
D.E.S. drew up a plan to investigate all those families in the
area who had refused to sign medical consent forms for their
school-age children.34'7 The D.E.S. also filed a petition asking
the court to assume jurisdiction over the seven surviving Drew
children?'4s
The juvenile court denied the petition after finding that
the children were "apparently well fed, neatly clothed, ...
attend school with some degree of regularity and they have a
home which is clean and well kept."349 The court of appeals
reversed, however, and granted the petition.3 "In such child
protection proceedings," said the court, "it is the function of
the court to determine not only whether neglect or far more
serious abuse exists, but whether it is likely to exist in the
future."'" "It must also be noted," the court added, "that the
particular religious belief of a person provides no defense in
prosecution for breach of a duty imposed by statute to furnish
339. See supra text accompanying notes 316-323.
340. See supra text accompanying note 320.
341. 650 P.2d 467 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981), vacated, 650 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1982).
342. Id. at 466, 471 (Hathaway, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 460.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Cochise, 650 P.2d at 460.
347. Id. at 465.
348. Id. at 460.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Cochise, 650 P.2d at 470.
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necessary medical attention to a child."' ' 2
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the appellate deci-
sion and affirmed the juvenile court determination. 353 The
high court declared that without "actual illness," the state
ought not interfere with the parents' religious beliefs.' In
reaching its decision, the court pointed to a statutory exemp-
tion which provided that children who received Christian Sci-
ence treatment were not to be considered abused, neglected, or
dependent for that reason alone.' And the court concluded:
"We cannot imagine that the Legislature would give preferen-
tial treatment to one religion over another because one is per-
haps more established and thus more acceptable than
another."' But the court also noted that the outcome might
well have been different "[h]ad there been a genetic predisposi-
tion to an illness or the strong suggestion that other children
would fall ill.' ' 3 7 In addition, the court indicated that D.E.S.
could continue to keep a "close eye" on the Drew children and
that an investigation could be prompted "by something less
than would be necessary in a typical situation."" 8
When children suffer from non-life-threatening conditions,
judges should resist the temptation to compel medical treat-
ment over parents' religious objections. When possible, courts
should await patient consent before approving a high-risk
treatment with a dubious outcome. Even a low-risk procedure
performed to satisfy an outsider's notion of normalcy and hap-
piness has limited value when one considers the potential dam-
age to family and religious integrity. The fact that statutes in a
number of jurisdictions recognize spiritual treatment as a legit-
imate form of care supports this conclusion.359 These statutes
should be construed in a non-discriminatory fashion to avoid
governmental favoritism toward any particular religion.
c. Religious Healing as a Supplementary Treatment
Two cases, both resolved in 1979, are worthy of mention
352. Id. at 471.
353. Id. at 466.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 465.
356. Cochise, 650 P.2d at 465-66.
357. IM at 466.
358. Id.
359. See Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 n.1 (Fla. 1992) (listing statutes in
various jurisdictions).
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with respect to a parent's choice of religious healing for a child.
Although the opinions themselves barely touch on religious
concerns, they do suggest that a parent's use of religious heal-
ing as a supplement to medical care may garner judicial sup-
port if three conditions are met: the religious treatment is not
dangerous in itself, it does not interfere with prescribed medi-
cal care, and a competent medical practitioner is willing to
endorse its use.
In Custody of a Minor,' the parents of a three-year-old
child suffering from acute lymphocytic leukemia opposed
ongoing chemotherapy for their child. 61 They wished to con-
tinue providing an alternative treatment consisting of prayer
and metabolic therapy. 2 Metabolic therapy involved the
administration of enzymes, large doses of vitamins, and lae-
trile.3 In the face of conflicting expert testimony regarding
the value of metabolic therapy, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the
child should continue chemotherapy and desist from metabolic
treatment because the latter was useless and dangerous.'
Metabolic therapy for another form of cancer was permit-
ted to continue, however, in In re Hofbauer,3 decided earlier
the same year. In that case, the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that the parents' choice of metabolic treatment would be
respected when it was provided by a competent physician.'
Seven-year-old Joseph Hofbauer was diagnosed with Hodgkin's
disease and his doctor recommended radiation and chemother-
360. 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978), appeal after remand, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass.
1979).
361. Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d at 836-38.
362. Id. at 839.
363. Id.
364. Regarding the uselessness of metabolic therapy, the court noted:
The most that any witness claimed for these substances is that they might
help to ease the effects of chemotherapy, or they might have a psychological
or placebo effect, but even these claims are totally negated by the fact that the
chemotherapy for this child has proceeded with minimum side effects, and the
placebo impact on a three year old [sic] is clearly nonexistent.
Id. at 844-45.
Concerning the dangers of the alternative treatment, the court pointed out that
the child was already afflicted with a low-grade chronic cyanide poisoning from the
laetrile and faced the risk of brain damage therefrom. In addition, the enzyme and
vitamin therapy posed dangers to the child's liver and intestines and also ran the risk
of interfering directly with the chemotherapy treatments. Id at 845.
365. 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979).
366. Id. at 1014.
[Vol. 16:599
Religious Healing
apy.8 7 His parents, however, placed Joseph under the care of
doctors employing metabolic therapy. 3 At a fact-finding hear-
ing to determine if the child was being neglected by his par-
ents, sharp medical disagreement erupted over the value of
metabolic treatment 6 9 Nonetheless, the family court found
that Joseph was not neglected and the appellate courts
affirmed that decision. 7°
The New York Court of Appeals concluded that the course
of treatment pursued by the parents did not have to be "right"
according to certain objective criteria in order to meet with
judicial approval.3 7 1  "Rather, in our view," the opinion
continued,
the court's inquiry should be whether the parents, once hav-
ing sought accredited medical assistance and having been
made aware of the seriousness of their child's affliction and
the possibility of cure if a certain mode of treatment is
undertaken, have provided for their child a treatment which
is recommended by their physician and which has not been
totally rejected by all responsible medical authority.3 72
The court emphasized several additional factors in reaching its
conclusion: the parents agreed that conventional treatment
would be provided if the treating physician so advised; the
present treatment appeared to medical authorities to be con-
trolling Joseph's condition; numerous qualified doctors had
been consulted and contributed to the child's care; the parents
had serious and justifiable concerns about the deleterious
effects of conventional treatment; and the nutritional treat-
ment being administered was less toxic than conventional
treatment.7 3
Although the court also pointed out that the Hofbauers
had not refused medical treatment for religious reasons,374
implying that such a case would be less likely to find a sympa-
thetic ear, the decision is nonetheless relevant to such cases.
367. rd. at 1011.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1012.
370. Hoflxuer, 393 N.E.2d at 1012-13.
371. Id. at 1014.
372. Id. Several state legislatures have also concluded that a physician's use of a
harmless nontraditional treatment shall not constitute unprofessional conduct. See,
e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.130.180(4) (Supp. 1993).
373. HoJbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014.
374. rd.
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As in Hamilton, discussed above,37 5 Haujtauer reveals that
courts may be willing to respect alternative treatments unless
such care interferes with medical procedures judged to be
absolutely necessary. Given the deference that courts have
shown to physicians in recent times,3 7 6 it is also clear that med-
ical testimony would be effective in supporting a parent's deci-
sion to employ religious healing for a sick child. In addition,
the opinion in Custody of a Minor implies that evidence
regarding a placebo effect of religious treatment may be some-
what persuasive, at least when the child is old enough to
believe in religious care or caregivers.3 77
3. Conclusion
Following initial reluctance to interfere with parents'
sacred duty to raise their children, courts have taken a more
active role during the latter half of this century in compelling
medical care for children, religious objections by parents
notwithstanding. In some instances, courts have been willing
to order life-saving and even life-enhancing medical treatment,
no matter how remote the threat of death nor how dangerous
the procedure, so long as the medical treatment offers hope of
being in the child's best interests-in other words, so long as
the medical treatment may possibly lead the child toward nor-
malcy and happiness.
In decisions more supportive of religious liberty and family
integrity, however, courts have refused to order treatment-
particularly high-risk treatment-over religious objections if
the child is also opposed to the treatment or if the medical care
is either not intended to be or not likely to be life-saving.
When a medical prognosis declares it more likely than not that
the child will die even with medical treatment, courts should
not coerce care. Religious convictions should not be overrid-
den to allow relatively disinterested parties to grasp at straws.
In a like manner, petitions to declare children anticipatorily
dependent should be-but have not always been--denied.
While some courts have been reluctant to allow minors to
make healthcare decisions for themselves, they have shown
considerable deference to expert medical opinion. A few
courts have even allowed the physicians themselves to make
375. See supra text accompanying note 264.
376. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 311.
377. See mention of the placebo effect supra note 364.
[Vol. 16:599
Religious Healing
the final decision in complex and uncertain cases. But judges
should not abnegate their responsibility to decide these cases.
Although doctors are recognized as experts in diagnosing ail-
ments and in determining prognoses and possible treatments,
they are not specially qualified to balance the patient, familial,
and societal interests involved in coercing a particular course
of medical care. If the family's decision is to be overruled, only
the court-the ultimate arbiter of social values--should make
the final treatment decision, as informed by all interested
parties.37
B. Prosecuting Parents for Providing Only Religious
Treatment for Seriously Ill Children
As discussed previously, parents who have chosen to rely
exclusively on religious healing have faced neglect and depen-
dency proceedings to compel medical care for their children.
Where authorities did not learn of the parents' sole reliance on
religious healing until the child's death, prosecutors often have
pressed criminal charges. This subsection tracks the develop-
ment of this criminal offense, examining litigation in which
parents who relied exclusively on religious treatment were
charged with neglect, child endangerment, manslaughter, or
murder in connection with their child's death. To a greater
extent than the litigation to compel care for children discussed
in the previous subsection, these early parental prosecutions
reveal that by the first years of this century, a number of
American courts considered medical treatment a part of the
common faith of mankind. Developments prior to the Second
World War are described initially, followed by an analysis of
the modern trend toward increased legal scrutiny. Statutory
ambiguity and conflicting judicial opinions in this area signal a
need for legislative action.
1. Historical Development
It was probably not until 1802 that cruelty to children was
recognized as a criminal offense.379 In an English case arising
at that time, the defendants were indicted for failing to provide
their young "apprentice" with sufficient food and clothing.80
378. Regarding physician decision-making, see generally, VEATCH, supra note 210,
at 139-143.
379. State v. Clark, 261 A.2d 294 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1969).
380. Id.
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More than half a century elapsed, however, before English law
made it a crime for a parent, acting pursuant to religious
scruples, to withhold medical care from a seriously ill child.
Parliament was apparently moved to action by the court's deci-
sion in Regina v. Wagst&ffe.s l
Thomas and Mary Ann Wagstaffe, members of a religious
group known as the Peculiar People, placed their trust in
Providence rather than medicine when their fourteen-month-
old daughter fell ill. The parents were prosecuted for man-
slaughter after her death. They were acquitted, however,
because they had acted on sincere religious convictions.' 2
Six months after Wagstffe, Parliament enacted the Poor
Law Amendment Act, 1868, to make it a criminal offense
"when any parent shall willfully neglect to provide adequate
food, clothing, medical aid, or lodging for his child... whereby
the health of such child shall have been . . . injured."'
Although the Poor Law was succeeded by legislation that no
longer made explicit a parent's duty to provide medical aid to
children,' English courts subsequently found no difficulty in
convicting parents for denying medical care to their seriously
ill children.m
American courts followed this direction. Shortly after the
turn of the twentieth century, parents in this country who pro-
vided religious treatment alone to seriously ill children began
381. 10 Cox Crim. Cas. 530 (1868).
382. Id.
383. Queen v. Downes, 1 LR,-Q.B. 25 (1875) (quoting Poor Law Amendment Act,
1868, 31 & 32 Vict. ch. 122, § 6 (Eng.)).
384. Queen v. Senior, 1 Q.B. 283 (1898) (citing Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. ch. 41 (Eng.)).
385. The leading case in this regard was Queen v. Senior, 1 Q.B. 283 (1898), in
which the English court of appeals affirmed the conviction for child neglect of another
member of the Peculiar People, whose eight-month-old infant had died of diarrhea and
pneumonia. Chief Justice Lord Russell's opinion heralded the age of medical
preeminence. Referring to the trial judge's instructions to the jury, Lord Russell
wrote:
I agree with the statement in the summing-up, that the standard of neglect
varied as time went on, and that many things might be legitimately looked
upon as evidence of neglect in one generation, which would not have been
thought so in a preceding generation, and that regard must be had to the
habits and thoughts of the time. At the present day, when medical care is
within the reach of the humblest and poorest members of the community, it
cannot reasonably be suggested that the omission to provide medical aid for a




to face prosecution.' Several courts found in the law a spe-
cific parental duty to provide medical care to sick children,
whether or not such duty existed by statute. 3 7 These courts
simultaneously rejected evidence that religious healing was a
prudent means to meet a parent's general duty to care for a
minor.-3s
In early cases of criminal prosecution, courts perfunctorily
dismissed the parents' free exercise of religion as a defense."8 9
The opinions relied on the distinction set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States,' which
allowed the government broad latitude to regulate religious
action, while holding religious belief inviolate. Although
rejected as a defense, the religious nature of parents' refusal to
provide medical care often served to mitigate punishment. 91
Until 1985, in fact, it appears that no court of review allowed a
parent's conviction for manslaughter to stand when religious
beliefs were at issue. 92
In 1903, the first reported American opinion established
the precedent for misdemeanor prosecutions in cases involving
religious treatment for minors. In People v. Pierson," the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion of failing to provide medical care to his infant daughter
who contracted whooping cough and then died the following
month of catarrhal pneumonia.-94 The child had received
prayer treatment alone in accordance with the beliefs of the
Christian Catholic Church of Chicago-an entity unrelated to
the more familiar Roman Catholic Church.3 9 5
The New York Court of Appeals relied on then Section
288 of the Penal Code, which specifically imposed a duty on
parents to provide "medical attendance" for their children, and
found that medical attendance, as defined by statute, did not
386. See, e.g., People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903) (denying that medical care
is an act of worship protected by the Constitution); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 29 Pa.
C. 65 (1903) (finding father guilty of manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. C.
56 (1915) (finding father guilty of manslaughter).
387. Hoffman, 29 Pa. C. 65 (1903); Breth, 44 Pa. C. 56 (1915).
388. See, e.g., Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903); Hoffman, 29 Pa. C. 65 (1903); Breth,
44 Pa. C. 56 (1915).
389. See, e.g., Pierson, 68 N.E. at 246.
390. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
391. See, e.g., Beck v. State, 233 P. 495, 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925).
392. See discussion in/ra part IV.B.2.a.
393. 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
394. Id. at 244-47.
395. Id. at 244.
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include the defendant's prayer treatmentYm The court also
rejected the defendant's argument that his actions were a mat-
ter of the free exercise of his religion.'
In neighboring Pennsylvania that same year, the trial
court in Commonwealth v. Hoffman 39 declared that parents
had a duty to furnish medical care to minors although no such
requirement appeared explicitly in Pennsylvania statutes.'
The court refused to acknowledge the possibility that religious
healing satisfied the defendant's general duty to maintain his
child, and the judge excluded all testimony that related to the
efficacy of prayer.4 ° In dismissing the defendant's claim that
spiritual treatment was sufficient, the trial judge quoted scrip-
ture: "[A]s the body, without the spirit, is dead, so faith with-
out works is dead also."40 ' The jury convicted the defendant of
manslaughter with a recommendation to mercy, and the
defendant did not appeal.' 2
Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Breth,4°3 another Penn-
sylvania trial court elaborated on the view that an honest
belief in the efficacy of prayer did not constitute a defense to
the charge of manslaughter. Quoting the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, the judge noted:
It is not a question as to how far prayer for the recovery of
the sick may be efficacious. The common faith of mankind
relies not only upon prayer, but upon the use of means
which knowledge and experience have shown to be efficient.
It may be said that the wisdom or folly of depending upon
the power of inaudible prayer alone, in the cure of disease, is
for the parties who invoke such a remedy. But this is not
396. Id. at 245-46.
397. Id. at 246-47.
398. 29 Pa. C. 65 (1903).
399. Id. at 66.
400. Id. at 65-66.
401. Id. at 69 (quoting James 2:26).
402. Id. at 73. See also State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197, 199 (Ind. 1904) (declaring
that "[t]he religious doctrine or belief of a person cannot be recognized or accepted as a
justification or excuse for his committing an act which is a criminal offense under the
law of the land"). Not all courts at the turn of the century, however, took the position
that a conscientious objection to medical care was no defense to criminal charges. See,
e.g., State v. Sandford, 59 A. 597, 600 (Me. 1905) (instructing jury as follows: "When
the death of a human being from disease is caused or hastened by reason of the
omission to call in a physician, or to provide medicine, when such omission proceeds
not from any criminal indifference to the needs of the person, but from a conscientious
disbelief as to the efficacy of medicine or medical attendance, it is not criminal
negligence, and does not constitute a basis for conviction for manslaughter").
403. 44 Pa. C. 56 (1915).
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wholly true. For none of us liveth to himself and no man
dieth to himself .... '
The jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter--again,
despite the absence of a statute specifically requiring a parent
to furnish medical care to a minor.405 The court viewed the
matter simply as a question of whether the defendant had
intentionally failed to do what a "reasonably prudent person"
would do in a situation requiring "great care and caution. '
No appeal was taken.
As demonstrated by Hoffman and Breth, early in this cen-
tury total reliance on the efficacy of religious healing in the
face of serious illness was generally considered unreasonable.
Although religious motives did, on occasion, serve to mitigate
punishment, parents were subject to conviction for providing
religious treatment alone if they had failed to call a doctor
404. Id. at 64.
405. Id. See Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 620-21 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988).
406. Breth, 44 Pa. C. at 65. The courts have distinguished the reasonably-prudent-
person standard by which parents are found guilty of criminal neglect or manslaughter
from the less rigorous standard used in civil negligence cases. See State v. Watson, 71
A. 1113 (N.J. 1909) (reversing parents' manslaughter convictions on the ground that
the jury charge failed to distinguish between the gross, more culpable negligence
required for conviction of a crime and the negligence standard used in civil matters).
The reasonably prudent person standard as applied to parents providing religious
treatment alone was called into question in Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677, 679 (Fla. 1920),
where the parent's conviction was reversed on the grounds that omission to provide
medical care for daughter's burns did not amount to the type of "killing" contemplated
in the manslaughter statute. In his concurring opinion Chief Justice Browne asked:
Must a parent call a physician every time his child is sick, or risk being
adjudged guilty of manslaughter if the child should die? .. . Can the law fix
what class of ailments a child must be suffering from before the failure to call
a physician becomes culpable negligence, so that if death ensues in one class it
is manslaughter and in another class it is not?
Id. at 679 (Browne, C.J., concurring). Browne answered his own queries in the nega-
tive. Id. But see Beck v. State, 233 P. 495 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925) (reaffirming the
reasonably prudent person standard but reducing parent's sentence from six months in
jail to a fifty dollar fine). Regarding Browne's concerns, the court in Beck explained:
A fair amount of discretion is vested in parents charged with the duty of
maintaining and bringing up infant children, and this statute will not be con-
strued to mean that a physician must be called for every trifling complaint
with which a child might be afflicted, such as may be overcome by ordinary
household nursing by members of the family. But where, as in this case, a
child is suffering intense pain, and where the muscles of the body have
become drawn and rigid, it would seem that an ordinarily kind or prudent
parent, solicitous for the welfare of his child and anxious to promote its [sic]
recovery, would call in medical aid.
Id. at 496.
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when the average person would have done so and if evidence
was introduced that a doctor could have saved the child.
2. Modern Approach
In the closing decades of the twentieth century, religious
parents have faced increased legal pressure to provide medical
care for their children. At the turn of the century, govern-
ment intervention in the parent-child relationship was
unlikely if the parents acted in good faith. More recently,
courts have disregarded parents' good intentions in order to
compel medical treatment that is deemed to be in the child's
best interests. Where a child has died for lack of medical care,
felony rather than misdemeanor prosecutions have been initi-
ated with mixed results. Constitutional concerns arising from
the prosecution of religious parents signal the need for courts
and legislatures to chart a new course in this area.
a. Free Exercise of Religion
With but one possible exception, courts have rejected par-
ents' arguments that freedom of religion includes the right to
provide religious treatment alone to their seriously ill chil-
dren.' Ironically, as discussed below, some courts have rea-
soned that the right to religious freedom actually bars parents
from presenting part of their defense in these prosecutions.
This aberration of free exercise jurisprudence stands in need of
correction.
In 1985, a Pennsylvania court became the first appellate
tribunal to affirm manslaughter convictions of religious par-
ents who provided only spiritual care for their child."08 Two-
407. Trescher & O'Neill, supra note 3, at 217 n.76 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Cornelius, No. 105, April Sessions, 1956, Philadelphia County (Pa.) Quar. Sess., Nov. 5,
1958) (manslaughter charges were dismissed against Christian Science couple following
the death of their infant son from diabetes). In Cornelius, the prosecutor moved to
drop the charges and the judge concluded that
[w]hile a conviction of involuntary manslaughter may, under some
circumstances be predicated upon death attributable to the failure to provide
medical care, the character of the ailment, the good faith of the parent is of
supreme importance. If the failure to provide medical care is the result of [a]
religious tenet or a sincere belief in the inefficacy of medical treatment there
may be no criminal responsibility under the law.
Id. See also People v. Glaser, County of Los Angeles, Case No. A 753 942 (jury acquit-
ted Christian Science parents of manslaughter following the death of their child from
meningitis).
408. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), cert denied,
488 U.S. 817 (1988). Three earlier cases in the latter half of the century set the stage
[Vol. 16:599
Religious Healing
year-old Justin Barnhart died as the result of a Wilm's
tumor.' His parents, life-long members of the Faith Taberna-
cle Church, had chosen to treat Justin's cancer with prayer.41
In upholding the parents' convictions, the appellate court
quoted the Supreme Court's decision in Prince v. Massachu-
setts: "The right to practice religion freely does not include lib-
erty to expose the community or child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill health or death."'411
The appellate court then went on to use the Free Exercise
Clause itself as a reason to reject the defendants' argument
that spiritual healing was a reasonable means of fulfilling a
parent's duty.412 Citing United States v. Ballard, the court
declared that "the First Amendment precludes scrutiny of the
verity or validity of religious beliefs." 413 In other words, had
the parents employed nonreligious means to care for their
child, they might have been allowed to introduce evidence that
their curative efforts were reasonable. But because they chose
religious treatment, that possibility was foreclosed. Barnhart's
conclusion in this regard is actually inimical to Ballard; the
First Amendment arguably requires courts to follow a contrary
course of action.
In Ballard, the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment prohibited inquiry into the veracity of religious assertions
in a fraud prosecution.414 The holding sought to protect
defendants with unorthodox beliefs from religious persecution
at the hands of unsympathetic juries.41 5 In parental prosecu-
tions, however, the defendants are not prosecuted for what
for the Barnharts' convictions: Craig v. State, 155 A.2d 684 (Md. Ct. App. 1959)
(reversing parents' manslaughter convictions because prosecutor had not introduced
sufficient evidence that a doctor could have prevented the child's death from
pneumonia at such time as the parents should have realized the danger); State v.
Arnold, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Cal. 1967) (reversing manslaughter conviction because of
improper admission of parent's prearrest statements about the child's illness);
Commonwealth v. Sheridan, No. 26307 (Super. Ct., Barnstable Cty., Mass., Nov. 1967)
(suspended sentence for manslaughter conviction of Christian Science parent not
appealed).
409. Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 620.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 623 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)).
412. Id.
413. Id. at 623 (citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944)).
414. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.
415. Justice William 0. Douglas wrote the following-
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
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they asserted, but for what they did, or failed to do: for relying
on religious rather than medical treatment for their chil-
dren.416 Under such circumstances, to permit the defendants
to introduce evidence that they acted reasonably-including
evidence concerning the efficacy of spiritual healing-is not to
subject them to persecution on account of their religious
beliefs. To the contrary, to deny defendants the opportunity to
introduce such evidence is to discriminate against their action
for the very reason that it is religiously inspired. Rather than
protecting religious individuals from a heresy trial, as in Bal-
lard, this practice unfairly strips religious parents of an essen-
tial element of their defense.417
As the United States Supreme Court declared recently
regarding "the performance of... physical acts" in connection
with the "exercise of religion, . .. it would be true, we think
(though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State
would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought
to ban such acts . . .only because of the religious belief that
they display.1418  In a like manner, for a court to refuse to
entertain and evaluate evidence about the defendant's healing
practices simply because of the religious beliefs motivating
their use is to unlawfully discriminate against the free exercise
of religion.
A better rule to be followed in prosecutions of religious
parents would permit the defendant to raise the question of
the efficacy or reasonableness of religious treatment.419 Only
then would the prosecution be permitted to refute evidence
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of
mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
Id. at 86-87.
416. See generally Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322, 334-35 (Fla. App. 1990),
rev'd, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
417. Ironically, evidence that parents did seek out religious treatment virtually
negates their potential defense that the child's condition did not appear to warrant
healthcare. The parents' defense that a doctor could not have saved the child's life is
also often unconvincing. In Barnhart, for example, the jury concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that physicians could have saved the child's life despite expert
testimony that medical treatment would have afforded Justin Barnhart only a fifty
percent chance of survival if the cancer had already metastasized before treatment
began. Barnhart, 497 A.2d at 625-26.
418. Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990) (Free Exercise Clause does not bar state from banning use of peyote in
conjunction with religious ceremonies).
419. Courts have permitted juries to consider the reasonableness of religious




offered on this point. This judicial course is consistent with
the Supreme Court's intention, as expressed in Ballard, to pre-
vent heresy trials. Such a procedure is also in harmony with
the conclusions offered above. 42° Namely, it was suggested that
courts should permit parents to proceed with alternative treat-
ments for their seriously ill children, despite opposition from
the orthodox medical community, if at least some credible
expert testimony supports the provision of that alternative
form of care.421 Parents prosecuted following their child's
death should be allowed no less of an opportunity to defend
their liberty.
In addition, there is another reason for allowing parents to
introduce evidence that relying on religious healing was a rea-
sonable means of fulfilling their parental duty. To permit find-
ers of fact to consider other than medical evidence helps to
prevent medicine from assuming the role of a "religious"
orthodoxy, which may not be questioned, even in a court of
law.122 As noted previously, doctors should not be given the
authority to render decisions that are the court's to make; nor
should doctors' testimony be accepted on faith, as if no reason-
able person could disagree. Unless a statute clearly provides
that parents must consult a physician when their child falls
seriously ill, courts should allow the introduction of evidence
offered to prove that parents acted prudently by pursuing reli-
gious healing for their child.
b. Religious Statutory Exemptions
As described above, parents who relied on spiritual healing
alone for their seriously ill children have not received protec-
tion under the First Amendment's guarantee of religious free
exercise. They have found more success, however, arguing
that their right to due process of law has been violated. Some
courts have concluded that conflicting state statutes fail to give
parents adequate notice that their reliance on spiritual healing
could be criminal.423 Courts have also expressed concern that
420. See supra text accompanying notes 375-377.
421. See supra text accompanying note 375.
422. For a comparison between orthodox medicine and orthodox religion, see
generally ROBERT MENDELSOHN, CONFESSIONS OF A MEDICAL HERETIC (1990).
423. See, e.g., Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 604 So.
2d 775 (Fla. 1992); State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 475
N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991); State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Court of Common
Pleas 1984).
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religious statutory exemptions discriminate against certain
forms of religious expression.4 These constitutional problems
signal the need for legislative reform.
By the early 1980s, more than forty states had enacted
exemptions in their child neglect laws to protect parents who
provided only spiritual treatment for their children.' Since
1983, these exemptions have played a part in a series of con-
flicting judicial decisions in the prosecution of parents. In
State v. Lockhart,4 6 the first appellate court to interpret such
an exemption found that it provided a successful defense for
parents who relied on spiritual healing.
In Lockhart, parents were charged with manslaughter in
the first degree following the death of their nine-year-old
son.' Jason Dean Lockhart died from peritonitis in Garfield
County, Oklahoma, after receiving only spiritual treatment.428
The Lockharts were acquitted on the basis of the following
1975 exemption to Oklahoma's child endangerment statute:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to mean a child is
endangered for the sole reason the parent or guardian, in
good faith, selects and depends upon spiritual means alone
through prayer, in accordance with the tenets and practice of
a recognized church or religious denomination, for the treat-
ment or cure of disease or remedial care of such child; pro-
vided that the laws, rules, and regulations relating to
communicable disease and sanitary matters are not
violated.4
Following Lockhart, however, religious healing exemp-
tions failed to afford immunity to religious parents in a
number of jurisdictions, including Oklahoma. Shortly after the
Lockharts were acquitted, prosecuting attorneys found their
way around the Oklahoma exemption by charging Kevin
Eugene and Jamie Ann Funkhouser with manslaughter in the
second degree. 43° The Funkhousers were members of the
Church of the New Born, and they had relied on the elders of
424. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 22-27 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk,
J., concurring); McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720; Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931.
425. See Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 776-77 n.1 (listing statutes).
426. 664 P.2d 1059 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 1060 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852 (1981)).
430. Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695, 696 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert denied,
490 U.S. 1066 (1989).
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their church to heal their three-month-old son." 1 The child
died of pneumonia in 1983 after a two-week illness."2
The same appellate court that had affirmed the Lockharts'
acquittal ruled that Oklahoma's spiritual healing exemption
did not bar the Funkhousers' prosecution because-unlike
manslaughter in the first degree-second-degree manslaughter
did not involve the violation of the child endangerment statute
to which the exemption applied.433 The court also pointed out
that district attorneys had the authority to choose which
charges to file.4
In his dissent, Justice Ed Parks argued that Lockhart rec-
ognized a legislative intent not to punish parents who relied on
spiritual treatment for their children.431 "It is absurd," Parks
wrote, "to allow district attorneys to circumvent the expressed
legislative intent by charging an inapplicable offense under the
guise that district attorneys have sole authority to determine
what charge to file. ' 41
But Funkhouser's majority reasoned that the legislature's
intention to provide protection for parents who employed reli-
gious healing for their children had not been entirely disre-
garded.437 The appellate court affirmed a jury instruction that
simply modified the religious exemption in order to reinstate
the reasonably-prudent-person standard. 438  The approved
instruction read that a parent could be justified in offering
only religious care "provided that said treatment is something
which a reasonably careful person would do under similar cir-
cumnstances. 439 Courts in Indiana, California, and Colorado
have subsequently adopted similar reasoning with regard to
the application of their own spiritual healing exemptions. 40
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 698.
434. Id. at 697.




439. Id. at 698.
440. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (Cal. 1988), cert denied,
491 U.S. 905 (1989); People v. Lybarger, 807 P.2d 570, 578-79 (Colo. 1991); Hall v. State,
493 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 1986); Bergmann v. State, 486 N.E.2d 653, 660-61 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1985). See also People v. Rippberger, 283 Cal. Rptr. 111, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, No. 89-210 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., May 23, 1989, Suffolk
Cty., Docket Nos. 069517 and 069757).
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In State v. Miskimens,441 an Ohio trial court took a differ-
ent approach to the same problem, declaring Ohio's spiritual
treatment exemption unconstitutional under both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 442 The defendants, members of
the Christ Assembly, were charged with involuntary man-
slaughter in the pneumonia death of their thirteen-month-old
son.443 The child had received spiritual treatment alone. 
4 4
Judge Evans held that the exemption violated the First
Amendment establishment clause in that it gave preference to
certain religious people-those who practiced spiritual healing
through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets of a recog-
nized religious body." 5 The exemption also violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, according to Evans, in that its interpretation
would unnecessarily entangle the government in determining
exactly which religious bodies were to be "recognized" for pur-
poses of the statute." 6 Judge Evans further ruled that the
spiritual healing exemption violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause in that it failed to protect chil-
dren in these sects and it failed to give all parents equal
religious protection." 7 Finally, Judge Evans found the exemp-
tion unconstitutionally vague in that it did not provide fair
notice to parents of forbidden conduct."'
Judge Evans's non-establishment and due process concerns
have been shared by other courts." 9 The supreme courts in
Minnesota and Florida have recently concluded that their state
laws failed to provide adequate notice to religious parents that
relying on spiritual treatment could result in criminal convic-
tions.4 ° Christian Science parents in both cases had treated
their children by spiritual means only. The Minnesota
441. 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio 1984).
442. Id. at 936.
443. Id. at 935-36.
444. Id. at 938.
445. Id. at 934.
446. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
447. Id. at 936.
448. Id. at 937.
449. Regarding non-establishment clause concerns, see, e.g., Walker v. Superior
Court, 763 P.2d 852, 873 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., concurring), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905
(1989); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 1991); State v. McKown, 461
N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 475 N.W.2d 63, 69 n.9 (Minn. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992); see also In re Cochise County, 650 P.2d 459, 465-66 (Ariz.
1982).
450. McKown, 461 N.W.2d at 723; Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), rev'd, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
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Supreme Court also implied that the spiritual treatment
exemption violated the Establishment Clause as well, but the
case was decided on due process grounds only.45
As demonstrated by conflicting judicial decisions, exemp-
tions for spiritual healing in child protection statutes across the
nation have failed to adequately define the permissible scope of
spiritual healing for children. There are two problems with
these laws. In the first place, they do not give adequate notice
to religious parents that reliance on spiritual treatment can be
criminal. The Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in
cases reaching opposite conclusions on the due process issue.452
New legislation is required.
Secondly, many spiritual healing exemptions favor the
religious practices of "recognized" religious organizations over
individual religious expression. These exemptions raise the
same problem treated earlier in relation to compulsory vacci-
nation statutes.453 Although the Supreme Court recently
expressed approval of "nondiscriminatory religious-practice"
exemptions,4' a legislative preference for religious healing by
"recognized" religious groups only discriminates against less
popular sects and accordingly runs afoul of constitutional safe-
guards against the establishment of religion.4  New legislation
should provide equal protection to all religious parents.4e
C. Conclusion
Courts have shown an increasing willingness during this
century to intervene in the parent-child relationship. It is
clear that the child's best interests usually will prevail over the
451. McKown, 461 N.W.2d at 723; see also Walker, 763 P.2d at 873 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
452. See McKown, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992); Walker, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
453. See text accompanying notes 80-82 supra and infra notes 613-21.
454. Employment Div., Or. Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1989).
455. See Walker, 763 P.2d at 873-878 (Mosk, J., concurring) (pointing out that
provisions in the California penal code providing exemptions to members of recognized
religions violates First Amendment proscription of laws that discriminate among
religious groups); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1112-1113 (Del. 1991)
(suggesting that a Delaware child neglect statute invites courts to "impermissibly
determine the validity of an individual's own religious beliefs"); McKown, 475 N.W.2d
at 69 n.9; State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio Ct. of Common Pleas 1984) (holding
unconstitutional specific exemptions in child endangerment statute for parents and
custodians who utilize spiritual healing on children).
456. For a proposed model of a spiritual healing exemption, see Clark, supra note
3, at 588-89.
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parent's constitutional right to religious liberty. Courts, how-
ever, should not use the First Amendment as an excuse to
deny religious parents the opportunity to prove that they acted
with reasonable care to protect the child's interests.
In addition to First Amendment considerations, statutory
religious exemptions in child protection laws must also be
taken into account to resolve these dilemmas. Although these
statutes are in need of revision to address First and Fourteenth
Amendment problems, they do currently afford notice that
spiritual treatment helps to satisfy a parent's duty to meet a
child's basic needs. Thus, children receiving religious care
should not come under court jurisdiction in the absence of
actual harm or some immediate likelihood thereof. Spiritual
healing provisions do not prohibit courts from ordering life-
saving medical care. But courts should refrain from interfer-
ing with a family's integrity and religious liberty in most other
instances.
V. REUGIoUS HEALERS
The individual's right in a free society to practice healing
has been considered fundamental. Nevertheless, state and fed-
eral governments regulate healers to protect and promote pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare. Courts consistently uphold
these regulations as proper exercises of the state police power
and congressional interstate commerce power, so long as the
authority is exercised within constitutional limits. 457 Sensitive
to constitutional protections, state legislatures often exempt
religious healers from regulatory measures applicable to other
healing arts practitioners.458 After exploring the interplay
between legislative regulatory power and constitutional guar-
antees of religious liberty and patient autonomy, this section
concludes that First Amendment protections require courts to
liberally construe religious healing exemptions in public
health, safety, and welfare legislation.
A. Fraud
"Most faith healers are usually uneducated, untrained,
incompetent, avaricious charlatans, quacks and quasi-fortune
457. See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 (1917); Drown v. United States, 198
F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1952); Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911); State v. Marble, 73
N.E. 1063 (Ohio 1905).
458. See infra part V.B.2 (discussing medical licensing laws).
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tellers,"'459 concluded I.H. Rubenstein, a prominent legal com-
mentator on religious healing regulation. Rubenstein is not
alone in his suspicion of those professing to be religious heal-
ers.' Judges themselves have not always been free from prej-
udice when faced with unusual claims by religious healers."'
This section examines the tension between a legitimate gov-
ernment interest in protecting citizens from fraud and the pub-
lic's right to practice and receive unorthodox treatment.
As detailed below, fraud actions-both criminal and civil-
require (1) proof that the perpetrator knowingly made false
representations, and (2) proof that the healer intended to
defraud the victim.462 A religious healer's good faith may thus
be a double defense to a fraud charge-negating knowledge of
falsity as well as fraudulent intent. But is a jury likely to
believe that a practitioner who engages in exotic healing rites
for pay is actually involved in the good faith practice of reli-
459. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 39.
460. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neely, 444 A.2d 1199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). Harold
Neely was convicted of the aggravated assault and attempted robbery of John Pearson,
a seventy-three-year-old faith healer in Philadelphia. Neely claimed that Pearson
"had amassed the blessings of 25 stores and a Temple of a thousand people as the
Lord's minister of mercy healing" but that, in actuality, the healer "was a demon who
was wearing the Lord's mantle to ward off the ugly winds of poverty and honest
work." Id. at 1204.
In his confession, Neely described what happened when the healer solicited
payment:
I told Pearson that I don't have any money but that I would write him a
check. Pearson then asked me if I had a car. I told him that I had a car. He
then asked me if I owned a home. Pearson then asked me if I could get the
deed. I said yes and slapped him alongside the head with my hand.
Id. at 1204.
461. For example, in Jageriskey v. Detroit United Ry., 128 N.W. 726 (Mich. 1910),
Anna Jageriskey, a seamstress and faith healer, encountered judicial prejudice in the
personal injury action she brought after falling from a street car. On cross-
examination, the defense counsel inquired at great length into the plaintiff's faith-
healing activities. Jageriskey testified that she, her brother, and a ten-year-old girl
went out at three o'clock one morning to conduct a healing ceremony for a patient
who had recently undergone an operation. The brother dug a hole behind a billboard
while the plaintiff and the child prayed for the patient. Upon further examination, the
plaintiff testified that she had been instructed by the angel Casimir, who "lives with
God in heaven," to dig the hole in order to help her patient. Id. at 727.
The plaintiff's counsel objected that this line of questioning impermissibly
examined the basis of Jageriskey's religion. Nonetheless, the trial judge permitted the
questioning to continue and commented: "I do not think this is religion; you cannot
make this religion with me; it is too fakey." Id. On appeal, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court found that the judge's remarks constituted reversible error, and the
court ordered a new trial. Id.
462. See generally RoLLN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 363-
64 (3d ed. 1982).
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gion? Courts have attempted to counter prejudice by requiring
that conviction for religious fraud be based on more than the
jury's disbelief in unusual religious practices.
463
1. Falsity and Knowledge of Falsity
Conviction for fraud requires proof that the victim relied
on false claims known by the perpetrator to be false. 4 4 As a
general rule, the falsity and knowledge of falsity requirements
are not satisfied simply by a finding that the defendant did not
believe his own assertions."15 Proof must also be offered that
those assertions were, in fact, false. 46 As discussed in this sec-
tion, the truth or falsity of religious claims is outside the scope
of judicial determination. Consequently, fraud conviction of
religious healers requires proof that the victim relied on a reli-
gious healer's insincere claims that were both false and non-
religious.
Two turn-of-the-century decisions made clear that the fal-
sity of unorthodox healing claims and the healer's knowledge
of that falsity must be proved rather than assumed.467 In
American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,4  the
petitioner sued to obtain delivery of its mail, which the post-
master had withheld on the grounds that the school was using
the mails to defraud customers." 9 The Supreme Court held
that promises to heal by highly unorthodox but not illegitimate
means were merely the expression of opinion, and would not,
in and of themselves, be considered false representations.4 70
463. See, e.g., National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 591 F.2d 812, 817-18
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that the denial of plaintiff's challenge to a television station's
license renewal was insufficient when it alleged certain faith healing programs were
fraudulent without specific support for the allegation).
464. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 462, 363-64.
465. Id. at 368-69.
466. Id. at 366.
467. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); Post
v. United States, 135 F. 1 (5th Cir. 1905).
468. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
469. Id. at 98-99.
470. The Court declared:
As the effectiveness of almost any particular method of treatment of disease
is, to a more or less extent, a fruitful source of difference of opinion, even
though the great majority may be of one way of thinking, the efficacy of any
special method is certainly not a matter for the decision of the Postmaster
General within these statutes relative to fraud .... The opinions entertained
cannot, like allegations of fact, be proved to be false, and therefore it cannot
be proved as a matter of fact that those who maintain them obtain their
money by false pretenses or promises ....
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Three years later, Helen Post was also indicted for mail
fraud for using the mails to carry on her mental healing busi-
ness.471 The trial court required Post to prove that she could
heal at a distance and without the knowledge of the patient.472
The court also prevented Post from using witness testimony
that she had accomplished such healing in the past.7  Unable
to sustain her burden of proof, Post was convicted. 4
The Fifth Circuit reversed Post's conviction, holding that
the prosecution-not the defendant-had the burden of prov-
ing Post's representations false. 75 The government must carry
the burden of proof, explained the court, even if Post's healing
claims appeared to contradict the laws of nature.4 "7  A convic-
tion could be sustained, however, if the prosecution could show
that Post did not believe her own representations. The court
explained:
The ultimate question of fact before the jury was as to the
good faith of the defendant and that question involved her
belief in her representations and promises. While her belief
is not the subject of direct proof, it may be ascertained from
circumstances and by proof of her actions and dec-
larations. 4
77
The Fifth Circuit did not detail what would constitute
proof of a healer's bad faith. The court declared, however, that
Post's failure to "sit" to administer absent treatment to her
mail-order customers did not evidence insincerity.478 The court
noted that Post had mailed healing instructions to her patients
Id. at 105-07.
The Court left open the possibility, however, that the Postmaster could show at
trial that the healing business, as conducted, involved fraud. What exactly would con-
stitute such fraud, the Court did not say.
471. Post v. United States, 135 F. 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1905).
472. Id. at 10.
473. Id. at 11.
474. Id. at 2.
475. Id. at 10.
476. Post, 135 F. at 5. The circuit court further urged other courts not to jump to
conclusions in such matters:
The experience of the judiciary, as shown by history, should teach tolerance
and humility, when we recall that the bench once accounted for familiar
physical and mental conditions by witchcraft, and that, too, at the expense of
the lives of innocent men and women. In that day, it was said from the bench
that to deny the existence of witchcraft was to deny the Christian religion.
Id. at 11-12.
477. 1d at 9.
478. Id.
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and that she could have used her thoughts to heal "in one pos-
ture or place as in another .... 47 9
The Post court's assertion that a healer's bad faith-
"ascertained from circumstances and by proof of her actions
and declarations""q-was grounds for conviction provided the
standard for subsequent prosecutions of religious healers. In
three mail-fraud prosecutions reported over the course of the
next fifteen years, juries found sufficient evidence of bad faith
to return guilty verdicts against religious healers.4s In each of
these matters, the prosecution introduced proof that the
defendant had made false representations about his services.
Not until the prosecution of Edna and Guy Ballard-more
than forty years after Helen Post's indictment-did the appel-
late courts directly address whether a religious healer could be
convicted of fraud for not believing his own healing claims,
without additional proof that any of his declarations were
otherwise false.' 2  By its decision in United States v. Bal-
lard,483 the Supreme Court made clear that the First Amend-
ment prohibits judicial determination of the truth or falsity of
religious claims.4s The majority opinion did not go on to
decide, however, whether a conviction for religious fraud may
be obtained in the absence of such a determination. s The Bal-
lard opinions warrant further attention as they provide the
only Supreme Court commentary on the scope of First Amend-
ment protection for religious healers.
Guy and Edna Ballard founded the "I AM" movement in
1930, and within a decade their theatrical meetings and mail-
ings attracted the attention of as many as three million Ameri-
479. Id. at 6.
480. Id. at 9.
481. See Crane v. United States, 259 F. 480 (9th Cir. 1919); New v. United States,
245 F. 710 (9th Cir. 1917); United States v. White, 150 F. 379 (D. Md. 1906).
482. In other words, the question that went unanswered can be stated as follows:
If the healer asserts "x is true," can he be convicted of making a false representation if
no evidence is introduced that x is not true? It can be argued that the healer's
statement can be rewritten as "I believe x is true," and if the jury finds that the healer
does not believe x is true, then the claim is a false representation, knowingly made,
even though there is no evidence that x is, in fact, false. A statement of belief, even if
not genuinely held, however, does not constitute a false representation, at least for
purposes of some crimes involving fraud. See generally PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
462, at 368-69.
483. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
484. Id. at 86-87.
485. Id. at 88.
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cans.486 Mr. Ballard claimed to be in contact with ascended
masters through whom he gained supernormal powers, includ-
ing immortality." 7 Shortly after Guy Ballard died in 1939, his
wife, Edna, and son, Donald, were prosecuted for mail fraud.4ss
The Ballards were charged with fraudulently representing
that they were divine messengers with supernatural powers
and that, inter alia, they "did falsely represent to persons
intended to be defrauded that . . . [they] had the ability and
power to cure... [and] had in fact cured ... hundreds of per-
sons afflicted with diseases and ailments .... ."41 As part of
their defense, the Ballards argued that their healing claims
were similar to those made by other more established religious
groups, such as those who "conduct the Shrine at Lourdes, ' 4 °
advocate a "scientific system of divine healing," or teach that
"healings through others than Christ have occurred.
491
At trial, the district judge removed from jury considera-
tion the question of whether the Ballards' supernatural beliefs,
powers, and experiences were, in fact, false.49 2 But the jury
apparently found that the Ballards did not believe what they
preached because it returned a guilty verdict.493
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions,
holding that it was an error to withdraw from jury considera-
tion the truth or falsity of all of the defendants' claims. 4' "[I]t
was necessary to prove that [the Ballards] schemed to make
some, at least, of the representations set forth [in the indict-
ment] and that some, at least, of the representations which
they schemed to make were false."'49 In support of this hold-
ing, Judge William Denman explained in a concurring opinion
that to deny the defendants the right to introduce evidence in
486. SYDNEY E. AHSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 927,
1043 (3d prtg. 1973).
487. NOONAN, supra note 39, at 300.
488. Id.
489. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80.
490. Brief for Respondent at 77, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (No.
472).
491. Id.
492. As in the earlier religious fraud trials, the judge instructed the jury, in part,
as follows: "Mhe religious beliefs of these defendants cannot be an issue in this court.
The issue is: Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If
they did, they should be acquitted." Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81.
493. Id. at 79.
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support of their supernatural claims was "an obvious denial of
the freedom of religion of the First Amendment of the
Constitution.''49
The government appealed the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
the Supreme Court overturned the appellate decision.4 ' The
case was remanded to the circuit court for consideration of the
defendants' other arguments on appeal. 4 98 The Supreme Court
opinion affirmed the trial judge's instruction that the jury was
not to inquire into the truth or falsity of religious assertions.499
In a passage with direct relevance to the evaluation of asser-
tions regarding religious healing powers, Justice Douglas
wrote:
Many take their gospel from the New Testament. But it
would hardly be supposed that they could be tried before a
jury charged with the duty of determining whether those
teachings contained false representations. The miracles of
the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death,
the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of
many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile
environment found those teachings false, little indeed would
be left of religious freedom.'
In ruling that a jury may not inquire as to the veracity of
the Ballards' religious assertions, the Supreme Court did not
reach the question that the Ninth Circuit had previously
answered in the negative: Can a religious healer be convicted
of fraud without proof that he or she made a false representa-
tion other than a disingenuous assertion of belief? Nor did the
high court's opinion discuss the distinction between religious
and nonreligious representations.
In his dissent, however, Chief Justice Harlan Stone
addressed both of these matters.5° 1 Justice Stone concluded
496. ILd. at 546 (Denman, J., concurring).
497. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88.
498. Id.
499. Basing his conclusion on the First Amendment, Justice William 0. Douglas
declared in the majority opinion:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or
beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of
mortals does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law.
rd. at 86-87.
500. Id. at 87.
501. Id. at 88 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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that an insincere statement of belief was adequate to satisfy
the false representation requirement.' 2 In addition, he con-
cluded that the First Amendment does not prevent courts from
determining the veracity of representations regarding religious
experiences, including the experience of healing.'
Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his Ballard dissent,
expressed a third opinion, diametrically opposed to Justice
Stone's conclusions. Whereas the majority refused to say
whether the Ballards could be convicted of fraud if they did
not believe their religious healing claims, and Justice Stone
was convinced that their convictions should be upheld on those
very grounds alone, Justice Jackson would have dismissed the
indictment and "have done with this business of judicially
examining other people's faiths."'
Justice Jackson concluded that, both philosophically and
practically, prosecution for fraud based on matters of religious
belief and experience was ill-advised. 5 As a matter of philos-
ophy, Justice Jackson relied on William James's assertion that
personal religious experience constitutes the vital core of reli-
gious commitment. °  To prosecute individuals for communi-
cating these experiences with others, Justice Jackson reasoned,
would cut religious liberty to the quick.
5 0 7
As a matter of practice, Justice Jackson implied that even
502. Justice Stone wrote:
The state of one's mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent misrepresentation as
is one's physical condition or the state of his bodily health .... [I]t is
irrelevant whether the religious experiences alleged did or did not in fact
occur or whether that issue could or could not, for constitutional reasons, have
been rightly submitted to the jury. Certainly none of respondents'
constitutional rights are violated if they are prosecuted for the fraudulent
procurement of money by false representations as to their beliefs, religious or
otherwise.
Id. at 90 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
503. Justice Stone explained:
If it were shown that a defendant in this case had asserted as a part of the
alleged fraudulent scheme, that he had physically shaken hands with St.
Germain in San Francisco on a day named, or that, as the indictment here
alleges, by the exertion of his spiritual power he "had in fact cured .. .
hundreds of persons afflicted with diseases and ailments," I should not doubt
that it would be open to the Government to submit to the jury proof that he
had never been in San Francisco and that no such cures had ever been
effected.
Id. at 89 (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
504. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
505. Id.
506. Id. at 93.
507. Id.
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in the absence of any evidence that healers' assertions were
false, jurors might well be disposed to conclude that practition-
ers had acted in bad faith simply because the religious beliefs
involved were unusual. 508 "If we try religious sincerity severed
from religious verity," Justice Jackson noted, "we isolate the
dispute from the very considerations which in common experi-
ence provide its most reliable answer."'  Justice Jackson also
observed that the determination of sincerity was particularly
difficult in religious affairs given the various levels of literal
interpretation that are quite common.510 Accordingly, Justice
Jackson expressed concern that exposing religious healers to
fraud charges would open the door to prosecutions of ministers
propounding all varieties of religious beliefs.511
Taking Justice Jackson's admonition to heart, one court
faced with adjudicating allegations of religious healing fraud
has since stated explicitly: "We do not construe Ballard to
hold that, although courts may not examine the truth or falsity
of statements of a religious nature, these statements may be
the bases of a fraud action if made in bad faith. '51 2
On the other hand, following Justice Stone's advice, judges
have not placed religious fraud beyond the ken of governmen-
tal regulation.51 3  The judiciary's delicate task in matters of
508. Id.
509. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
510. Justice Jackson wrote:
Some who profess belief in the Bible read literally what others read as
allegory or metaphor, as they read Aesop's fables .... It is hard in matters so
mystical to say how literally one is bound to believe the doctrine he teaches
and even more difficult to say how far it is reliance upon a teacher's literal
belief which induces followers to give him money.
Id. at 94.
511. Justice Jackson explained:
Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious
persecution. I do not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud
for making false representations on matters other than faith or experience, as
for example if one represents that funds are being used to construct a church
when in fact they are being used for personal purposes. But that is not this
case, which reaches into wholly dangerous ground. When does less than full
belief in a professed credo become actionable fraud if one is soliciting gifts or
legacies? Such inquiries may discomfort orthodox as well as unconventional
religious teachers, for even the most regular of them are sometimes accused of
taking their orthodoxy with a grain of salt.
Id. at 95.
512. Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1142 n.16 (D.
Mass. 1982).
513. National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 591 F.2d 812, 817-18 n.33
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
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alleged fraud by religious healers was succinctly stated by a
federal circuit court confronted by allegations that a television
licensee had aired fraudulent faith healing programs:
We note the special difficulties attending the allegation of
fraudulent religious programming. While... it is quite clear
that religious fraud is not protected by any clause of the
First Amendment, inquiries into religious fraud must scru-
pulously avoid becoming inquisitions into the sincerity of
religious belief. It will thus ordinarily be necessary to rely
on extrinsic evidence of fraud in such cases.
5 14
Since Ballard, three appellate courts have been forced to
decide when it is legitimate to question the veracity and sincer-
ity of healing claims made by those professing to be religious
practitioners.515 These appellate decisions indicate that this
type of inquiry is permissible only if the healing assertions are
first held to be nonreligious. And as evidence of such, each
court found it necessary to rely on the healer's own declara-
tions that the practices described were not religious in nature.
One year after the decision in Ballard, Hugh Greer Car-
ruthers appealed his conviction of mail fraud.516 Carruthers,
who professed to be a doctor of both medicine and divinity,
claimed that he had learned his healing skills in a lamasery in
Tibet.517 Carruthers tended to the physical and mental needs
of his patients through his Neological Foundation, which had a
membership of over four thousand students.' Through the
Foundation, the defendant dispensed health advice, gathered
money for investment, and marketed a shampoo and a
laxative. 19
In appealing his conviction, Carruthers argued that the
jury was improperly allowed to consider the veracity of his
religious teachings regarding the health benefits to be gained
from "[b]reathing, silence, and [the] position of persons during
sleep. 520 In upholding the jury instruction, the circuit court
514. Id.
515. United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 787 (1946); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125
(D. Mass. 1982); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 644 P.2d 577 (Or.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1982).
516. United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
787 (1946).
517. Id. at 514.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 517.
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relied on the fact that in his writings the defendant himself
had denied that the Neological Foundation was a religious
organization, sect, or cult.52' Thus, the appellate court rea-
soned, a jury could consider the sincerity and veracity of Car-
ruther's health claims if it first found that his representations
were nonreligious, as he himself had once contended.522
The court in Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology523 also
indicated that it would permit further inquiry into the veracity
and sincerity of the defendants' healing claims.524 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant churches had fraudulently repre-
sented that the practice of auditing was "scientifically guaran-
teed to have certain beneficial physical, mental, and social
consequences." 25 The court found that the church's use of the
phrase "scientifically guaranteed" in promoting auditing would
be sufficient to raise the possibility that such assertions were
not presented as matters of religious belief.5 26  The court
warned, however, that words such as "scientifically guaran-
teed" were "not always adequate ... to divide precisely that
which relates to the sacred and that which is purely secu-
lar. '527 Hence, it was implied that proof that the defendants'
assertions were truly nonreligious would require an analysis of
the context in which the words were used.
In Christofferson v. Church of Scientology,52 another
appellate court declared that healing claims concerning the
concededly religious healing practice of auditing could none-
theless serve as the basis of a fraud action if the representa-
tions themselves were made for a nonreligious or "wholly
secular" purpose.5 29 The (hristofferson court went on to note
521. Carruthers, 152 F.2d at 517-18.
522. Id.
523. 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
524. Id. at 1144.
525. Id. at 1131.
526. Id. at 1141. The court stated:
The First Amendment protects utterances which relate to religion but does
not confer the same license for representations based on other sources of
belief or verification. Statements citing science as their source may provide
the basis for a fraud action even though the same contention would not
support such an action if it relied on religious belief for its authority.
Id.
527. Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1141.
528. 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1982).
529. Id. at 602. In determining that a jury question was presented as to whether
the defendants' healing claims were wholly secular, the court noted:
[P]laintiff did present evidence that the courses and auditing she received
were offered to her on an entirely secular basis for self improvement ....
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that the defendants' own opinion as to what was or was not
"religious" was not conclusive for constitutional purposes. °
As in Van Schaick, the entire context in which the statements
were made was the decisive factor in determining whether
they were nonreligious. 53'
Court decisions regarding fraud reveal that a conviction
requires the government to show that the healer made an
insincere and nonreligious claim upon which the patient relied.
Whether the healer's assertion actually falls outside of the pro-
tected religious realm must be determined by the entire con-
text of the transaction. But statements by the healer
concerning the secular or scientific nature of the services are
particularly persuasive in this regard.
2. Intent to Defraud
Fraud convictions require not only that the perpetrator
knowingly make false representations, as discussed above, but
also that these deceitful statements be made with the intent to
defraud.532 Usually a jury is free to infer fraudulent intent
from the fact that the defendant profited from false and insin-
cere claims. But this is not invariably the case. For example,
deception practiced to induce a debtor to pay a legitimate debt
will not support a fraud claim.53 3 Similarly, religious healers
can argue that one who intends to deceive a patient regarding
the efficacy of a certain healing instrumentality may not neces-
sarily intend to defraud. This follows because the patient's
belief in such an instrumentality may itself be therapeutic, and
the healer may intend to induce belief for this beneficent
purpose.
W.H. Neher raised this defense in his 1942 prosecution for
mail fraud.534 The defendant advertised that he could draw
curative power from the "Divine reservoir" to individual
Plaintiff testified that she was told that the term "religion" and "church"
were used only for public relations purposes. She also presented testimony
... that the staff was instructed to avoid the issue of religion when attempting
to interest someone in Scientology and that, if pressed, they were to say that it
was not a religion.
Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. at 603.
532. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 462, at 364.
533. Id. at 380.
534. Neher v. Harwood, 128 F.2d 846, 852-53 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 317 U.S. 659
(1942).
1993] 679
680 University of Puget Sound Law Review
patients whose names and addresses were placed on a card in
his "Cosmic Generator."'' 5 The appellate court rejected
Neher's argument that his intent to heal would constitute a
defense to fraud:
It is intimated in the complaint that even if the machine into
which the card is placed does not do the work, the fact that
the poor soul seeking relief from physical ills may receive
help simply because of the misrepresentation in which he
has faith, a sort of argument that the more cleverly convinc-
ing the misrepresentation is put the more it will be believed
and the belief if strong enough will effect the cure [is] a
sophistry that would justify and legalize any fraud upon the
sufferer of physical ills. 5 "
Yet, in 1943, the very next year, a New York court found
that a religious healer and doctor who knowingly employed
ineffective means for a fee did not possess the requisite intent
to defraud.53 Dr. Edward S. Cowles, long affiliated with the
Emmanuel Movement, conducted a "faith healing clinic" for
neurasthenics. s The Board of Regents suspended the physi-
cian's license for fraud and deceit, but the court reversed that
decision, finding that Dr. Cowles did not intend to defraud his
patients even if he had knowingly supplied remedies of ques-
tionable efficacy.539 Thus, Dr. Cowles's exoneration provides
precedent for the assertion that religious healers who know-
ingly mislead their patients by prescribing placebos are not
guilty of fraud if their intent is to heal, not to defraud, their
patients.
3. Conclusion
Throughout the twentieth century, appellate courts have
sought to protect religious liberty by setting high standards for
the prosecution of religious fraud. Fraud inquiries involving
religious healers must "scrupulously avoid" becoming inquiries
into the sincerity of religious belief."4° Under the First
Amendment, courts may not evaluate the truth or falsity of
religious statements, including statements regarding the effi-
535. Id. at 853.
536. Id. at 852-53.
537. Cowles v. Board of Regents, 44 N.Y.S.2d 911, 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 1943).
538. Id. at 912-14.
539. Id. at 916.
540. See supra note 514 and accompanying text.
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cacy of religious healing."1 Accordingly, conclusions regarding
the good faith or sincerity of religious healers must be based
on extrinsic evidence of fraud rather than on the evaluation of
religious declarations.' In other words, the prosecution must
show that the victim relied on false and nonreligious claims by
an insincere practitioner. The entire context of the transaction
must be considered to determine whether or not representa-
tions are, in fact, religious."M 3 For example, although a simple
declaration taken out of context that a healing practice is "sci-
entifically guaranteed" may provide a basis for fraud, it is not
conclusive evidence that the statement is not protected by the
First Amendment.5"
B. Regulation
1. Food and Drug Laws
Since the turn of the century, Congress has sought to pre-
vent the sale and use of harmful drugs and related devices that
are falsely represented as remedying illness.545 State legisla-
tures have followed suit. First Amendment protection for the
religious use of dangerous drugs has generally been unavaila-
ble.- In denying free exercise claims in these cases, courts
have relied on the Supreme Court's rationale first set forth in
Reynolds v. United States:M7 while freedom of belief is abso-
lutely protected, dangerous conduct may be regulated regard-
less of the impact on religious expression.B In addition, some
courts have interpreted federal laws to prohibit even the use of
drugs or devices "harmless in themselves" because-as one jus-
tice put it-"danger lies in the possibility that ignorant and
541. See supra note 499 and accompanying text.
542. See supra note 514 and accompanying text.
543. Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1141; Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 603.
544. See supra note 527 and accompanying text.
545. See Norman Gevitz, Three Perspectives on Unorthodox Medicine, in OTHER
HEALERS: UNORTHODOX MEDICINE IN AMERICA 9 (Norman Gevitz ed., 1988).
546. See generally Laughran, supra note 3, at 425 n.179 and accompanying text
(asserting that religion is an insufficient basis for allowing non-medical use of legally
restricted drugs). See also Employment Div., Or. Dep't Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (state laws prohibiting religious use of peyote are constitutional).
But see People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (use of peyote in religious
ceremonies can not be prohibited under the Constitution).
547. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
548. See Employment Div., Or. Dep't Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that religious adherents who use drugs deemed dangerous by
legislative authorities are not protected by the First Amendment from prosecution
under generally applicable criminal drug laws).
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gullible persons are likely to rely on them instead of seeking
professional advice for conditions they are represented to
relieve or prevent."' 9 Nonetheless, citing the First Amend-
ment, at least one court has interpreted the federal food and
drug laws to allow the use of harmless healing devices for reli-
gious purposes.5 °
Congress passed the first significant legislation regulating
the sale of drugs in 1906. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906 was largely a response to muckraking literature-such as
Upton Sinclair's novel The Jungle--and to pressure from the
American Medical Association."' "The law was passed,"
declared the trial judge in the first case brought under the Act,
"not to protect experts especially, not to protect scientific men
who know the meaning and value of drugs, but for the purpose
of protecting ordinary citizens."'' 2 The Nation predicted that
the new law would deal a "death-blow" to dangerous nostrums,
elsewhere estimated as a sixty million dollar annual trade.'
But the task of restricting the flow of drugs proved a diffi-
cult one. In an initial setback to regulators, the Supreme
Court declared that the 1906 law was only intended to prevent
fraudulent statements about the composition and origin of a
remedy's ingredients;' the law did not restrict claims regard-
ing the remedy's curative powers, no matter how exaggerated.
Even after Congress expanded the Act's coverage, critics
charged that the law was still inadequate because it applied
only to labeling and not to mass advertising schemes.55
After some years, federal regulation was again expanded
to apply to all representations that could be considered label-
ing that accompanied a product.-, In this context, litigation
arose to determine whether religious healing devices could be
549. Church of Scientology v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 341 F.
Supp. 563, 568 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting Drown v.
United States, 198 F.2d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 1952)).
550. See United States v. Article or Device, etc., 333 F. Supp. 357, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
551. Gevitz, supra note 545, at 9; RICHARD HARRISON SHRYOCK, MEDICAL
LICENSING IN AMERICA, 1650-1965, 71 (1967).
552. JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE MEDICAL MESSIAJHS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
HEALTH QUACKERY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 9-10 (1967).
553. I& at 36; see also SHRYOCK, supra note 551, at 71.
554. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911).
555. See ARTHUR J. CRAMP, NOSTRUMS AND QUACKERY 806 (1921).
556. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (1988).
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condemned because of alleged misrepresentations regarding
curative powers.
In the early 1960s, the United States government sued the
Founding Church of Scientology under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act-the successor to the Pure Food and Drugs
Act-to condemn the E-meter, a device used and promoted by
the church to conduct its auditing process.5 7 The government
charged that the device was "misbranded in that its 'labeling'
made false or misleading claims. .. and that the E-meter was
not accompanied by adequate instructions for its use."'  The
prosecution offered proof that L. Ron Hubbard-a science fic-
tion author and the founder of Scientology-and his followers
"repeatedly and explicitly represented that such auditing effec-
tuated cures of many physical and mental illnesses."" 9
At trial, the defendant church argued that it had "aban-
doned any contention that there is a scientific basis for claim-
ing cures resulting from E-meter use."'  But the church
affirmed its belief in the religious doctrine that "many ill-
nesses may be cured through E-meter auditing by its trained
ministers through an appeal to the spirit or soul of man.""
Accordingly, the church contended that the government was
prohibited by the First Amendment from introducing into evi-
dence religious assertions regarding the curative effects of
auditing.56
2
At the trial's conclusion, the jury returned a general ver-
dict in favor of the government and condemning the E-
meter."6 On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed the
trial court's decision and ordered a new trial because the jury
had been improperly allowed to consider whether thousands of
pages of Scientology literature constituted false labeling.'
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Ballard-which
prohibited consideration of the truth or falsity of religious
557. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
558. Id. at 1161.
559. United States v. Article or Device, etc., 333 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(discussing Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1969)).
560. Id. at 360.
561. Id. at 359.
562. Id. at 360.
563. Id. at 359.
564. Article, 333 F. Supp. at 359 (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. United
States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
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teachings-the court declared that Scientology's doctrinal reli-
gious literature could not be considered labeling accompanying
the E-meter for purposes of the statute.' Hence, the trial
judge should have removed any such material from jury
consideration.6
On remand, the lower court-referring to auditing as
"pseudo-science" and a "scientific fraud"--determined that
much of the literature promoting the E-meter was, in fact, sec-
ular, not religious." 7 The court then concluded that this secu-
lar material constituted misbranding in that it contained
misrepresentations and inadequate instructions for the device's
intended use.5 s District Judge Gerhard Gesell declared, how-
ever, that the court was "without power" to order the whole-
sale destruction of the E-meter because of First Amendment
protection afforded a religious practice "harmless in itself."' 9
The First Amendment also prevented the government from
rewriting Scientology literature to eliminate false claims, a
remedy commonly employed in commercial cases.570 The dis-
trict court reasoned that even scientific claims could not be
excised from religious literature because "there is religious
substance to everything when seen with the eyes of the
believer," and "what may appear to the layman as a factual sci-
entific representation (clearly false) is not necessarily this at
all when read by one who has embraced the doctrine of the
Church."
571
In light of these First Amendment concerns, the "most
satisfactory remedy," said Judge Gesell, would be to curtail
"purely commercial use of the E-meter while leaving the
Church free to practice its belief under limited circum-
565. Founding Church, 409 F.2d at 1160-61.
566. Speaking for the majority, Justice J. Skelly Wright concluded:
We cannot assume as a matter of law that all theories describing curative
techniques or powers are medical and therefore not religious. Established
religions claim for their practices the power to treat or prevent disease, or
include within their hagiologies accounts of miraculous cures. In the
circumstances of this case we must conclude that the literature setting forth
the theory of auditing, including the claims for curative efficacy contained
therein, is religious doctrine of Scientology and hence as a matter of law is not
"labeling" for the purposes of the Act.
Id. at 1161.
567. Article, 333 F. Supp. at 363.
568. Id. at 362.
569. Id. at 363.
570. Id. at 363-64.
571. Id. at 363.
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stances."572 Accordingly, Gesell set forth a list of restrictions
to ensure that Scientologists and others would make no secular
use of the E-meter.573 In other words, said the court, "E-meter
auditing will be permitted only in a religious setting subject to
placing explicit warning disclaimers on the meter itself and on
all labeling."
574
Similar to the court opinions addressing the issue of reli-
gious healing fraud, the E-meter litigation emphasizes the First
Amendment's role in protecting religious practices-including
religious healing practices. So long as such practices are both
"harmless in themselves" and conducted in a clearly religious
context, First Amendment protection applies. 75 As discussed
below, courts should employ similar criteria to determine the
legitimate scope of the religious healer's means of treatment
under medical licensing laws.
2. Medical Licensing Laws
Medical licensing laws-also known as medical practice
acts (MPAs)-have been the most significant form of healer
regulation since the turn of this century.5 7 6 MPAs in America,
572. Article, 333 F. Supp. at 364.
573. Restrictions set on future auditing consisted of the following.
1. The E-meter could be used only for religious counseling,
2. Users, purchasers, and distributers (other than the Church or its ministers)
must file an affidavit and an undertaking,
3. The E-meter must carry a warning that it has no scientific or medical
benefit; that it has been condemned in United States District Court for
misrepresentation and misbranding under the Food and Drug laws; and
that its use is permitted only as part of a religious activity;
4. Users, purchasers and distributees must sign a written statement that they
understand the warning; and
5. All literature and E-meter sales contracts must bear a notice that the
article has been condemned by the court, and that it has no proven
usefulness.
Id. at 364-65.
574. Md at 365.
575. See Heins, supra note 3, at 153.
576. Comment, Quackery in California, supra note 2, at 271.
Regarding the licensing of health care professionals, the Supreme Court has
explained:
Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks to enter it
than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those subtle and mysterious
influences upon which health and life depend, and requires not only a
knowledge of the properties of vegetable and mineral substances, but of the
human body in all its complicated parts, and their relation to each other, as
well as their influence upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect
readily the presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its
removal. Every one may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively few
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limiting those who can lawfully practice the healing arts and
condemning violators to "severe punishment," date back to
1649. 577 These licensing regulations have not gone unopposed,
however. Two hundred years ago, Benjamin Rush, Surgeon
General of the Continental Army and signer of the Declaration
of Independence, expressed a recurring objection to regulation:
"To restrict the art of healing to one class of men and deny
equal privileges to others will constitute the Bastille of medical
practice.... The Constitution of this Republic should make
special provision for Medical Freedom as well as Religious
Freedom. 5
78
The ongoing tension between those supporting and those
opposing regulation is evident from the fact that state licensing
laws adopted between 1790 and 1820 were repealed during the
Jacksonian Era of the "Common Man," 1830-1850. Opposition
to regulation arose, in part, from the fact that medical treat-
ment at that time was often characterized by the questionable
practices of drawing blood from, raising blisters on, and
administering poisons to the sick.
Scientific progress and increasing standardization in medi-
cal education during the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
however, led to renewed regulation. Medical reform acceler-
ated around the turn of the century as medical societies and
state licensing boards gained power over individual schools and
practitioners.
When numerous state legislatures first considered bills
requiring practitioners of the healing arts to pass medical
examinations, Christian Scientists and others, echoing Benja-
min Rush, argued that their constitutional rights to the free
exercise of religion and to equal protection of the laws would
be infringed.579 But by the early decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, state laws routinely prohibited a healer from practicing
medicine without first obtaining a license, and state courts
upheld these regulations as valid expressions of state police
can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he possesses.
Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his license, issued by an
authority competent to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite
qualifications. Due consideration, therefore, for the protection of society may
well induce the State to exclude from practice those who have not such a
license, or who are found upon examination not to be fully qualified.
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
577. SHYROCK, supra note 551, at 1.
578. Hodgson, supra note 3, at 647.
579. CLiFFoRD P. SMrrH, CmusTLN ScIENcE: ITs LEGAL STATuS 36 (1914).
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powers. s0 Courts generally construed these statutes very
broadly so as to cover all forms of healing activities.M5 Judicial
opinion varied, however, as to whether the practice of
medicine, as defined by statute, included religious forms of
healing.W
2
Legislators responded to the uncertainty in licensing cov-
erage and to the influence from interested parties by enacting
specific exclusions for religious healers."3 Some medical prac-
tice acts prohibited interference with "the practice of the reli-
gious tenets of any church, ' 5 84  and other jurisdictions
protected healing accomplished by "prayer or spiritual
means."585
Limited statutory protection for religious healers from the
application of medical licensing laws remains the rule through-
out the nation today. In the past, courts have generally ana-
lyzed three variables in determining whether the practice of
religious healing falls within the safe harbor of legislative
exemptions: the commercial nature of the healing operation;
the relationship of the healer to the organized practice of reli-
gion; and the spiritual nature of the means of treatment.~6 In
light of First Amendment concerns discussed above, religious
580. See Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911) (citing cases in which courts
around the nation upheld medical practice acts as a valid expression of state police
power).
581. See generally Mark A. Hall, Comment, Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U.
PENN. L. REV. 431, 453 n.80 (1988).
582. See, e.g., State v. Buswell, 58 N.W. 728 (Neb. 1894) (Christian Science
practitioners convicted of violating medical practice acts); State v. Marble, 73 N.E. 1063
(Ohio 1905) (Christian Science practitioners convicted of violating medical practice
acts). But see Bennett v. Ware, 61 S.E. 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (hands-on-healing does
not fall within the medical practice act).
583. See, e.g., 1907 CAL. STAT. chs. 212, 252. California's law, as revised in 1907, is
typical. It provided that anyone practicing medicine "or any other system or mode of
treating the sick or afflicted" was required to have a certificate or face prosecution for
a misdemeanor. Id. But the act went on to declare that licensing was not "to interfere
in any way with the practice of religion; [and it] provided that nothing herein shall be
held to apply or to regulate any kind of treatment by prayer." Id.
584. See, e.g., NEw YORK PUBLIC HEALTH LAw § 173 (McKinney 1910), cited in
People v. Cole, 113 N.E. 790 (N.Y. 1916) (reversing conviction of Christian Science
practitioner under medical practice act); FLOR. STAT. ch. 458.13 (1941), cited in Curley
v. State, 16 So. 2d 440, 441 (Fla. 1943); see also IND. CODE § 25-22-5-1-2(f) (1987), cited in
Stetina v. State, 513 N.E.2d 1234, 1240-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding conviction of
healer).
585. See, e.g., People v. Estep, 97 N.E.2d 823 (Ill. 1951), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 970
(1953), citing ILL. MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT § 37 (1949).
586. See infra part V.B.2.a.-c. (discussing the religious healer as a business person,
the relationship of the healer and organized religion, and the healer's means of
treatment).
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healers ought to qualify for MPA exemptions when their spiri-
tual means are harmless in themselves and their services are
rendered in a religious context. This proposed standard will be
discussed further following a description of the three tradi-
tional factors courts have employed.
a. The Religious Healer as Business Person
Some courts early in this century concluded that religion
and business were mutually exclusive. Hence, unlicensed reli-
gious healing could not be practiced as a business despite statu-
tory exemptions that arguably appeared to so allow." 7 In 1908,
for example, the Colorado Legislature enacted a law regulating
the practice of medicine, which provided that "nothing in the
act shall be construed to prohibit... the practice of the reli-
gious tenets or general beliefs of any church whatsoever, not
prescribing or administering drugs." Edward C. Smith, a
preacher and healer of the Divine Scientific Healing Mission
was tried and convicted, however, for violating the medical
practice act.-s9 At trial, the judge excluded uncontroverted evi-
dence that a tenet of the incorporated church was the belief
"in healing the suffering [of] humanity by laying on of
hands. ''"5 9 The prosecution did not offer any evidence that the
defendant prescribed or administered drugs.59' On appeal, the
Colorado Supreme Court, despite the religious exemption,
pointed out the differences between "commercial healing as a
money-making occupation" and "religion or religious
devotions. '
59 2
A more liberal interpretation of religious statutory exemp-
tions, however, was soon to become the majority rule protect-
ing sincere religious practitioners. In 1913, the New York
Court of Appeals issued its much-cited opinion in People v.
Cole,593 affirming the right of Christian Scientists to practice
religious healing as a profession.59
Willis V. Cole, a Christian Science practitioner, had main-
587. See, e.g., Smith v. People, 117 P. 612 (Colo. 1911) (religion and healing
business held mutually incompatible).
588. Id at 614 (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. ch. 121', § 6069 (1908)).
589. Id. at 615.
590. Id
591. Id. at 614.
592. Smith, 117 P. at 614-15.
593. 113 N.E. 790 (N.Y. 1916).
594. Id. at 794-95.
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tained his office in New York City for seven years when he
was charged with violating New York's MPA.595 On appeal,
Cole successfully contended that a professional healer could
fall within the MPA's exception for one practicing the tenets
of a church.59 The court stated:
When a person claims to be practicing the religious tenets of
any church, particularly where compensation is taken there-
for and the practice is apart from a church edifice or the
sanctity of the home of the applicant, the question whether
such person is within the exception should be left to a jury
as a question of fact.s9
Accordingly, evidence of the profit motive has continued
to cast doubt on healers' claims that their activities are sin-
cerely religious and thereby qualify for licensing exemptions.
Even healers who avoid a business-like appearance by
accepting donations rather than charging fees, or by con-
ducting their activities in the "sanctity of the home," have not
been free from suspicion.
Such suspicion was clearly evident in the midcentury trials
of William and Dora Estep and Esther 0. Handzik.5 98 These
defendants were arrested in the largest religious-healer raid
reported in twentieth-century appellate opinions. A grand jury
named fifteen members of the Central Baptist Church of Chi-
cago in an indictment charging the defendants with conspiracy
to violate the medical practice act, perpetrate a confidence
game, and obtain money under false pretenses.5' The case
received public attention and trial proceedings were regularly
reported in the Chicago Tribune.6°°
All of the defendants claimed to believe in and practice
divine healing as Christian Psycho-Physicians.0' But the fact-
finders looked behind defendants' contentions that no fees
were charged for their healing services and found that
595. Id. at 792.
596. Id. at 794-95.
597. Id The following year, the court reiterated its position that a religious healer
may conduct a business. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, affirming the conviction of a
healer for illegal medical practices, wrote that it was error, albeit harmless, for a trial
court to charge the jury that "the defendant had not the right to practice his religion
for pay." People v. Vogelgesang, 116 N.E. 977, 978 (N.Y. 1917).
598. People v. Estep, 104 N.E.2d 562, 565 (Ill. App, Ct. 1952); People v. Handzik,
102 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
599. Estep, 104 N.E.2d at 563.
600. Id. at 566.
601. Id. at 564.
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amounts for voluntary contributions were actually fixed.6°2 In
the Esteps' prosecution, one appellate court wrote as follows:
Fixed charges were made for everything, including attend-
ance at classes, the purchase of the machines and for the
treatments. Ostensibly, all these were voluntary contribu-
tions. However, the contribution for a specific service or
machine was always the same. Defendant, William Estep,
referred to the "twenty dollar treatment" when talking to
one of his patients.6°
In People v. Handzik, ° Ester 0. Handzik was also con-
victed despite her testimony that she earned her living as a tai-
lor and merely accepted donations for her services. Handzik's
"sanctity of the home" defense failed as well. She was found
guilty of unlawfully maintaining "an office for examination or
treatment of persons afflicted . . . with any ailment," despite
the fact that she practiced her healing trade exclusively in the
privacy of her own home. 6° s
At the present time, religious healing may be practiced as
a legitimate business. Courts continue to entertain doubts,
however, about religious healers who charge for their services
or who operate outside of church or home. Healers function-
ing apart from the organized practice of religion are also sub-
ject to increased suspicion.
b. The Relationship of the Healer to the Organized Practice
of Religion
As noted above, state statutes frequently provide that
licensing is not intended to interfere with either the practice of
religion 6°6 or with the religious tenets of a church.' 7 Courts
have generally construed these legislative exemptions to
require that both healer and healing practices be closely associ-
ated with a recognizable religious organization. 8 Still other
602. Id. at 563.
603. Id. at 565.
604. 102 N.E.2d 340 (Ill. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
605. Id. at 343. In finding that the home was used as a business office, the court
relied on the facts that Ms. Handzik passed out business cards using the title "Dr." and
listing her home address and "office hours." Id.
606. See, e.g., State v. Verbon, 167 Wash. 140, 8 P.2d 1083 (1932). See also supra
note 583.
607. See supra note 584.
608. The New York Court of Appeals explained the religious tenet exemption in
this way:
The tenets of a church are the beliefs, doctrines, and creeds of the church.
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courts have indicated that the patient, as well as the healer and
the healing activity, must be church-affiliated to qualify for the
exemption.609
The requirement that healers be part of an organized reli-
gion is constitutionally suspect. Legislative610 and judicial"'
preferences for members of organized or recognized religious
groups acting in accordance with church tenets is contrary to
contemporary First Amendment thinking. Admittedly, the
United States Supreme Court has not specifically held that
actions motivated by individual religious belief fall within a
statutory exemption that applies to "the practice of religion" or
to those practices that are in accord with "the religious tenets
of any church." To exclude sincere religious practitioners from
such exemptions, however, runs afoul of the First Amend-
ment's prohibition against religious discrimination.
Three Supreme Court decisions forbid such religious dis-
crimination. In United States v. Seeger,612 the Court broadly
construed the term religion to avoid governmental preference
for one form of religious expression over another.6 13 In Seeger,
the Court held that conscientious objectors to military service
need not be members of organized religious groups.614 And
more recently, in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employ-
ment Security,615 the Court declared that religious action
unsupported by a "tenet, belief, or teaching of an established
religious body" nonetheless enjoys First Amendment protec-
tion.616 In Frazee, the Supreme Court awarded unemployment
benefits to a claimant whose refusal to work on Sundays was
not based on a tenet of a particular church.617 Furthermore, in
The exception relates to the tenets of the church as an organized body as
distinguished from an individual. It does not relate to or except persons
practicing in accordance with individual belief.
People v. Cole, 113 N.E. 790, 794 (N.Y. 1916).
609. See, e.g., Northrup v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258-59 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987); Stetina v. State, 513 N.E.2d 1234, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
610. See, e.g., Cole, 113 N.E. 790.
611. See, e.g., Northrup, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255.
612. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
613. Id. at 183 (reflecting the "broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among
US",).
614. Id. at 172.
615. 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (granting unemployment benefits to a worker who lost his
job because he refused to work on Sunday).
616. Id. at 831-32.
617. The Court declared:
Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination, especially
one with a specific tenet [authorizing the religious action], would simplify the
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Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human
Resources v. Smith,61 the Court emphasized that the judiciary
must avoid examining the tenets of religious bodies because
these inquiries impermissibly entangle the government in reli-
gious affairs.6 19 Accordingly, it may be argued that courts
which exempt only healers acting in accordance with church
tenets are violating the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Such a policy involves the government in unnec-
essary determinations of religious doctrine and discriminates
against less organized forms of religious expression.
In addressing questions of religious exemptions in the con-
text of healthcare, lower courts have similarly concluded that
statutory exemptions in immunization laws limited to mem-
bers of recognized denominations unfairly discriminate against
individual religious practitioners. 20 To remedy this injustice,
several courts have broadly construed the statutory exemp-
tions to allow unaffiliated individuals to exercise their religious
preferences. 62 ' A similar course is called for in the interpreta-
tion of medical licensing exemptions.
Although some courts reviewing vaccination statutes saw
fit to eliminate the religious exemptions in their entirety, this
result is unwarranted in dealing with medical licensing laws.
In the context of immunizations, it may be argued that broad-
ening the exemptions subjects the public to the increased risk
of epidemic. Expanding licensing exemptions, however, does
not expose the public-at-large to danger. Only the individual
patient is placed at risk. Moreover, this risk is minimal
because the healer is limited to the use of harmless means
employed in a religious context, as discussed below. Thus, the
course of action recommended here offers the advantage of
problem of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion
that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be
responding to the commands of a particular religious organization.
Id. at 834.
618. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
619. Id. at 887.
620. See, e.g., Davis v. State of Maryland, 451 A.2d 107 (Md. 1982); Dalli v. Board of
Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971); Board of Educ. of Mountain Lakes v. Maas, 152
A.2d 394 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 158 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1960).
621. See, e.g., Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (upholding
preliminary injunction prohibiting exclusion from school of non-immunized children
who practiced faith similar to Christian Science); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 202 A.2d 889
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964) (compelling state university to accept a non-
immunized student who belonged to no recognized religious group when Christian
Scientists were exempted from vaccination).
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promoting religious liberty on an equal basis to all without
unnecessarily jeopardizing public health.
Although courts have generally viewed church affiliation
with favor, some healers have nonetheless faced prosecution
for practicing their trade on church members in accordance
with the church's tenets. For example, in 1976, Carey Reams
of the Interfaith Christian Church in Georgia was enjoined
from practicing medicine without a license. 2 Pastor Reams
employed urine and saliva tests to diagnose illness, and he pre-
scribed dietary measures as a cure.623 At trial, the pastor
argued that he had been practicing his religious beliefs, not
medicine, and that those he treated were well aware of this
fact. 24 To support his contentions, Reams produced church
membership applications completed by his patients prior to
treatment.2 5 Nonetheless, the Georgia Supreme Court found
that Pastor Reams had not been practicing religious tenets
because he regularly diagnosed and prescribed remedies as
part of his cure. 26 Limitations on a religious healer's means of
treatment is the next topic of concern.
c. The Religious Healer's Means of Treatment
Medical practice acts around the nation uniformly prohibit
diagnosis, treatment, or prescription of remedies by unlicensed
practitioners. Many of these acts provide, as noted above, that
licensing is not intended to interfere with the practice or ten-
ets of religion. Other acts specifically exempt treatment by
prayer or spiritual means. No matter which approach to reli-
gious exemptions legislatures have taken-and some have com-
bined them-most courts have narrowly construed the
exemptions, affording protection only to healers who treat by
prayer or spiritual means alone.627 Accordingly, appellate
courts have consistently upheld convictions of religious healers
who diagnose, prescribe remedies, or employ medical, material,
or psychological means of treatment.62 But, as indicated




626. Id. at 347.
627. For examples of these approaches, see People v. Vogelgesang, 116 N.E. 977
(N.Y. 1917) (healer employing physical agencies does not fall within MPA exception);
People v. Cole, 113 N.E. 790 (N.Y. 1916) (Christian Science practitioner may fall within
MPA exemption).
628. See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 40-41.
1993] 693
694 University of Puget Sound Law Review
below, some courts have given more leeway to healers with
close connections to established religions. 9
The following subsections describe court treatment of reli-
gious healers employing (1) drugs and devices, (2) non-physical
agencies, (3) midwifery, and (4) laying-on-hands. A suggested
approach to determine the legitimacy of the religious healer's
means immediately follows.
i. Drugs and Devices
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York
Court of Appeals in 1917, authored an influential opinion
strictly limiting religious treatment to spiritual means alone.
In People v. Vogelgesang,ss° a healer recognized by the Spiritu-
alist Church was convicted at trial of practicing medicine with-
out a license.63 ' Vogelgesang treated his patients with
medicines he himself had patented as well as with prayer.632
He used a massage liniment of angle worms, turpentine, sweet
oil, and benzine, and he prescribed a compound of wine, beef
tea, and citrate of iron for internal use.6 33 Cardozo wrote in
upholding Vogelgesang's conviction:
He combined faith with patent medicine. If he invoked the
power of spirit, he did not forget to prescribe his drugs. "It
is beyond all question or dispute," said Voltaire, "that magic
words and ceremonies are quite capable of most effectually
destroying a whole flock of sheep, if the words be accompa-
nied by a sufficient quantity of arsenic." . . . While the
healer inculcates the faith of the church as a method of heal-
ing, he is immune. When he goes beyond that, puts his spiri-
tual agencies aside and takes up the agencies of the flesh, his
immunity ceases.
634
A more recent example in which the courts affirmed the
distinction between permissible spiritual and illegitimate mate-
rial agencies is the prosecution of William and Dora Estep,
Christian Psycho-Physicians, discussed above. 635 The Esteps
629. See People v. Klinger, 11 N.E.2d 40 (I1. App. Ct. 1937). Discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 675-77.
630. 116 N.E. 977 (N.Y. 1917).
631. Id.
632. Id. at 977-78.
633. Id.
634. Id. (citation omitted)




were convicted of conspiring to violate the Illinois Medical
Practice Act-' The Act, by its own terms, did not apply to
"persons treating human ailments by prayer or spiritual means
as an exercise or enjoyment of religious freedom.""
The defendants did not deny employing physical instru-
ments as part of their treatment: an estemeter ascertained
vitamin deficiencies; a roto-ray created atomic water using
colored light rays; and a vita-ray delivered electricity to parts
of patients' bodies.6 38 But the defendants argued that these
instrumentalities were subordinate to the spiritual means
employed. 39
During each treatment, patients were requested to pray in
order to join their will with the will of God. ° Further, the
Esteps explained to their patients that the various instruments
were not used for diagnosis of disease nor for cure. They
taught that the equipment merely ascertained the condition of
the patient's life energy and that "God alone cures disease and
no man or remedy ever cured any ailment whatsoever. '
Prior to treatment each patient signed a document acknowl-
edging his or her understanding of the church's tenets regard-
ing healing.63 Despite these efforts to bring the sufferer's
mind into submission with the infinite mind and to obtain the
patients' informed consent, the court rejected the defendants'
claim for protection within the prayer and spiritual means
exclusion and affirmed their criminal convictions.'
ii. Non-Physical Agencies
Whereas courts have had little difficulty in distinguishing
purely spiritual treatment from practices involving drugs or
devices, more disagreement has arisen in drawing the line
between spiritual and mental means. In Crane v. Johnson,6'
the Supreme Court held that California's prayer exemption did
not unfairly discriminate against a drugless practitioner who
did not use prayer, but rather who employed faith, hope,
636. Estep, 104 N.E.2d at 563.




641. Estep, 104 N.E.2d at 564.
642. Id.
643. Id.
644. Id. at 565, 567.
645. 242 U.S. 339 (1917).
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mental suggestion, and mental adaptation in his healing."
The Court declared that the drugless practitioner's trade was
"one in which skill is to be exercised, and the skill can be
enhanced by practice."" 7 Hence, the Court reasoned, the peti-
tioner had not been denied the equal protection of the law
because the legislature had a rational basis in seeking to regu-
late mental skills while at the same time exempting prayer
treatment.6 s Many early appellate courts followed similar rea-
soning in affirming convictions of healers who relied on mental
therapeutics. 649
Some courts, however, have interpreted the prayer or spir-
itual means exemption more broadly to include the activities of
those employing mental therapeutics. This more liberal con-
struction has been especially apparent when religious healers
have shown close affiliations with established religions.
For example, the New York Court of Appeals laid the
groundwork for broadening the concept of spiritual means
when it reversed the conviction of Willis Cole, the Christian
Science practitioner mentioned above.6m The court empha-
sized Cole's affiliation with a recognized and well-established
religious organization.65 ' Uncontradicted evidence was
adduced at trial that Cole had advised a patient to remove a
"porous plaster" from her back, to remove her glasses, and to
remove her child's glasses.65' Cole further told this patient
that she could cure herself, and that if she "would study and
purify her life and her thoughts and cleanse from her con-
sciousness fear and inharmony and false thoughts... she could
apply the principle and law of Christian Science as well as any-
one else.""3 The court found that Cole did not diagnose his
patient's illness, but he did "treat" her.' Nonetheless, such
treatment fell within the religious-tenet exemption in New
646. Id. at 343-44.
647. Id at 343.
648. Id. at 343-44.
649. See RuBENsTIN, supra note 2, at 40 n.30. See also Board of Med. Quality
Assurance v. Andrews, 260 Cal. Rptr. 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding healer
employing prayer, laying-on-hands, rest, natural diet, and hygiene to be in violation of
MPA).
650. People v. Cole, 113 N.E. 790 (N.Y. 1916).
651. Id. at 795.
652. Id. at 792.
653. Id. at 793.




The New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Max-
well8' provides a clearer instance in which a mental healer
was exempted from licensing. Relying on the MPA exemption
for those who ministered to the sick or suffering by prayer or
spiritual means without the use of drugs or material remedy,
the court reversed the conviction of a healer who preached
mind over physical ills.65 7
Courts have generally sought to distinguish between heal-
ers employing mental means and those using spiritual methods
to treat their patients. Although the difference between the
two approaches may not always be readily apparent, only spiri-
tual treatment is exempted from regulation under state medi-
cal practice acts. In Crane, the Supreme Court sought to
distinguish mental from spiritual healing by declaring that the
former requires a skilled and experienced practitioner, while
the latter-in its total reliance upon divine intervention-does
not. This distinction reveals a theistic bias, however, and
should be discarded. 18 Courts should instead rely on a contex-
tual analysis to determine whether the patient could reason-
ably have understood that the healing services provided were
of a spiritual nature. This approach is developed further
below.
iii. Midwifery
Contrary to the majority rule limiting religious healers to
the use of purely spiritual means, one California court inter-
preted the religious practice exemption in the state's licensing
law to extend protection to religious midwives.6 9 Midwifery is
commonly regulated by medical licensing acts, and at least one
court has specifically held that a midwife who practices prayer
during childbirth will not be excused from complying with that
law and may be criminally convicted for its violation.'
655. Cole, 113 N.E. at 794.
656. 181 A. 694 (N.J. 1935).
657. Id. at 694.
658. Although simple prayers by the untutored and inexperienced may be
recognized as effective in some religious traditions, it is clear that other forms of
spiritual healing require more extensive qualifications. The New Testament itself
suggests that the prayers of elders be offered to heal the sick. For a list of such
instances, see supra note 10.
659. Northrup v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
660. See People v. Cosper, 245 P. 466 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1926).
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In Northrup v. Superior Court,661 however, the court
ordered dismissal of informations charging unlicensed religious
childbirth helpers with violating the medical practice act.'6
The midwives were members of the Church of the First
Born--a church dating back to the seventeenth century in this
country-whose tenets forbid use of traditional medical care.'
The court repeatedly emphasized that this church was well-
established and did not merely represent an effort to escape
licensing laws.Y
In dismissing the charges, the court reasoned that the mid-
wives were exempt from licensing because the terms of the
California MPA-not unlike the language in other MPAs
around the nation-were absolute, forbidding interference "in
any way" with the practice of religion.665 The appellate court
limited the application of its holding by emphasizing three
related points already touched on in the previous two subsec-
tions. Specifically, the court pointed out that: (1) "[tlhere has
been no suggestion the Church of the First Born is pretextual
or a subterfuge designed to circumvent the licensing stat-
utes";' (2) opposition to medical care was a central tenet of
the religion;6 7 and (3) the childbirth helpers treated only
members of the faith.' The Northrup court also noted that
despite the exemption from licensing requirements, the mid-
wives were still subject to other generally applicable criminal
laws.6 9
iv. Laying-On-Hands
Judicial opinion has been divided as to whether healers
who lay-on-hands qualify for religious exemption under MPAs.
Some courts have interpreted laying-on-hands as purely spiri-
tual treatment. Early in the century, the Georgia Court of
Appeals declared that hands-on-healing and the closely related
661. 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
662. Id. at 260.
663. Id. at 256.
664. Id. at 258-60. Two years later in Board of Med. Quality Assurance v.
Andrews, 260 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), another California court picked up on
this point and agreed that MPA exemptions only apply to bona fide religious practices
and not to religious practices created as a mere subterfuge to regulation.




669. Id. at 260. See infra text accompanying notes 718-20.
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practice of magnetism were simply not within the purview of
the medical practice act.""° Two years later, a California appel-
late court also implied that those who lay-on-hands were
excluded from the licensing requirement.671 Although declar-
ing that the exemption for prayer included "only a reverent
petition to some divinity or object of worship," the court pro-
vided the following New Testament example as illustration:
"For instance, where Peter's wife's mother lay sick of a fever
we are told that the Savior 'touched her hand and the fever
left her, and she arose and ministered unto them.' "672
Judicial approval of hands-on-healing was apparent
twenty-three years later in the matter of State v. Miller.6 73 In
this case, the Iowa Supreme Court found that a faith healer
laying-on-hands, "or at most administering a slight massage,"
but without providing a diagnosis or promise of cure, was
exempt from regulation.674 Similarly, in People v. Klinger,67 s
an Illinois appellate court overturned the conviction of a Spiri-
tualist healer despite the fact that the lower court had con-
cluded that the "defendant gave the witness a treatment,
manipulating the shoulder muscles with her hands and also
worked on the back of her neck. ' 676 After recounting at some
length defendant Valerie Klinger's close affiliation with, and
certification by, a well-established Spiritualist church, the
court simply declared that:
The evidence in this case clearly shows that defendant's
method of curing was by prayer; that defendant was a duly
authorized member of the First Spiritualist Church of Cic-
ero; and that her license was issued by the Spiritualist Asso-
ciation of Illinois, Inc., which was incorporated under the
laws of the state of Illinois, and defendant was one of their
regular healers.
677
Most appellate courts, however, have been unwilling to
construe spiritual means exemptions so liberally, and they
670. See Bennett v. Ware, 61 S.E. 546 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908).
671. See Ex parte Bohannon, 111 P. 1039 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910).
672. Id
673. 249 N.W. 141 (Iowa 1933).
674. Id at 141.
675. 11 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937).
676. Id. at 41-42.
677. Id. For a gallant judicial defense of the legality of laying-on-hands, see Curley
v. State, 16 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1944) (Buford, C.J., and Terrell and Brown, J.J.,
dissenting).
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have offered a variety of reasons to support their positions.
One court, for example, relied on a close analysis of the
defendant's healing technique. In State v. Pratt,67 the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld a healer's conviction
based on a distinction between "prayer, accompanied by the
laying on of hands" and the defendant's practice of moving his
hands from one place on the body to another "after the
warmth of [the] hands had become noticeable." '679
Another court openly expressed its disbelief in hands-on-
healing generally. In State v. Robinson,' the Supreme Court
of Iowa overruled without comment its earlier holding in
Miller discussed above.61 At trial, the defendant testified that
his treatment consisted of laying-on-hands and that he gained
his power to heal "from the silent, invisible God." 2 The trial
court refused to enjoin the defendant from his healing activi-
ties, but the supreme court reversed.' The court deemed tes-
timony by the defendant's witnesses "evidence of gullibility"
and concluded that "the very confidence which [the healer]
thus engendered in his patrons is a part of the fraud and impo-
sition against which the [licensing] statute seeks to protect gul-
lible innocence."' 4
v. Proposed Approach
In construing medical practice acts that limit religious
healers to prayer and spiritual means alone, courts have
revealed a theistic bias. Outside the practice of Christian Sci-
ence, treatments other than passive reliance on divine inter-
vention have rarely been considered spiritual. The Supreme
Court repudiated a theistic understanding of religion, however,
in the 1960s. In Torcaso v. Watkins,' Justice Hugo L. Black
wrote that "[n]either a State nor the Federal Government can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs."'
In line with this broader view of religion, a few courts
678. 92 Wash. 200, 158 P. 981 (1916).
679. Id. at 201-02, 158 P. at 981.
680. 19 N.W.2d 214 (Iowa 1945).
681. See supra note 673 and accompanying text.
682. Robinson, 19 N.W.2d at 216.
683. Id.
684. 1&
685. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
686. Id. at 495.
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have since recognized that there may be other legitimate forms
of religious treatment besides prayer. The decisions in Found-
ing Church' 7 and Article"3 ' support the conclusion that, so
long as religious healers employ harmless means in a religious
context, the First Amendment requires courts to treat such
activities as the equivalent of prayer. A contrary conclusion
would impermissibly discriminate against one form of religious
expression (e.g., auditing) in favor of another (e.g., Christian
prayer)."9
This proposal to broaden the legitimate means a religious
healer may employ-from "prayer or other spiritual means" to
include "all harmless means"-will not endanger public
health. As discussed in Section III, the state's interest in pro-
tecting an individual from harm must be balanced against its
duty to protect patient autonomy.690 These dual obligations are
best met by requiring a healer to use harmless means in a reli-
gious context. This requirement both protects the patient from
direct injury by the religious means employed and puts the
patient on notice that the means employed are not sanctioned
by the medical establishment.
Some courts have reasoned that the state may forbid reli-
gious treatment that is "harmless in itself" to protect patients
from a resultant failure to seek medical care.691 Still, a compe-
tent adult has the right to refuse medical intervention for reli-
gious reasons in most instances, even if such intervention will
lead to a cure and said refusal will result in death.6 9 2 Accord-
ingly, so long as the patient makes an informed decision not to
pursue medical care, courts should honor that wish.
The patient who employs a healer in a religious context
has arguably made an informed decision. The religious context
puts the patient on notice that no medical claims are made for
the treatment. Although it may be contended that the patient
has not been adequately diagnosed nor informed of specific
687. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 396 U.S. 973 (1969).
688. United States v. Article or Device, etc., 333 F. Supp. 357 (D.D.C. 1971).
689. See generally Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (finding that charitable
registration law discriminating against certain forms of religious organization violates
First Amendment).
690. See supra part III.A.
691. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare,
341 F. Supp. 563 (D. Minn. 1971) (finding that misbranded E-meters constitute danger
to gullible public even if "harmless in themselves").
692. Regarding patient autonomy, see supra part III.A.
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medical services waived by choosing a religious healer, the risk
undertaken is no greater than that assumed by the individual
who chooses not to seek out any care at all. The state's inter-
est in protecting the patient should give way to the individual's
right to refuse medical care in favor of religious healing, and
courts should construe statutory language that exempts heal-
ing by "prayer or spiritual means" to include any harmless
means employed in a religious context.
d. Conclusion
Many judicial decisions over the course of the twentieth
century have narrowly construed religious exemptions in med-
ical practice acts, legitimating little other than prayer and
Christian Science treatment. Healers who operated outside of
organized Christian religions and who relied on laying-on-
hands, mental therapeutics, or similar procedures, have rou-
tinely been convicted of violating the medical acts amidst alle-
gations that they or their means were not truly religious.
Recent litigation has shed additional light, however, on the
protection to be accorded religious healers under the First
Amendment. Judicial opinions concerning religious fraud,
food and drug laws, and patient autonomy pay heed to modern
Supreme Court precedent and provide direction for the future
interpretation of religious exemptions. Three conclusions-
corresponding to the medical licensing factors discussed
above-may be drawn from this material:
(1) Religious healers may not be disqualified from religious
practice exemptions because they heal as a business, nor
because their healing claims are false, so long as the
healers function in a religious context;69
3
(2) Religious healers need not be affiliated with a recognized
religious organization, nor be acting in accord with
church tenets, so long as they operate in a religious con-
text; and
(3) Religious healers may use means other than prayer, so
long as these means are harmless in themselves and the
healers operate in a religious context.
All three conclusions require healers to function in a reli-
gious context if they are to qualify for exemption from medical




licensing. The Scientology decisions examined previously"
provide the best evidence of the manner in which recent courts
have sought to identify a religious healing context. In these
cases, the courts chose to define a religious context primarily
by indicating what it is not.
In Founding Church, Judge Skelly Wright stated that, to
come within the protection of the First Amendment, the
defendant "must have explicitly held himself out as making
religious, as opposed to medical, scientific or otherwise secular,
claims."6 95 In a like manner, Justice Gesell required that every
participant be given adequate warning that the religious heal-
ing had no "medical or scientific basis."6" Further, in Chris-
tofferson, the court noted that "wholly secular" healing
representations were actionable.69 7 And finally, in Van
Schaick the court ruled that the use of terms such as "scientifi-
cally guaranteed" might expose religious healers to liability.698
These decisions suggest that a religious healing context
may be defined simply as one that the parties should under-
stand to be neither secular, nor scientific, nor medical. Judge
Gesell's opinion-legitimating the practice of religious healing
so long as the means employed are harmless and the parties
involved can recognize the religious nature of the healing
enterprise-thus provides a coherent model for future applica-
tion of religious exemptions in medical licensing laws.
C. Personal Injury Liability
Religious healers have been successful recently in gaining
First Amendment protection in personal injury litigation.
Because of society's interest in preserving religious liberty, the
courts have, thus far, refused to impose civil liability on heal-
ers who treat patients-including minor patients-by spiritual
means.699 Consistent with the interpretation of spiritual means
694. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); United States v. Article or Device, etc., 333 F. Supp.
357 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D.
Mass. 1982); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Or. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1982).
695. Founding Church, 409 F.2d at 1164.
696. Article, 333 F. Supp. at 364.
697. Christofferson, 644 P.2d at 602.
698. Van Schaick, 535 F. Supp. at 1141.
699. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Brown v. Laitner, No. 73903, 2, 3 (Mich. Ct. App.), summary
judgment aff'd, Dec. 17, 1986, leave to appeal denied, 435 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1989).
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proposed above in regard to MPAs, courts in these civil cases
have defined spiritual means to include not only prayer but
limited diagnosis and the prescription of harmless remedies as
well.7°
Mary Baumgartner brought a wrongful death action
against a Christian Science practitioner, a Christian Science
nurse, and the First Church of Christ, Scientist, itself, follow-
ing the death of her husband in 1974.701 The plaintiff claimed
that the defendants' religious treatments amounted to medical
malpractice, Christian Science malpractice, negligence, and
intentional or reckless disregard for the decedent's health and
safety.702 The following allegations were accepted as true for
purposes of ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action: the practitioner had given the decedent hot baths and
had massaged and manipulated his prostate gland as part of
the spiritual treatment; in addition, the nurse had warned the
decedent that he would die if he sought medical care.7 "3
The trial court dismissed the complaint and an Illinois
appellate court affirmed the decision.7°4 Despite the defend-
ants' alleged use of baths and massage, the reviewing court
found that the defendants had employed spiritual, not medical,
means of treatment. °5 Hence, there was no basis for the medi-
cal malpractice claim. With regard to the remaining claims of
action, the appellate court declared that the First Amendment
prohibits the judiciary from determining "whether certain reli-
gious conduct conforms to the standards of a particular reli-
gious group. '' 706 And the court concluded that "adjudication of
the present case would require the court to extensively investi-
gate and evaluate religious tenets and doctrines: first to estab-
lish the standard of care of an 'ordinary' Christian Science
practitioner; and second to determine whether [the practition-
ers] deviated from those standards."7 °7
In 1986, less than ten months later, a Michigan appellate
court reached similar conclusions in a wrongful death suit also
700. Id.
701. Baumgartner, 490 N.E.2d 1319.
702. Id. at 1322.
703. Id. at 1321.
704. Id. at 1322.
705. Id. at 1323.
706. Baumgartner, 490 N.E.2d at 1323.
707. Id. at 1324.
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brought against Christian Scientists.7°8 This matter arose from
the death of a sixteen-month-old child who received only
Christian Science treatment up until the last week of life.7°9
Jeanne Laitner, a Christian Science practitioner, urged Mat-
thew Swan's parents to "try not to notice whether the [child's]
fever was up or down," and she also "speculated that Matthew
might be suffering from roseola." 710 A second practitioner,
June Ahearn, advised the Swans that medicine would not help
Matthew and, in fact, would induce disease.71' When Ahearn
did recommend that he be taken to a hospital for x-rays, she
told the parents: "Don't tell them about the fever and all this
other. 7
12
The plaintiffs' claims of Christian Science malpractice,
negligence, and misrepresentation against the practitioners and
the church were ultimately dismissed." 3 In reaching its deci-
sion, the appellate court upheld the trial judge's determination
that two principles governed the litigation:
1. A statement of a sincerely-held religious belief cannot be
the basis for a cause of action for misrepresentation.
2. A cause of action which necessitates competing testimony
as to what church doctrine was and what it required of a
person cannot be the basis of imposing civil liability.
714
The plaintiffs argued that no evaluation of church doctrine
was needed to impose liability because the defendants had vio-
lated "an objective standard of reasonableness established by
society. ' 715 But the appellate court declined to impose such a
standard in the absence of a specific statute designed to protect
children from the defendants' conduct.
716
D. Criminal Prosecutions
Although they have escaped civil liability for their healing
endeavors, religious practitioners are not immune from crimi-
708. Laitner, No. 73903 at 2, 3.
709. Id. at 2-4.
710. Id. at 2-3.
711. Id. at 3.
712. Id. at 4.
713. Laitner, No. 73903 at 13.
714. Id at 6.
715. Id, at 8.
716. Id. at 6. At least one legislature has specifically provided that spiritual
treatment shall not be the basis for a medical malpractice cause of action. See Lyon v.
Hasbro Industries, Inc., 509 N.E.2d 702, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
1993]
706 University of Puget Sound Law Revie [
nal sanctions. Courts have indicated that conviction for homi-
cide, assault and battery, and zoning violations are possible.717
As one California appellate court has pointed out, medical
licensing exemptions available to religious healers do not
excuse conduct in violation of other criminal laws.718 Even in
the absence of actual malice, said the court, a religious healer
may be convicted of second degree murder if the healer per-
forms "an act, the natural consequences of which are danger-
ous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person
who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and
who acts with conscious disregard to life. 71 9  The court's
authority for this proposition, however, did not involve the
conviction of religious healers.720
On the other hand, the California Supreme Court has spe-
cifically held that the felony-murder rule may not be employed
against a healer who commits the underlying felony of practic-
ing medicine without a license.721 Although the rule generally
provides that death resulting from the commission of a felony
will be treated as murder, the modern trend is to apply the
rule only when the underlying felony is inherently dangerous.
In People v. Burroughs,722 the supreme court found that prac-
ticing medicine without a license is not inherently danger-
ous. 723  The court added, however, that a healer may be
convicted of involuntary manslaughter if the treatment ren-
dered was the proximate cause of the patient's death.724 In
Burroughs, the patient died of a massive abdominal hemor-
rhage following a deep stomach massage.725
While a religious healer's affirmative action that uninten-
tionally causes death may provide the basis for a manslaughter
conviction, the healer's failure to provide conventional care
717. See infra notes 719, 731, 734 and accompanying text.
718. Northrup v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
719. Id. at 259 (quoting People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353, 363 (Cal. 1966)).
720. Id. at 259-60.
721. People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1984). Practicing medicine without a
license is commonly a misdemeanor, but may be elevated to a felony if there is a risk
of great bodily harm. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053, 2153 (1990). In other
jurisdictions, however, it is always a felony. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 677.990(2)
(1991).
722. 678 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1984).
723. Id. at 900.
724. Id. See also State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P.2d 390 (1938) (drugless
practitioner who prescribed drugs and told diabetic to change diet and stop taking
insulin was convicted of manslaughter and the unlicensed practice of medicine).
725. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 896.
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will not lead to criminal liability of this sort.726 Nor will coun-
seling another to use religious rather than medical treatment
amount to manslaughter if the patient dies. Although legal
commentators have cited Canadian law for the proposition that
manslaughter charges should lie under the latter circum-
stances,72 apparently no appellate courts in the United States
have so held. In the recent case of People v. Stephanski,721 a
"self-professed minister" was charged with criminally negli-
gent homicide in the death of Pamela Robbins. Jerry Stephan-
ski was accused of "counseling, urging, suggesting and
directing" Robbins to refrain from insulin and to rely on God
to heal her diabetes.7- Robbins later lapsed into a diabetic
coma and died. The indictment against Stephanski was dis-
missed for failure to state an offense, and the appellate court
upheld the dismissal.7 °
Aside from homicide, two rather unusual matters involv-
ing criminal sanctions against religious healers have received
judicial attention. The first case involved a charge of assault
and battery brought against one professing to be a magnetic
healer.73 ' As a general rule, consent to treatment will consti-
tute a defense to such a charge,73 2 but in this instance, the
court concluded that the patient's consent to treatment was
vitiated by the healer's fraud. At the defendant's request, the
patient had disrobed to receive a massage. The trial court con-
cluded that there was no basis for massaging a nude patient
other than to satisfy the healer's prurient interests. The appel-
late court affirmed the conviction.733
A second dispute concerned the propriety of animal sacri-
fices practiced by Santeria priests in Florida.7 3 As part of
their faith-healing rites, Santeria priests ritually sacrifice an
726. See Laughran, supra note 3, at 421. Religious healers, however, may have
statutory duties to report certain types of diseases, disabilities, or child abuse unless
specifically exempted therefrom.
727. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 55; Cawley, supra note 2, 69.
728. 443 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
729. Id. at 1017.
730. Id. at 1019. See also Commonwealth v. Konz, 450 A.2d 638 (Pa. 1982)
(reversing manslaughter convictions of spouse and friend who urged patient to refrain
from taking medication).
731. Bartell v. State, 82 N.W. 142 (Wis. 1900).
732. See Laughran, supra note 3, at 404 n.38.
733. Bartell, 82 N.W. at 142-43.
734. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (S.D. Fla.
1989), ff'd without opinion, 936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472
(1992).
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animal, such as a chicken, pigeon, dove, duck, guinea fowl,
goat, sheep, or turtle.7" The patient's illness "is considered to
have then passed to the animal."" Priests also offer sacrifices
on other ceremonial occasions." 3
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye and several of its
members brought a civil rights action in federal court, assert-
ing that the city of Hialeah passed certain zoning ordinances in
order to stop the sacrificial practices. The plaintiffs contended,
in part, that the laws violated their free exercise of religion.7 s
The federal district court upheld the regulations, however, as
an appropriate exercise of the government's power to preserve
animal welfare, to prevent health hazards from animal car-
casses, and to protect the welfare of children who might suffer
psychological harm from witnessing the sacrifices. 39
In sum, a religious healer may be prosecuted for homicide
for performing an act that causes the patient's death. If the
practitioner employs only harmless means and the patient dies
from the lack of conventional medical care, however, no
charges will lie. Unless vitiated by fraud, the patient's consent
provides a complete defense to assault and battery when harm-
less touching is involved. But in enforcing a zoning ordinance
banning ritual sacrifice, courts have concluded that harm to
animals, juvenile witnesses, and public health outweighs heal-
ers' and patients' rights to religious free exercise.
E. Conclusion
Whereas judicial interpretation of the First Amendment
has shielded religious healers from civil liability and from most
criminal charges, some courts have not adequately protected
healers charged with violations of medical practice acts.
Courts must endeavor to "scrupulously avoid"7 ° religious dis-
crimination and persecution in these cases.
Despite extensive healthcare regulations promulgated in
the twentieth century, most medical licensing acts retain
exemptions for religious healers. Since the second decade of
this century, the majority rule has been that these practition-
735. Id. at 1471.
736. Id. at 1474.
737. Id.
738. Id. at 1482.
739. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1485.




ers may receive compensation for their services. Furthermore,
so long as they confine their healing activities to prayer, they
need not fear prosecution. In addition, religious healers are
not liable for negligence or malpractice. Courts have deter-
mined that formulating a civil standard of reasonable care for
religious healers would violate the First Amendment by entan-
gling the government in the evaluation of protected religious
beliefs and conduct. Thus, even if the patient is advised not to
seek medical treatment and then dies following spiritual care,
the religious healer is not guilty of negligently causing the
death.
But when religious healers employ other means besides
prayer-such as laying-on-hands, anointing with oil, or other
verbal or material aids-their immunities frequently vanish.
This outcome is even more likely if the healer is not closely
affiliated with an organized religious group. As argued in this
section, however, religious healers, whether or not affiliated
with a recognized denomination, should fall within MPA
exemptions so long as they use harmless means in a religious
context.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the liberties and liabilities sur-
rounding the practice of religious healing as reflected in twen-
tieth century judicial opinions from around the nation.
Statutory exemptions for religious healers and parents, heal-
ers' First Amendment immunity from civil suit, and the award
of disability benefits to claimants who rely on religious rather
than medical treatment bespeak a limited governmental
accommodation of religious expression. In most instances, reli-
gious healing may be chosen at the patient's own risk. By so
choosing, the patient relinquishes the right to recover damages
against the religious healer. And in an action against any other
tortfeasor, the patient's damages are limited to those that could
not reasonably have been avoided.
For those without the capacity to choose for themselves
(e.g., minors), the law imposes on their guardians the duty to
make reasonable healthcare decisions. Authorities will inter-
vene when this care strays too far from the norm. In such
cases, the child will often be forced to receive medical care, or
if the child dies without receiving medical treatment, the par-
ent will be subject to criminal prosecution. It has been sug-
19931
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gested in the preceding pages that the determination of
reasonable care in these situations-as well as in those cases
where a religious plaintiff confronts the doctrine of avoidable
consequences-be made after consideration of all competent
evidence concerning the efficacy of religious treatment. This
approach helps to avert religious persecution in a criminal con-
text while forcing the religious plaintiff to act reasonably to
recover civil damages. The proposal was also made that courts
refrain from coercing anything but life-saving medical
intervention.
And finally, as to the statutory exemptions for religious
healers and religious parents noted above, one fundamental
constitutional argument has been developed in this work.
Although the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment-
as interpreted presently by the Supreme Court-does not
require that religious healing be permitted as a matter of indi-
vidual right, the Establishment Clause nonetheless prohibits
the government from preferring one form of religious expres-
sion over another. Accordingly, religious healing conducted by
"recognized" religious organizations should not be preferred
over similar activities performed by individuals or less well-
organized religious groups. Moreover, more-familiar types of
religious healing techniques cannot be preferred over less com-
mon varieties. Hence, theistic prayer, for instance, must not be
favored over other spiritual means such as laying-on-hands,
anointing with oil, auditing, etc. The crucial factors in deter-
mining whether such activities constitute spiritual means are
whether (1) they are harmless in themselves, and (2) the
patient has been led to understand that healing depends on
religious rather than scientific or medical factors. Defining the
scope of religious exemptions in healthcare regulations in this
manner is consistent with the trend toward greater patient
autonomy, and it also helps to fulfill the government's obliga-
tions to promote public health, preserve religious liberty, and
guarantee equal protection under the law.
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